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Today’s restructured electricity markets illustrate the importance and power of effective market design. Over
the last 25 years, electricity markets have evolved to address complex economic and engineering challenges. Despite
some impediments along the way, the markets have largely succeeded in the goal of providing reliable electricity at
least cost to consumers. This is no simple task. Every second, supply and demand must balance. Thousands of
resource and network constraints must be satisfied. And the market must send the right price signals to motivate
efficient generation and investment in resources over time.
The complexity of the economic problem that the market must solve makes the market design complex. Good
electricity market design has always been important. Design mistakes can cost consumers tens of billions of dollars,
as illustrated by the California electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001 (Borenstein (2002)). Fortunately, because of good
governance and technological progress, market designs have improved over time. Flaws have been identified and
largely addressed.
Electricity market design still needs steady improvement. New challenges are emerging with the ongoing
transformation of the electricity industry. These modern challenges are the huge integration of renewables, demand
response, distributed generation, smart homes, and battery storage. The electricity market design must be able to
handle this transformation.
There are many different electricity market designs around the world mainly due to the diverse economic and
political tastes as well as technical differences. But all market designs must address variety of important issues such
as:
 Transmission network and generation resources restrictions must be considered to impede the failure of equip-
ments.
 Demand and supply uncertainty originating from generators or network failure or intermittent generation
from solar and wind resources.
 Momentarily supply and demand balance.
Cramton (2017) categorizes market designs into two main groups: 1- integrated market and 2- exchange-based
market.
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Based on his description, in the integrated markets, by a central optimization, the system operator finds the
optimal scheduling and dispatch of all generation units. Hence, the system operator has access to the detailed and
private cost and technology information of each unit. Even though the market is centralized, market participants
have enough freedom for their decentralized decisions. This centralization on market clearing and dispatch lets the
system operator to simultaneously reach reliability and economic efficiency objectives. This model is the dominant
market design utilized in most of North America. North America spot markets composed of two day-ahead and
real-time markets. Both of them are utilizing very complex optimization techniques and hardware. In order to give
a clue on the size of the problems, the Texas market -which is run by its independent system operator (ERCOT)- is
given as an example. By using thousands of computer servers, ERCOT is like a smart market. In order to reach to
the highest possible welfare, optimization is done subject to the very sophisticated bid/offer curves and constraints.
In the day-ahead market, participants submit bids and offers not only for energy but also for reserves for each hour of
the next day. The result of the day-ahead clearing is a schedule of generation units with hourly locational marginal
prices. The day-ahead market allows participants to efficiently utilize their physical assets by ahead planning and
hedge against volatile real-time prices. The real-time market is a 5-minute bid-based security-constrained economic
dispatch of generation resources along with 5-minute locational prices.
On the other hand, in exchange-based markets, there is not a centralized optimization like the first case
but generation companies trade at spot markets by cleared prices. Most European markets tend to follow this
model. Despite all efforts put into integration of European markets by Euphemia and XBID projects to integrate
day-ahead and intraday markets respectively, still they can be considered as more fragmented markets than in
the US. This fragmentation particularly originates from national preferences with limited cooperation possibilities
across countries. The most crucial difference between US and Europe markets is on how the transmission network
is modeled. Locational price signals are much weaker in Europe, because usually prices are cleared for larger
zones that are composed of several nodes. By zonal simplification, either within or across countries, transmission
congestion is not efficiently priced. Cramton (2017) suggests that European-wide commitment and dispatch of
resources along with a more efficient congestion pricing could bring considerable benefits, particularly in the case
that rapid integration of renewables put significant pressure on the transmission network.
European spot markets are composed of three sequential markets: day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets.
In the first two markets the simplified zonal structure based on either Available Transmission Capacity (ATC) or
Flow-based approach is utilized. In real-time, a voluntary balancing market which tends to be thinner than the
US real-time markets is run. Since this balancing market is more simplified than the security-constrained economic
dispatch of the US, less reliable real-time prices may appear. Hence, the need for intraday trading increases since
it provides an opportunity to resolve imbalances ahead of real-time.
It seems that the advocates of financial exchanges tried to persuade electricity regulators to model intraday
electricity market as a continuous trading market, similar to stock market. Even though Henriot (2012a) and
Hagemann (2013a) point out that continuous trading is superior to discrete auctions from ease of trade point of
view especially for intermittent generators to balance their forecast errors before delivery time, it has been shown
in many other papers that this method just encourage speed rather than optimal trading. Moreover, continuous
trading is not suitable for electricity markets, because it is based on bilateral trades while Wu and Varaiya (1999)
prove that to relieve congestion of just one congested line at least a 3-lateral trade is required. Therefore, if we are
eager to consider both aspects speed and optimal feasibility of trades, more frequent intraday auctions seem to be
more reasonable.
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With respect to these explanations, I reckon that the European sequential market design needs to be further
investigated to see whether market objectives which are short-term and long-term efficiency have been attained
yet. The aim of this thesis is to find the major deficiencies of the current design and to present the remedial or
alternative market designs. Hence, chapter 2 focuses on the potential of market power exercise in the current design
and the other chapters spotlight the different intraday market designs and the issues coming from each design.
In chapter 2, ”market power under nodal and zonal congestion management techniques”, it has been shown
that one of the challenges that European sequential market design can arise is providing some opportunities to
exercise market power. The main reason of such issue is the different congestion management techniques utilized in
the day-ahead market than in the real-time (balancing) market. In European zonal markets, at the day-ahead stage,
the physical transmission lines are partially neglected; meaning that the intra-zonal lines are neglected and just
cross-border inter-zonal capacities are modeled by Available transmission Capacity (ATC) or flow-based models.
Then at the real-time stage, all physical transmission constraints are captured based on Kirchhoff’s law. In this
paper, the market power potential of nodal model (wherein the same congestion management technique is utilized
at both day-ahead and real-time with full transmission constraints) is compared with ATC and flow-based zonal
models. By a simple 3 nodes (2 zones) illustrative example, we show that despite the common objection to nodal
pricing that has the more potential of market power in zonal models the need for redispatch at real-time (to make
the day-ahead result feasible with respect to physical transmission constraints) creats a place for gaming. Our
results show that in zonal ATC model, market power could be very dependent on the ATC levels and therefore
this model has the highest potential of market power among others. Above all, infinite ATC which is equivalent
to uniform pricing model is the worst case. Our results do not show very different surpluses for strategic player
in various flow-based models than in the nodal model, although the social surplus of nodal model with a great
difference is higher than the other models.
With the large-scale penetration of intermittent resources in the Europe, it becomes more challenging for
market participants to be in balance between day-ahead and real-time markets. Therefore, intraday market has
been designed and now the integration of all European intraday markets is on the agenda. As mentioned before,
the intraday market follows the same congestion management technique as day-ahead. Hence, the imbalances due
to the network simplification still exist. In the current continuous trading market, whenever a matching happens
the shared order book (SOB) calculates the required quantity to be transferred between the source and destination
zone. Then capacity management module (CMM) is responsible to find an optimal routing plan by minimum cost
flow routing problem to select routes with minimum cost satisfying the flow constraints over cross-border interfaces.
But these interfaces are not reflecting the physical transmission network. Consequently, it is still very probable that
the trades occur in the intraday market lead to infeasible flows and therefore imbalances in the real-time market.
In chapter 3, I will show that in addition to its original functionality, intraday market can also be designed such
that gradually and by an iterative procedure feasible flows are achievable at the end of the intraday market. By
customizing the coordinated multilateral trading (CMT) approach to the current European structure, our model is
able to reach to the optimal nodal solution, provided that all circumstances such as bid and offers remain unchanged
and no uncertainty is modeled. By these assumptions and running day-ahead market with different ATCs, we reach
to the conclusion that irrespective of what ATCs are adopted in the day-ahead market, at the end of the intraday
market optimal nodal solution is achievable. This means that no imbalances occur in the real-time market due to
the network violation.
The recent decision of the European commission to integrate intraday markets by continuous trading through
XBID project launches new challenges regarding to the pricing of cross-zonal capacity. Consequently, recently agency
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for the cooperation of energy regulators (ACER) has decided to complement the already established continuous
trading intraday with three pan-European auctions (ACER, (2019)). Once the necessity of having intraday auctions
proved, the next question is the optimal timing of these auctions. Decision on timing of auctions is heavily dependent
on two factors: the share of uncertain production and flexibility of the system to respond to that uncertainty. By
getting closer to the delivery time, the forecast errors and therefore uncertainty is declining while the flexibility of
the power system decreases and the related cost increases. In chapter 4, the optimal timing of one intraday auction
in the presence of wind uncertainty and flexibility costs is examined. For a specific delivery hour, the day-ahead
economic dispatch problem with expected wind power at delivery hour is optimized. Then for 3 intraday places,
optimal re-adjustments are done to correct expected wind deviations from day-ahead market. Likewise, the final
optimal reschedule is done in real-time to cope with the real wind deviations from intraday. By testing several
scenario trees with uncertainty reduction characteristic from day-ahead to real-time, a tight trade-off between these
two factors has been observed. Our findings reveal that even though standard deviation reduction is an important
measure for uncertainty its reduction is not enough to say that always the latest intraday is the best by assuming the
other variables as fixed. Therefore, the standard deviation reduction is mainly reflected in re-adjustment quantities.
This means that the more STD is reducing from day-ahead to real-time, the more re-adjustments are required and
finally, in the sequential market setting that the expected wind power is utilized for clearing stochastic generators,
the multiplicative effect of flexibility cost and re-adjustment quantities determine the best intraday place not the
trade-off between flexibility cost and STD reduction.
In most papers on intraday market design, the continuous trading structure of this market has not paid too
much attention. Limit order book is the tool for continuous trading operation. In chapter 5, I focus on limit
order book modeling and simulation wherein market participants (intermittent and conventional generators, elastic
demands and financial traders) randomly submit market orders or limit orders with random quantities chosen
from their residual capacity or cleared capacity (depending on ask or bid order submission) and marginal cost as
the submitted price. The model is able to manage the order arrivals, their addition to the list (as limit order)
or matching them with the best available opposite order (market order), store the matched trades, update the
quantities of matched orders and lastly accept part (or whole) of matched order to maintain the feasibility of
transmission network with respect to the nodal constraints of the network.
Before going through the other chapters of the thesis, further introduction to European intraday market, the
relevant terms and terminologies and specifically integration of intraday markets with XBID project will be reviewed
in the following subsections of introduction chapter.
1.1 An overview over European intraday markets and the cross-border
integrated intraday market (XBID)
The integration of electricity markets when transaction is allowed among entities from different market areas
is refered to as market coupling. Meeus et al. (2009) and Hobbs et al. (2005) show that market coupling can be
considered as an important instrument for increasing economic efficiency. In a coupled market, demand and supply
orders in one market are no longer confined to the local market. On the contrary, energy transactions can involve
sellers and buyers from different areas, only restricted by the electricity network constraints.
The main benefit of the market coupling approach is to improve the market liquidity along with the less volatile
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electricity prices. It is also advantageous for market participants. They no longer need to acquire transmission
capacity rights to conduct cross-border exchanges, since these cross-border exchanges are the result of the market
coupling mechanism now. They only have to submit a single order in their market (via their corresponding PX)
which will be matched with other competitive orders in the same market or other markets (provided that enough
electricity network capacity is available).
In this regard, after the successful experience of implementing Price Coupling of Regions (PCR) that aims to
integrate all European day-ahead markets, the Cross-border Integrated Intraday Market (XBID) project is high on
the agenda. The XBID project is a joint work by four power exchanges (PXs) - EPEX SPOT, GME, Nord Pool
and OMIE - together with the transmission system operators (TSOs) from eleven countries, to create an integrated
intraday cross-border market. The coupled intraday market enables continuous cross-border trading across all of
Europe.
The benefits of intraday market coupling mentioned in the related official documents (NordPool (2016a)) are
the following:
1. A cross-border trading opportunity within the day across Europe on a consistent platform
2. More efficient utilization of generation resources across Europe, especially variable renewable energy sources
3. A complement to the existing day-ahead market
4. The capability of delivering a wide range of products - 15 minutes, 30 minutes, hourly and block products
and a wide range of order types which provide easier trading possibilities
XBID enables the continuous matching of orders from market participants either in the same market area or
from any other market area provided that cross-zonal capacity is available. It comprises three main modules and
each of them performs part of the algorithm tasks: the Shared Ordered Book (SOB), the Capacity Management
Module (CMM) and the Shipping Module (SM). The combined entity allows multiple power exchanges in different
geographical places to trade cross-border energy products continuously on a centralized platform. In the following
sections the relevant XBID terminology and the different XBID modules will be presented.
1.1.1 Terminology
 Delivery area
Is the smallest element in the transmission network which is managed by one TSO. Market participants
that are physically connected to those TSOs can submit their orders with reference to the delivery area they are
connected by. The information related to the source and destination delivery area of the matched trades is also
recorded. Each delivery area is assigned to a market area.
 Market area
Illustrates an uncongested price area, meaning that the transmission capacity between market areas is subject
to the congestion. Each market area can contain more than one delivery area. There is not any transmission
capacity limitation between delivery areas within the same market area.
 Interconnector
Is a connection between two delivery areas. An interconnector A Ñ B is a directional connection between
source delivery area A and destination delivery area B. Only one interconnector per direction and pair of delivery
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areas is considered. If there is an interconnector in one direction, the interconnector in the opposite direction must
also exist which is called the reverse interconnector.
 Border
Is a connection between two market areas.
 Path
A path A Ñ B Ñ ... Ñ Z is a sequence of distinct delivery areas in the grid where subsequent areas of the
path are connected by interconnectors. The first delivery area of a path is called the source of the path and the
last delivery area of a path is called its destination. A path cannot contain the same delivery area more than once,
meaning that no loop is allowed.
 Available transmission capacity (ATC)
ATC is an interconnector attribute indicating the maximum available amount of power that can be transported
in the direction of the interconnector. The ATC quantity varies per period and changes after each capacity
allocation.
 Flow
A flow is an interconnector attribute indicating the flow of power in the direction of the interconnector that
is used in the routing calculation. The value cannot be negative and must be smaller than or equal to the ATC.
 Capacity information
Everyday the involved TSOs announce the transmission capacity of their own interconnectors or borders for
both direction. They provide two values: Net transfer capacity (NTC) which conveys the physical transfer capacity
of the interconnectors or borders and already allocated capacity (AAC).
 Cost coefficient
Is an interconnector attribute indicating the mathematical cost of a flow. It must be a positive value. This
coefficient is independent of the period and determines over which path power should be routed preferably. It has
no financial bearing and is only a mathematical construct to make a distinction between interconnectors in terms
of routing priority. Interconnectors with a lower cost coefficient will be prioritized over interconnectors with a
higher cost coefficient. The cost coefficient is direction-independent, i.e. it is the same for an interconnector and
its reverse. The default value of a cost coefficient is 1.
 Transport
Is the transfer of power through the grid, determined by a path and a quantity. A cross-border trade may
require the transportation of power on several paths, i.e. a set of transports.
 Network flow
A set of transports starting at the same source and ending at the same destination can be gathered into a
network flow. Network flows are obtained by merging multiple transports where parallel and opposing flows are
combined per interconnector in common, the resulting network flow on this interconnector is the sum of the flows
of the individual transports.
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 Internal netting
When the paths of two transports share the same pair of adjacent areas with flows in opposite directions or in
other words, if a certain interconnector is part of the first transport and its reverse is part of the second transport,
then internal netting is applied on that interconnector and its reverse.
If the path of one transport includes an interconnector that is the reverse of an interconnector in a second
transport, the magnitude of the resulting network flow is the absolute value of the difference of the two individual
transport flows in the direction of the interconnector with the flow value that was larger initially.
1.1.2 The Capacity Management module (CMM)
The Capacity Management Module is a module in which cross border capacity between connected market
areas is managed. The main components of the CMM module are delivery area, market area, interconnector,
border and capacity information. The CMM supports separate (independent) configuration and administration of
each functional entity shown in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.2 illustrates a clearer understanding of these definitions.
 
Figure 1.1. CMM entities (Verseille and Alaimo (2018))
 
Figure 1.2. CMM configuration setting (Verseille and Alaimo (2018))
In order to allow feasible trades between different market areas, enough transmission capacity is needed. The
involved TSOs use the CMM module to allocate available transmission capacity (ATC).
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With respect to these daily inputs, the ATC for each border is calculated as follows: ATCAÑB  NTCAÑB 
AACAÑB  AACBÑA  intraday allocationsAÑB   intraday allocationsBÑA
ATCBÑA  NTCBÑA AACBÑA  AACAÑB  intraday allocationsBÑA   intraday allocationsAÑB
Figure 1.3 shows the European CMM topology.
 
Figure 1.3. European CMM topology (Verseille and Alaimo (2018))
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1.1.3 The Shared Order Book (SOB) module
The Shared Order Book module is a consolidated order book that connects the local order books of the involved
delivery areas. This module accommodates the basic functionality for continuous trading, like order entry, order
management and order matching. It also initiates the capacity allocation. The two main components of the limit
order book are products and orders.
1.1.3.1 Products





 User-defined hourly block products
Products have a trading unit (MW) and a trading currency (it could be any type of currency, although Euro
will probably be used most of the time). Figure 1.4 illustrates a snapshot of the shared order book which is visible
in the delivery area of SE3 (third delivery area of Sweden). For instance, PH is a 60-minutue product while 4H
shows a 4-hour block product, etc.
 




Reflects the maximum willingness to pay (bid) or the minimum willingness to accept (ask) for each unit
(megawatt hour) of the specified quantity of a given product. As Figure 1.4 shows, bids and asks are sorted
respectively in descending and ascending orders. These sortings let the current ”best offers” to be located at the
top of the order book. The highest bid price 54 in Figure 1.4 is less than the lowest ask pric 59, which implies
that the highest willingness to pay among the buyers is not sufficiently high to encourage a seller to trade. The
magnitude of the difference between the prices at the top of the order book is called bid-ask spread. A limit order
can be matched either partly or entirely. If it is not fully matched, it will remain active in the market until it is
matched or cancelled (NordPool (2016b)).
 Market order
Participants submit a market order when they buy or sell a certain quantity at the best available sell or buy
price. Once a market order has arrived, it is matched instantly with the best available price in the order book and
trade occurs.
 Iceberg order
Iceberg order is a large single order that has been divided into smaller limit orders in order to hide the actual
order quantity. By submitting the iceberg order just one part of it is visible until it is matched, then a new part
of the hidden portion of the same size becomes visible. These smaller parts are called peak size. Therefore, for
each iceberg order, a peak size and a total quantity of the order is defined. The size of the visible portion in the
limit order book called the shown quantity is equal to the peak size.
When an iceberg order is matched in a trade, its total quantity is reduced by the trade quantity. If the shown
quantity before the trade was greater than the subtracted amount, the order remains visible in the market with
the remaining shown quantity. If the shown quantity before the trade was less than or equal to the subtracted
amount, a new slice of order quantity is made available in the market at the peak size quantity of the iceberg order.
When the quantity of the last slice has been reduced to zero, the iceberg order is fully executed and removed from
the order book.
Iceberg orders can be submitted with a peak price delta. Each new slice will be entered with a new limit price
which is reduced by the peak price delta for buy orders and increased by the peak price delta for sell orders.
1.1.3.3 Order execution restrictions
Some execution constraints on limit orders have been defined for continuous intraday electricity markets such
as none (NON), immediate or cancel (IOC), fill or kill (FOK) and all or nothing (AON).
 None (NON)
An order submitted with the execution restriction NON is either matched immediately or if it cannot be
matched right away, will be added to the order book. Hence, partial order execution is allowed and they can be
executed against multiple orders to create multiple trades. The default execution restriction is NON if nothing is
entered in the execution restriction field.
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 Immediate or cancel (IOC)
The IOC execution restriction forces the order to be either matched immediately or if it cannot be matched,
deleted without entering into the order book. Partial executions are allowed and IOC orders can be matched
against multiple other orders to create multiple trades. These orders are never displayed in the order book.
 Fill or Kill (FOK)
An order with an FOK execution restriction has to be matched immediately with its full quantity or if it
cannot be matched with its entire quantity, will be deleted without entering into the order book. FOK orders can
be matched against multiple other orders to create multiple trades but partial matching is not allowed. Like IOC,
they are never displayed in the order book.
 All or nothing (AON)
An order with an AON execution restriction has to be exactly matched against one other order with its entire
quantity or enters into the order book. Partial executions are not allowed. This restriction is only used for block
orders and block orders are always AON.
1.1.4 Order book creation
1.1.4.1 Timestamp
For every submitted order into the SOB, a timestamp is registered and all timestamps are sequentially allocated.
1.1.4.2 Price-time-capacity priority criteria
 Price: orders are sorted in the SOB based on their prices such that the best price is first, meaning that buy
prices are sorted descendingly (highest willingness to pay is the best bid price) while sell (ask) prices are in
ascending order (lowest willingness to accept is the best ask price). Orders with the same limit price are
prioritized based on their timestamp such that the oldest is the first.
 Time: orders with the same limit price are prioritized based on their timestamp such that the oldest is the first.
 Capacity: orders submitted in different local trading places can be matched provided that enough capacity is
available.
1.1.4.3 Cross-border trading
Trading between different market areas is called cross-border trading. As mentioned before, borders between
market areas are subject to congestion. Therefore, trades only happen between market areas provided that enough
transmission capacity is available.
The CMM provides ATCs between all connected market areas for SOB. If positive transmission capacity is
available between two delivery areas, the orders entered in one of these delivery areas will be displayed in the local
order book of the other delivery area.
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Local views will be supplemented with cross-border orders if sufficient capacity is available. Conditional to the
available transmission capacity, an order can be shown in several local views with different quantities. If partial
matching is allowed for an order - for example, for orders without an AON execution restriction - then that order
can be displayed in the local views of the other market areas with different quantities provided that available
transmission capacity is smaller than their announced quantity. For orders with full matching restriction (AON
execution restriction) either their full quantity is displayed in SOB or not displayed at all. After matching an order
which was visible in several local views it is eliminated from all of them.
1.1.4.4 The order matching process
Order matching just occurs between a buy (or several ones) and a sell (or several ones) order and on the same
product, meaning that an hourly product cannot ba matched with two 30-minute products. Moreover, for example,
an hourly product for hours 19:00-20:00 cannot be matched with hourly product for hour 20:00-21:00, etc. There
are two different matching processes in the current intraday market algorithm. Regular and batch matching.
1.1.4.4.1 Regular matching
The regular matching rule which follows the price-time-priority principle is that the limit price of the best sell
order (entails the lowest price among all sell orders for the same product) must be lower than or equal to the limit
price of the best buy order (entails the highest price among all buy orders for the same product). Then the quantity
of the matched order is declined by the trade quantity. Orders with the same limit price are prioritized based on
their timestamp so that the oldest is the first.
Whenever an order with a new timestamp is submitted, regular matching is triggered. An order with a new
timestamp can be a newly entered order, a modified order or a reactivated order or a new slice of an iceberg order.
 Price determination
By the entry of an order with a new timestamp, its price is checked with the best price of the order already
existing on the other side (buy checked with sell or reverse). If it satisfies the matching rule, then the two orders
will be matched at the limit price of the order that was already in the order book. For instance, if a buy order
which is newly entered is matched with an existing sell order, the limit price of the sell order is set as the trade
execution price.
 Iceberg orders in regular matching
If a newly entered single order is matched with more than one slice of an iceberg order which was already in
the order book, the price of the existing iceberg order determines the trade price and the timestamp renewal of
the iceberg order during the matching process does not effect the trade execution price. Figure 1.5 shows how a
new single order is matched with an iceberg order and what would be the matching prices and quantities.
In the first top left table of Figure 1.5 three sell orders I, Z and Y are represented, where I is an iceberg order
with total quantity 200 MW, peak size 50 MW, price 15e with peak price delta equals to 1e. This means that
each new slice will be entered with a new limit price which is increased by 1e. Z and Y are regular sell orders
with price and quantity pair (15,25) and (16,25), respectively.
Let’s assume that a regular buy order B with price and quantity pair (99,225) just entered and can be matched
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Figure 1.5. Iceberg matching example
with the existing orders as shown in the right table of Figure 1.5. First, 50 MW of B is matched with the first
slice of best available sell order I with price of 15e. Since the second slice of I will come with price 16e, this has
to be wait until Z and Y are matched because both of them have lower or equal price than second slice and Y has
time priority over second slice of I. Therefore, after matching B with Z and Y, second, third and fourth slices of I
will be matched with B until total quantity of B is matched.
 Unmatchable orders
If a newly entered order does not satisfy the matching rule and is not an IOC or FOK order, it will be added
to the order book, while IOC and FOK orders (if not matched) are instantly deleted.
 Matching against multiple orders
If a newly entered order can be matched, it is not necessarily matched with just a single best order on the
other side of limit order book. After first matching, if the new order still has positive quantity and better price
than the existing order on the other side of limit order book, it can be matched with that at a different transaction
price. Hence, it is possible with multiple transactions against multiple orders that already exist in the order book.
Finally, the new order is deleted if the order quantity becomes zero or if it has the IOC restriction. Otherwise, it
will be added to the limit order book with its remaining quantity.
1.1.4.4.2 Batch matching
Batch matching rounds are referred to as intraday auctions, because the matching criterion has an auction-like
characteristic.
Budish et al. (2014) argue that the design of markets based on a continuous limit order book (which is the
predominant design for financial exchanges) has some weaknesses. Therefore, they suggest frequent batch auctions
as an alternative. These auctions are uniform-price double auctions run frequently but at discrete time intervals.
The advantage of batch auctions over continuous limit order book is getting rid of the speed race and its
related detrimental effects on liquidity and social welfare. In a continuous time market just having a very tiny
speed advantage is enough to win the race while in a discrete time market, even in the most frequent ones, tiny








Figure 1.6. Batch matching process flow, Budish et al. (2014)
nature of competition transforms from speed to price. Budish et al. (2015) prove that these two benefits result in
more liquidity and higher social welfare.
Figure 1.6 which represents the batch auction process flow is composed of 3 components: order submission,
auction and reporting.
 Order submission
Order submission in batch auctions is exactly similar to submission in the continuous limit order book. During
the order submission time period, orders can be submitted, modified or removed. If an order is not executed in
the batch auction at time t, it will automatically be transfered to the next auction at time t+1, etc., until it is
either matched or cancelled.
The main important aspect of batch auctions is that they are sealed-bid auctions, meaning that they are not
displayed during the order submission time period to avoid gaming possibilities. But after running the auctions,
orders are shown in aggregate at the reporting stage.
 Auctions
At the end of the order submission time period, all orders are sorted ascendingly for sell and descendingly
for buy and therefore, aggregate supply and demand functions will be computed. As Figure 1.7 demonstrates two
cases may happen:
1. No intersect of supply and demand functions: this case illustrates that the lowest ask price is higher than the
highest bid price. Hence, no trade can occur and all orders transfer to the next batch auction.
2. Supply and demand functions intersect: in step-wise supply and demand functions usually there is a horizontal
intersection with a unique price p and a maximum quantity q. For buy orders with prices greater than p
and sell orders with prices less than p, their full quantity is cleared at price p. For orders with price equal
to p, one of the buy or sell orders is cleared at full quantity while for the other, only a portion of the full
quantity is cleared. Therefore, the portion which is not cleared at the current auction will be automatically
transferred to the next auction with time priority, meaning that orders from earlier auctions are filled first.
Instead of a horizontal intersection, a vertical cross may also happen and this is sometimes referred to as
a knife-edge situation. In contrast to the horizontal case, the quantity is uniquely determined while the
midpoint of the price interval is often set as the clearing price. Since the full portion of crossed buy and sell
orders are cleared, there is no need to transfer orders prorata to the next auction.
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Figure 1.7. Batch auction supply and demand curves and outcome
 Reporting
After clearing every single auction, the following information is announced publicly:
– Price: the market clearing price p or ’no trade’ outcome
– Quantity : the cleared quantity of q
– The aggregate supply and demand curves
Moreover, the outcome of each particular order is sent to the submitter of the relevant order through a private
message.
 Duration of the Batch auctions
The most important and open question in designing batch auctions is to determine the duration of the batch
intervals.
1.1.4.5 Trade creation
A trade is a commitment to transfer a certain amount of energy from seller to buyer at the trade price. Moreover,
a trade contains information on 1- seller’s and buyer’s delivery areas between which the energy is transferred, 2-
the paths of transferring energy, 3- the delivery period of the energy.
A trade is created whenever two orders are matched. Even in the case of multiple matching, a trade is always
between exactly two orders. The order matching event comprises price, quantity, value and timestamp attributes.
The price and quantity establishment of a trade is explained in the regular matching and batch matching
sections. The financial value of a trade is calculated as follows:
V pEURq  QpMW q.P pEUR{MWhq.dphq (1.1)
V : The value of the trade in Euros
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Q: Quantity of the power traded in megawatt
P : The matched price of one megawatt hour energy in Euros
d: The duration of the delivery period of the trade in hours
1.1.4.6 Routing
The flow of a certain quantity of power between delivery areas may be routable via different routes. The
selection of the optimal route is a deterministic process following certain rules. This process is called the routing
calculation. The routing calculation is performed in two cases 1- order book recalculation 2- a trade flow calculation.
Whenever a new order is submitted in a local trading system, the SOB checks if sufficient transmission capacity
is available to display the newly arrived order in the other local trading systems of the other market areas. Therefore,
a change in ATC or a change in the order book content result in an order book recalculation and therefore a routing
calculation.
In the case of a cross-border trade creation or cancellation, the SOB calculates the required quantity to be
transferred between the source and destination areas. Then the CMM is responsible to find a routing plan which
results in capacity allocations.
The XBID routing model applies the minimum cost flow routing problem principle to select the optimal routing
plan. The minimum cost flow principle selects the routing plans with minimum cost among all feasible routing plans
satisfying the flow constraints. In order to have a better understanding of how the XBID routing model works, an
overview of the classic linear minimum cost network flow problem (MCNFP) is given.
 Minimum cost network flow problem
Let’s assume that the whole network which is going to be covered by XBID is a directed graph G  pN,Aq
with n nodes (delivery areas based on the XBID definition) and m arcs (interconnectors based on the XBID
definition), where N and A are the sets of delivery areas and interconnectors, respectively. Each interconnector
pi, jq P A, pi, j P Nq has a cost cij that illustrates the unit transferring cost along the interconnector pi, jq.
Each interconnector pi, jq is also associated with a variable xij of flow on the interconnector, a lower bound
Lij on the flow which is the ATCji and an upper bound Uij of the flow which is the ATCij in our case.
As mentioned before, in the case of cross-border trading, when the SOB module calculates the required
quantity to be transferred between source and sink delivery areas, the CMM is responsible to find a routing
plan which results in a capacity allocation to interconnectors. Let’s assume that i P N is a delivery area with
a sell order (which is called a source node) and j P N is a delivery area with buy order (which is called a sink
node) and all other delivery areas are transshipment nodes. The routing plan is responsible to find an optimal
routing for quantity si to be transferred from delivery area i to delivery area j through a number of transfer nodes






















xkm  0 m  i, j P N (1.2d)
ATCnm ¤ xmn ¤ ATCmn pm,nq P A (1.2e)
In the above formulation constraints (1.2a)-(1.2d) are known as the flow conservation equations, while con-
straints of type (1.2e) are known as the flow capacity constraints.
1.1.4.7 Local view
Orders are submitted to the local trading system of each delivery area. Therefore, each local view is calculated
independently. For orders submitted in different delivery areas in the same market area, all local views are the
same because congestion is just enforced between market areas not delivery areas belong to the same market area.
Calculation of the local view in the local trading system, depicted in Figure 1.8, is based on the following
procedure:
1. New order entered in delivery area 1 (DA1) (But it is still not visible by implicit market participant 2 in the
same delivery area)
2. -A- The responsible local trading system A send the order to the SOB
-B- The available capacity is updated by CMM and sent back to SOB. Then SOB calculates the local view of
each DA and matches them if possible.
3. SOB sends the result of a new order entry to it’s relevant local trading system if matching occurs, otherwise
go to step 4
4. SOB sends back the local view of the new order to all local trading systems
5. All local trading systems publish the local view of the new order
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Figure 1.8. SOB. order book update (Verseille and Alaimo (2018))
 
Figure 1.9. SOB. local view update based on ATC
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1.1.4.8 An example of local view update
The CMM provides two ATCs for each border, one for each direction. Then for each pair of market areas the
SOB calculates the maximum volume (in MW) of buy and sell orders of each market area that can be displayed in
the other market area. Figure 1.9 gives an example on how to update local views based on ATCs. The ATC from
DA1 (belongs to market area 1 (MA1)) to DA2 (belongs to market area 2 (MA2)) is 25 and 29 in reverse direction.
The local view of orders in each delivery area for participants in the same delivery area is shown in the first table
of Figure 1.9. To be more clear, participants in DA1 submitted ask orders with price and quantity pairs (25,10)
and (24,50) and bid orders (17,40) and (16,7). These ask and bid orders are entirely visible for all participants in
DA1 while participants in DA2 see these mentioned orders differently. It is the same for orders in DA2.
Buy orders require the flow towards the buy order delivery area. Hence, the whole quantity 40 of bid order
(17,40) in DA1 cannot be shown in DA2 and just 29 out of 40 is displayed in the local view of DA2 and bid order
(16,7) in DA1 is not displayed in DA2 at all. This illustrates that just 29 out of 40+7 DA1 buy bids can be shown
in the DA2 local view and since (17,40) had a more attractive price it is prioritized. Sell orders require that the
flow comes out of the sell order delivery area. Thus, among the sell orders (22,50), (23,10) and (24,35) in DA2, the
most attractive one which is (22,50) is partially shown in DA1, with 29 out of 50.
In general, if the ATC value from MA1 to MA2 (sum of all possible routes) is a positive value X then:
 Buy orders belonging to all delivery areas of MA2 are displayed in the local view of all delivery areas of MA1
such that the maximum volume of all these external buy bids is X.
 Sell orders belong to all delivery areas of MA1 are displayed in the local view of all delivery areas of MA2
such that the maximum volume of all these external sell orders is X.
If the ATC value from MA2 to MA1 (sum of all possible routes) is a positive value Y then:
 All sell orders in all delivery areas of MA2 are visible in all DAs of MA1 such that the maximum volume of
all these external sell orders is Y.
 All buy orders in all DAs of MA1 is visible in all DAs of MA2 such that the maximum volume of all these
external buy orders is Y.
Finally, for cross-border trading after checking available capacity based on the mentioned approach, they will
be ranked according to the price-time-priority principle. Except AON orders which have to be shown with their
full submitted quantity, other orders can be displayed with a fraction of their submitted quantity.
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Chapter 2
Market Power Under Nodal and Zonal
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Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway
Abstract
Contrary to the common thought that nodal pricing provides more opportunities for a strategic player to exert
market power than the zonal model, we show that in the latter one because of the need for redispatch or counter-
trading, another extra opportunity for gaming the market is created. Therefore, if proper market power mitigation
approaches are not utilized in both day-ahead and redispatch markets, then zonal pricing may be more susceptible
to market power. Especially in a zonal model which is based on available transfer capacity (ATC), a strategic
player’s profit and social welfare can be very volatile. In general, the more network constraints are incorporated
in the day-ahead market (100% in nodal and almost zero in ATC), the more social welfare is attainable. Hence,
the nodal model is acquitted from the more market power denunciation. This result can be generalized to the case
where market power mitigation rules are just enacted on the day-ahead market. Then both the strategic player, as
well as society, get the highest benefit from the nodal model. However, the zonal pricing outperforms the nodal one
in the case of setting mitigation rules just on the redispatching or counter-trading stage and again nodal model is
the prime suspect.
Keywords: Market design, congestion management, available transfer capacity (ATC), flow-based market cou-
pling (FBMC), market power, flexibility cost of redispatch or counter-trading
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2.1 Introduction
In designing efficient electricity markets, dealing with congestion is always a controversial issue. For many
years, there was an objection to nodal pricing, that it has the more potential of exercising market power, and the
argument was that due to more price areas and less producers, and therefore less competition in each node than
zonal pricing, a strategic player finds more opportunities to exercise market power. Therefore, the first suggested
solution is to aggregate some nodes into larger zones and hence create more competition across a wider area by
limiting the power of the strategic player.
In this paper, we are examining this claim through an illustrative example. Specifically, we compare the
market power potential of nodal versus zonal pricing with Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) and Flow-Based
Market Coupling (FBMC), which are the dominant methods to allocate capacity to cross-border interconnections
in Europe.
Electricity exchange is subject to the constraints of the transmission network. Congestion occurs when the
transmission lines do not hold enough capacity to fulfill the market requirements. Therefore, congestion management
(CM) techniques are deployed to dispatch an optimal power resulting from the market such that network constraints







Vries and Hakvoort (2002) drew a comprehensive economic comparison among these methods based on their
theoretical economic efficiency. They concluded that all these methods potentially lead to economic efficiency in the
short term. However, they may result in different distribution of costs, implementation costs, openness to strategic
behavior as well as the long-term incentives for generators and transmission system operators.
A state-of-the-art review of CM techniques is done by Pillay et al. (2015). They classify CM techniques into
avoiding or relieving congestion methods. Besides discussions on CM methods, various optimization techniques for
solving CM as well as their adaption in different countries are mentioned.
In general, various CM techniques can be distinguished by the level of integrating energy and transmission. On
the one side, there is an explicit auction, with a 100% separation of energy and transmission, in which the capacity
on the international interconnections (in Europe) has been auctioned in auctions separated from energy. Therefore,
the prices of these two commodities are not coordinated.
On the other side, nodal pricing, which is the perfect realization of an implicit auction, fully merges energy and
transmission, such that electricity prices cannot be decomposed into energy and transmission prices. Zonal pricing,
which is implemented in the whole of Europe, can be considered as an intermediate implicit auction. The first stage
of zonal pricing, which is the energy market, is operated by several power exchanges (PXs), each of them control
some pre-defined bidding areas or price zones. These price zones are linked by ”transfer capacities (TCs)”1between
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zones which are provided by transmission system operators (TSOs). Then in the second stage, depending on the
market design (which can be market splitting, redispatching or counter-trading), TSOs are responsible of securely
dispatching the obligations from their related energy market such that intra-zonal congestion never happens.
Though implementing the stages of zonal pricing seems straightforward, there still exists a lot of details about
the collaboration among PXs as well as TSOs. The collaboration among PXs was dealt with by implementing
market coupling in Europe. The initiative of price coupling of European PXs started in 2009. The aim of Price
Coupling of Regions (PCR) is to develop a single price coupling solution to increase liquidity, efficiency and social
welfare all through Europe EPEX-SPOT (2017). But there is still a lack of the same consensus among TSOs about
how to share information with each other as well as the algorithm to be utilized.
Oggioni and Smeers (2012), Oggioni et al. (2012), and Oggioni and Smeers (2013) analyzed different versions
of market coupling with respect to various degrees of coordination among TSOs. They assume that TSOs have to
do counter-trading in order to reach a viable intra-zonal network solution on their control area. Therefore, they
concluded that the high level of their collaboration and, more significantly, the right ATC adoption, could bring
about as efficient results as the benchmark nodal pricing case. Kunz (2013) pursued the same approach as Oggioni
and Smeers (2013) for the study region of Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovakia. They wrapped
up with the conclusion that the higher the coordination and sharing of network information, the more efficient is
the market coupling.
Regardless of how zonal pricing is designed, the efficiency of it compared to nodal pricing has been debated in
several papers. For instance, in Bjørndal (2000), Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001), Bjørndal et al. (2003), Bjørndal and
Jörnsten (2007), the authors argue that the problem of choosing the right number and definition of zones, makes
the zonal approach a thoroughly challenging congestion management method. And it can make a great impact on
the amount and distribution of surpluses among market participants and network operators.
On the other hand, zonal pricing has always been advocated by some policy makers, due to its less poten-
tial of exercising market power, with the reasoning that joining several nodes together culminate in having more
competitors in each zone. Therefore, the power of each firm can be suppressed compare to the nodal pricing
approach.
However, Hogan (1999) and more specifically Harvey and Hogan (2000) refute this idea by giving several
illustrative examples and show that zonal pricing makes poorer incentives for investment, and socializing the higher
costs to consumers, requires more administrative rules and more payments to generators for reducing production
in the case of intra-zonal congestion.
Nevertheless, so far nodal pricing has mainly been objected by European politicians. For instance, the Ger-
man government believes that nodal pricing could have destructive effects on market competition and liquidity
(Goldthau (2016)) by saying that: ”Smaller bidding areas tend to have an adverse effect on the market structure
and competition on the wholesale and retail markets, because the probability of profitable exhibition of market
power by incumbent market players increases.”
1Based on the definition in Van den Bergh et al. (2016), ”the Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) is calculated as the maximum com-
mercial exchange between two market areas, compatible with the physical transmission constraints and operational security standards.
In order to calculate the ATC, TSOs estimate the parallel flows that will result from the market outcome. The ATC calculation method
is based on heuristic rules and day-2 estimations of the market outcome (i.e., the so-called Base case). The ATC value is determined for
each cross-border link (interface) and can depend on the flow direction of the line due to the assumptions made in the ATC parameter
calculation.”
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In order to test this assertion mentioned by many European politicians about less market power of zonal pricing,
several papers were modeling redispatch or counter-trading to assess strategic behavior of generators. However,
detecting strategic behavior is very difficult to prove, especially with hydro power plants, since quantifying the
water value independent of energy value is practically impossible.
Holmberg et al. (2015), which is based on the notion of Nash equilibrium, compared three congestion manage-
ment techniques - nodal, zonal (uniform pricing) and discriminatory (pay-as-bid)- from a game-theoretical point
of view. With the assumption of perfect competition, inelastic demand and the full participation of all agents in
the real-time market, they came to the conclusion that the three mentioned market designs are equally socially
efficient. But in zonal pricing with redispatch, the payments from TSOs to producers is higher than nodal pricing
and pay-as-bid.
There could be several reasons that make analyzing strategic behavior a very challenging task. For example,
the geographical placement on the network could make an opportunity for some players to earn more profit.
Furthermore, the bidding strategy analysis of a generator that has several assets on different nodes or zones is
certainly different from a single one. The last but not the least is the marginal cost of a generator in its production
area. Hers et al. (2009) consider four different varieties of strategic behavior in a redispatch model; locating in
constrained-on or -off regions combined with price or volume bidding. Then, they test the results on the real Dutch
network by the COMPETES model. They conclude that by implementing redispatch, more firms will be allowed
to enter into the market in which none of them would come now because of the current situation of the market.
Dijk and Willems (2011) compare nodal pricing with counter-trading with respect to their long-term effects
on entry and investment decisions, by drawing the final inference that counter-trading is an inefficient congestion
management tool as well as an unproductive instrument to incentivize competition in the electricity market.
In our paper, we examine which of the three congestion management mechanisms, i.e. ’nodal pricing’, ’zonal
pricing with Available Transfer Capacity (ATC)’, and ’zonal pricing with Flow-Based Market Coupling (FBMC)’,
shows the most potential for exercising market power.
As mentioned before, until 2015 zonal pricing with ATC was mainly deployed in Europe. Afterwards, zonal
pricing with FBMC has been used for cross-border capacity allocation in the Central western European (CWE) day-
ahead markets Van den Bergh et al. (2016). Unlike the ATC approach, FBMC considers the physical transmission
constraints at the energy market clearing stage but with a different approach from the nodal pricing model.
This paper is different from previous papers in that it considers the market power under various congestion
management techniques with respect to the following main aspects:
1. The arbitrage possibility between the day-ahead and real-time markets is given to the strategic generator to
see if it is more profitable to behave strategically in both markets than in a one-stage nodal pricing benchmark
case.
2. Zonal pricing with FBMC has not been compared by preceding congestion management methods from a
market power point of view.
3. Whether and how different ATC quantities for cross-border lines affect the strategic behavior of generators.
Do they result in higher or lower surpluses than the nodal benchmark case?
4. Owing to the hardship of resetting plans close to the real-time delivery, especially for inflexible generators,
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the flexibility cost of production has been considered in the real-time market. It is similar to Morales et al.
(2014) and Bjorndal et al. (2016) approach in respect of flexibility costs. It means that generators are capable
of submitting different offers in day-ahead and real-time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the mathematical models of nodal pricing, zonal
pricing with ATC and zonal pricing with FBMC are described. Market power modeling is also represented in the
same section. These models are tested on a numerical example explained in Section 2.3. The strategic behavior of
two different generators, which are located at different nodes of the network, is studied when they play strategically
just in one of the day-ahead or real-time markets or in both. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 2.4.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Modeling assumptions
The main assumptions of the model are listed below:
1. The model represents the strategic decision of an individual strategic generator in different market designs-
nodal, zonal with ATC and zonal with FBMC. All the other generators and demands are price takers, therefore,
they offer their marginal cost and benefit to the market.
2. For simplicity, a single-period market has been considered but it can be extended to the multi-period case.
In studying market power, especially in hydro-dominated electrical systems, inter-temporal decisions could
make great differences in the profit of strategic player.
3. DC representation of the network that includes first and second Kirchhoff laws has been considered.
4. Following to EUPHEMIA algorithm (PCR (2013)), linear offer and bid curves are respectively considered for
generators and consumers.
5. Any kind of uncertainties are not taken into account.
6. Nodal pricing is just one stage model because the whole physical network is modeled in day-ahead market.
However, in zonal pricing, due to overlooking physical network in day-ahead, to avoid congestion, intra-zonal
network constraints are considered in real-time market.
2.2.2 Notation
We adopted almost the same mathematical formulation as Bjorndal et al. (2016). The model entails I partic-
ipants either generators with positive or consumers with negative values. For each i P I, there exists solutions xi
and Xi for day-ahead and real-time markets respectively.
C1i represents the set of feasible solutions corresponding to participant i for day-ahead market, whereas C
2
i
proportionates to the real-time market feasible solutions which is dependent on the decision xi from the day-





i i P I (2.1)
Xi P C
2
i pxiq i P I (2.2)
Each generator and load i locates in a specific node n P N as well as a pre-determined zone z P Z. Nodes
of the network are connected by a set of physical transmission lines L. Corresponds to each line l, there is a flow
f  pflqlPL. If ν0 and ν1 show the starting and ending nodes of line l and fl ¡ 0, then it means that power is
flowing from ν0 to ν1.
For every adjacent zones which are connected by physical connections l, there exists an inter-zonal interface
e P E which conveys commercial flows between zones. Likewise the definition of fl, corresponds to each inter-zonal
interface e, there is a flow pfeqePE . If ω0 and ω1 show the starting and ending zones of interface e and fe ¡ 0, then
it means that commercial flow is flowing from ω0 to ω1.
U1 and U2 represents network constraints in the day-ahead stage of nodal and zonal models respectively. More
detailed explanation about network constraints are given in Sections 2.2.3, 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.
2.2.3 Nodal pricing
In nodal pricing method, market clearing prices are calculated for locations on the network called nodes.
The nodal price composed of the marginal cost of energy plus the marginal cost of transmission which composed
of loss and congestion costs. As mentioned before, these two elements can not be decomposed into two energy
and transmission prices due to the implicit approach behind their calculation. The majority of US markets trade
electricity on a nodal basis with very efficient market result experience (Neuhoff and Boyd (2011)). The market
operator clears the market by maximizing the social welfare subject to the physical network constraints in a lossless
DC approximation of the network flows. As mentioned in 2.2, consumers can be considered as generators with
negative values. Therefore, their benefit curve with negative values is likewise a cost curve. Hence, the objective
function can just be outlined by costs. By virtue of full network consideration in day-ahead market, just day-ahead
costs are included in the objective function of nodal model.
Each offer i P I is associated with a linear day-ahead marginal cost and benefit function ai   bixi with non-
negative parameters ai and bi. To keep conciseness, we assume that inverse demand curve take negative values
xi   0. Thus, the corresponding curve ai   bixi has a downward slope. Accordingly, the total day-ahead cost
of participant i, which is the area under marginal cost or benefit curve, is a quadratic cost or benefit function
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fl, n P N (2.6)
f P U1 (2.7)
τnpfq represents the net inflow of power in node n from the network. Moreover, U
1 denotes all physical network
constraints related to a DC load flow model. Consequently, (2.7) is equivalent to the following constraints:
fl  Yl.pΘν1plq Θν0plqq l P L (2.8)
 capl ¤ fl ¤ capl l P L (2.9)
Θ1  0 (2.10)
(2.8) shows that flow is dependent on line characteristic parameter Yl which is the susceptance of line l as well
as phase angel Θ of related starting and ending nodes. In constraint (2.9), capl shows the thermal capacity of line
l. Finally, By (2.10), the first node is considered as a reference node.
2.2.4 Zonal pricing with ATC
All European electricity markets except Scandinavia and Italy, were organized nationally such that each country
concentrates on self-sufficiency of its electricity supply. Therefore, zonal approach was suggested by ENTSO as an
electricity trading target model, to couple all these interconnected markets which are called bidding zones. So as to
accomplish a global social welfare goal throughout the whole continent, the interconnection capacity among bidding
zones should be considered in the trading process. But the physical transmission network creates limitations on
international trade. Thus, how the available capacity for trading is calculated could have profound impact on
market result and efficiency. Thus far, excluding central western European countries, the ATC mechanism is the
dominant method to allocate capacity to cross-border interconnections.
ATC is related to the simplified zonal view of the transmission system in the day-ahead market and means
that the Kirchhoff laws that describe the physical power flow are partially ignored in day-ahead market. The ATC
calculation method is discussed in several papers; for example see Rious et al. (2008). However, the calculation
of the ATC is vague and not published or informed by TSOs. To gain a maximal social welfare in the whole
Europe, Jensen et al. (2017) and Aravena and Papavasiliou (2017) mentioned that ATCs should not be determined
exogenously, rather should be optimized endogenously synchronized with day-ahead and real-time markets. The
ATC calculation discussion is beyond the scope of our paper, but something that distinguishes this paper from
former ones is how different ATC quantities for a specific inter-zonal interface e P E could encourage or discourage
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market power. These inter-zonal interfaces are different from physical connections l.
The day-ahead market is a pool composed of all fully coordinated power exchanges whom receives offers and bids
of their related zones as well as the interface ATCs from their corresponding TSOs. The mathematical formulation
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fe, z P Z (2.14)
f P U2 (2.15)
τzpfq declares the net inflow of power in zone z from all inter-zonal interfaces e P E. Unlike nodal day-ahead
market, just commercial flows which do not reflect physical network constraints are modeled in zonal day-ahead
market. U2 only shows the inter-zonal trade capacities and is equivalent to the following constraints:
ATCe ¤ fe ¤ ATCe e P E (2.16)
Due to disregarding real characteristics of electrical network in day-ahead market, it is very probable that day-
ahead solution does not satisfy the physical network constraints in the real-time stage. Therefore, a remedial action
is invoked by TSOs to release congestion after clearing of the energy market. Based on the design and settlement
methods of real-time market, several corrective actions have been explored and argued in many papers. For example,
van Blijswijk and de Vries (2012) evaluates which of the three corrective mechanisms ’system redispatch’, ’market
splitting’ and ’market redispatch’ is mostly congruent with Dutch electricity transmission grid. Whereas, Oggioni
and Smeers (2013) and Dijk and Willems (2011) focused on counter-trading owing to lack of the documentation of
the other methods.
The aim of redispatching is finding optimal deviations from day-ahead scheduling. Hence, two re-adjustment
actions should be taken to balance supply and demand in nodes connected to congested lines:
 Down-regulation: the generators in the constrained-off area (area with excess of energy) have to decrease their
production by buying-back the deviated quantities from day-ahead market or consumers have to increase their
consumption.
 Up-regulation: as opposed to down-regulation, the generators in the constrained-on area (area with deficit of
energy) have to increase their production or consumers decrease their consumption by selling the day-ahead
market contracted electricity they decided not to use.
But changing the plan of the system ( which was arranged in day-ahead ) in a time-interval close to the delivery
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hour, requires flexible sources. This flexibility can originate from various sources like energy storage, demand-side
management, etc. Another essential source of flexibility is conventional generators’ ability to change their output to
follow varying load. The ability of changing production in a short interval depends on technological aspects such as
minimum up/down times, ramp rates, minimum generation levels and start-up costs (Palchak and Denholm (2014))
whereby some additional costs will be enforced to generators as well as the system.
Hentschel et al. (2016) evaluate the monetary value of conventional power plant flexibility options through
developing a valuation tool which relates a change in technical parameters to an economic effect and revenue.
Therefore, generators and consumers can have a different cost and benefit curve (offer/bid curve) in real-time
ascribed to flexibility costs. If in real-time the generators are asked to increase their production beyond the day-
ahead level, then flexibility cost means that the cost of generation is higher than the day-ahead marginal cost. If
they reduce production from the day-ahead level, then they have to repurchase this deviated quantity which is less
valuable than their day-ahead marginal cost. On the opposite side, if the consumers increase their consumption in
real-time, their bid will be lower than in day-ahead, because it is not as valuable as if it was planned in day-ahead
and if they reduce their consumption, they are eager to be compensated by asking higher than their day-ahead
willingness to pay.
The relation between day-ahead and real-time cost and benefit functions is shown in Figure 2.1. The left-
handside figure represents an offer (supply) curve for a generator, while the bid (demand) curve of a consumer is
illustrated on the right-handside. Moreover, the real-time flexibility costs in the case of deviation from day-ahead
market is shown in both figures.
Flexibility costs results in different cost and benefit function parameters in redispatch stage. If i P I is
a generator, then parameters aui and b
u




i for down-regulation where
















































(b) Demand function for a specific consumer
Figure 2.1. Supply and demand functions for a specific generator and consumer offers/bids to the day-ahead
market plus the flexibility costs incurred in real-time
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cipXiq   rcipxi, Xiq (2.17)
subject to: Xi P C
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fl, n P N (2.20)
F P U1 (2.21)
In (2.17), rcipxi, Xiq illustrates the additional cost caused by flexibility in the redispatch market. The flexibility
cost is dependent on the day-ahead quantity xi as well as the revised quantity Xi after running the redispatch and
is constructed as follows:
rcipxi, Xiq  paui  aiqXui   0.5pbui  biqpXui q2   pai  adi qXdi   0.5pbdi  biqpXdi q2 (2.22)
Where Xui  maxtXi  xi, 0u and X
d
i  maxtxi  Xi, 0u . Further examples and discussions are provided in
Bjorndal et al. (2016).
Definition of τnpF q and U
1 are the same as nodal model mentioned in Section 2.2.3. However, F illustrates
the physical flow in redispatch model. It should be noticed that in balancing constraint (2.19), xi is fixed from
day-ahead market result. Hence, just readjustments Xui and X
d
i will be optimized such that all physical network
flows are satisfied.
2.2.5 Zonal pricing with FBMC
Several years experience of running European electricity market with the conventional ATC mechanism re-
flects the necessity of incorporating the physical properties of the power network into the market/clearing stage.
So, including network properties into the market is the basic idea behind flow-based market coupling (FBMC),
distinguishing it from ATC model.
Similar to the ATC model, FBMC entails three main steps: 1- pre-market coupling which provides required
parameters by respected TSOs, 2- market coupling which is clearing day-ahead market, 3- post-market coupling
by counter-trading. The detailed explanation of each step is as follows: At the pre-market coupling step, which is
called the preparatory phase and starts D-2 before delivery time, TSOs are responsible of publishing all required
parameters of FBMC:
 Generation shift keys (GSK) and zonal power transfer distribution (PTDF) factors: GSKs transform the nodal
PTDFs into zonal PTDFs. The nodal PTDFs describe how one unit injection into a given node flows on a
given line in the network. While the FBMC requires that PTDFs describe the relation between a zone and a
line, means the net injections into a zone determines the flow on a particular line. Therefore, the node-to-line
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PTDFs should be aggregated into the equivalent zone-to-line PTDFs. However, the result of the aggregation
is very dependent on how the change in a zone’s net injections is divided on the nodes within that zone.
The key note here is that prior to the market clearing, this is not known. Hence, specific methods should be
developed to estimate how the change in a zone’s net injection will influence the different nodes within the
zone. Accordingly, several GSK strategies have been developed yet. Dierstein (2017) classified GSK strategies
in three different approaches:
– Flat-partitioning: allocates the same GSK factor to each node within the same zone. In this case,
GSKn 
1
N , in which N is the number of nodes in the same zone as n located.
– Residual generation capacity: This method depends on installed generation capacity in each node and is








– Base-case generation: This GSK is calculated by the ratio of node generation in base-case over the same




In this paper, Flat-partitioning and base-case GSK approaches were utilized. Before running the flow-based
model, the nodal pricing model is run as the base case.
More GSK strategies (eight) to implement in the Nordic power market are introduced and analyzed in Jegleim
(2015). But the main question is which of these GSK strategies is the optimal one? In the optimal GSK
strategy, the difference between estimated line flow (in DA market) and actual line flow (in RT market) is
the least. However, so far, there is not any GSK strategy that proved to be the optimal one. Hence, GSK
strategy can be a major source of imprecision in the flow-based pre-market step. Jegleim (2015) also discusses
about finding good GSK strategies.
 Critical Branches (CBs) and Remaining Available Margin (RAM): In the network simplification process of
FBMC, all cross-border lines and just those intra-zonal lines which are significantly affected by cross-border
trades are included which are called Critical Branches (CBs).
Then the Remaining Available Margin (RAM)is calculated by TSOs for each CB. This parameter shows the
free margin of each CB that can be used as transmission capacity in DA market. Jegleim (2015) and Statnett
(2016) discussed comprehensively about how to calculate this free margin.
In the second step which is day-ahead market, likewise zonal-ATC model, after receiving required parameters
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ZPTDF zl  τzpfq, l P CB (2.26)
f P U3 (2.27)
The same as τzpfq definition in Section 2.2.4, it shows the net inflow of power in zone z from all lines belong
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to CBs. ZPTDF zl is also the zonal PTDF parameter given by responsible TSO. ψlpfq is flow over critical branch
l. U3 illustrates the CBs capacity which are constrained by RAMS as follows:
ψlpfq ¤ RAM l P CB (2.28)
In general, the RAMs are positive unless a CB is known to be congested before allocation. Moreover, since the
RAM of a CB is only defined in one direction, then one CB must be defined for each direction.
In this paper because of a small network we are testing, all lines are considered as CBs and RAMs are simply
assumed to be equal to capl.
Finally, in the last step which is happening in the real-time, counter-trading or redispatching must be run. Even
though the FBMC had tried to model physical network, since GSK calculation is based on the prediction of the
state of the electricity system at the delivery time, the flows over lines calculated at day-ahead market may not be
equal to the actual line flows or even some GSKs may not result in feasible flows in RT market. Therefore, counter-
trading is necessary to find optimal deviations from day-ahead results. The assumptions about the flexibility cost
of counter-trading as well as the mathematical model are exactly the same as counter-trading part of Section 2.2.4.
Hence, we avoid to duplicate this part.
2.2.6 Market power modeling
After the deregulation of electricity industry, generation companies submit their offers/bids to the market
operator instead of revealing their real costs. Since the aim of these bidding strategies is to maximize their profit
then the potential for market power exercise will be created. Market power can be defined as the ability to profitably
lifting prices above marginal cost, which results in inefficiencies mainly due to suboptimal plant dispatch.
Several reasons for the existence of market power are identified (Rahman (2011)) such as:
 Transmission constraints and market fragmentation
 High degree of concentration
 Inelastic demand
 Peak demand conditions and instantaneous balancing
 Strong national incumbents
 Joint capital control of generation and transmission capacities
 Gaps in market arrangements
However, the reason of market power can be very specific to the examined market since each market has its
own loopholes that can be exploited by market participants to exercise market power. In this paper the main focus
is investigating the effect of market design on market power. To understand the extent of existed market power,
measuring tools are needed. They can be categorized into two main classic and dynamic methods.
The first category is just measuring market concentration and the well-known metrics are the Four-firm Con-
centration Ratio (I4), Herfindahl Hirshman Index (HHI) and Pivotal Supplier Index (PSI). But as we mentioned
earlier there would be other reasons than just market concentration. Hence, these methods are not powerful metrics
to measure the existence of market power.
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The second category can be divided into two ex-post analysis and equilibria modeling. In the former approach,
the difference between the actual market price and marginal cost of production shows the amount of market
power while in the latter one the examined market is simulated to find the equilibria, then the difference between
equilibrium prices and the marginal cost of production illustrates the amount of market power.
In this paper, the ex-post analysis approach has been adopted to measure market power. However, we tailored
the measuring metrics as follows:








cipXiq   rcipxi, Xiqq (2.30)
Si and SS respectively represent the surplus of participant i and the overall social surplus. After running both
markets the shadow price of equation (2.13) shows the day-ahead market clearing price λz for each zone z and
similarly λn extracted from equation (2.19) represents the redispatch market clearing price. If i is a generator, then
the first and second terms in equation (2.29) are respectively the income from day-ahead and redispatch markets
while the last parenthesis calculates the overall cost of production in both markets. With respect to the assumption
of negative values xi for consumers, the first two terms in equation (2.29) represents the consumer payments and
the last term is its benefit from both markets. Hence, in overall, for both kind of participants surplus is a suitable
term.
With the same analogy, social surplus is equal to the consumers’ benefits (bids) minus generators’ costs (offers).
These two indexes are used to compare the market power of different players. The more the social surplus is, the
more efficient is the market design.
2.3 Results and discussion
In this section we make use of a small three-node system to illustrate and compare three congestion management
approaches from market power point of view.
2.3.1 Illustrative example
The three different congestion management models are compared using the three-node system depicted in
Figure 2.2. This system is composed of eight conventional generators (G1,G2,...,G8), three demands (D1,...,D3) and





























Figure 2.2. Three-bus power system
Table 2.1. Data-Three bus system
Day-ahead market Network
Node Supply Demand Line Capacity
1
aG1=0 , bG1=0.01 aD1=3000 1-2 210aG2=0 , bG2=0.05 bD1=0.3aG3=0 , bG3=0.06
2
aG4=0 , bG4=0.05 aD2=3000 1-3 1210
aG5=0 , bG5=0.05 bD2=1.2
3
aG6=0 , bG6=0.02 aD3=3000 2-3 1000aG7=0 , bG7=0.2 bD3=0.24aG8=0 , bG8=0.15
Real-time market
Up/Dn Actor Coefficient
up-regulation generator γupGi  bGi
consumer γupDj  bDj
dn-regulation generator γdnGi  bGi
consumer γdnDj  bDj
bGi represents the slope of Gi’s marginal cost function and aDj and bDj are respectively the intercept and slope
of Dj ’s marginal benefit function.
As you can see in supply column, G1 is the cheapest generator in n1 as well as the whole system and G6 is the
cheapest in Z2 and the second cheapest in the whole system while D3 is the most expensive demand in the network.
All lines have the same reactance equal to one.
The last column in RT market illustrates that for up- and dn-regulation, costs and benefits are connected to
day-ahead related ones by multipliers γupGi , γ
dn
Gi
, γupDj , γ
dn
Dj
where a value of 1 indicates that the redispatch costs and
benefits are equal to the day-ahead ones, while higher values indicate extra costs of redispatch. In all cases of this






=1.5. It means that both marginal cost and benefit functions
in RT market entail steeper slope than DA market which shows the higher costs and benefits of redispatching.
It is assumed that all generators and demands in the illustrative example are flexible enough to participate in
RT market.
As we mentioned before, congested transmission network can result in market power and some generators
can take advantage of their geographic location and transmission capacity constraints to exercise market power.
Therefore, to test the effect of this item on market power, the results will be examined by choosing distinct strategic
players on different nodes.
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We assume that all generators except one and all consumers are price-taker participants, which means that
they all submit their true costs and benefits as represented in Table 2.1. Hence, just one strategic generator can be
price-maker - sets manipulated energy prices which are far from its marginal cost. G6 in Z2 (n3) is assumed to be
the strategic player and the results for each pricing mechanism will be demonstrated in the following subsections.
2.3.2 Strategic bidding of G6 when plays strategically in both day-ahead and real-
time markets
In this section we assume that G6, owing to its size, location and flexibility is able to submit strategic bids
that will increase its profit. In the following sections, the effect of market structure on its market power will be
investigated.
2.3.2.1 Strategic bidding of G6 in the Nodal model
Given the bids of the other participants are consistent with their true costs and benefits, G6 submits a strategic
bid to DA market in order to maximize its surplus. The G6’s true cost coefficient is 0.02 which results in the lowest
surplus for it, while the social surplus is at the highest level. By varying this bid, G6 can reach to the highest
surplus of 14.42  105 for DA offer equals to 0.08 (58% rises), where the corresponding social surplus is 35.033  106
(3% reduction). From the social surplus point of view, offering true cost is the most efficient option. G6’s surplus
and social surplus of the system in case that G6 is the strategic player are depicted in Figure 2.3. The decreasing
social surplus curve demonstrates the detrimental effects of market power in nodal pricing model.
(a) G6 surplus (b) Social surplus
Figure 2.3. Nodal pricing results
2.3.2.2 Strategic bidding of G6 in the zonal-ATC model
Regardless of the fact that how TSOs are picking out ATCs, it is interesting to see how strategic players can
benefit from irrelevant ATCs. Therefore, the results will be inspected for two end points 0 and 10000 (infinite).
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2.3.2.2.1 ATC=0
Means that DA market is running for two seperate (detached) markets and balancing individual supply and
demand in each zone Z1 and Z2. Z1 which contains the cheapest generator G1, clears with much lower zonal price
71 compared to 235 in Z2 which contains the most expensive demand D3. Hence, generators in Z1 are eager to
export to Z2 to increase the price in their related zone.
In RT market, due to the existence of lines L12 and L13, they find this opportunity to sell to consumers in Z2.
Hence, as you can see in Figure 2.4, all generators in n1 do up-regulation. Since in DA market, L23 was neglected
and D3 is the most expensive consumption, generators in n2 produce as much as they can but in RT market, due
to the limited capacity of L23, they have to do dn-regulation. In opposite, although G7 and G8 in n3 are the most
expensive ones, they have to do up-regulation in order to satisfy very high demand of D3 from DA which is 11520.
Thus, this expensive up-regulation in n3 results in very high RT clearing price 545 versus very low price -71 in n2.
But what can G6 do as an strategic player? Based on Figure 2.5 and with respect to the fact that G6 can
submit different offers for up- and dn-regulation than DA, its optimal strategy is (DA,up,dn)=(0.14,0.14,whatever).
Since G6 is the second cheapest generator in the system and is located in the same node as D3 (most expensive
demand), it seems that it is always profitable for it to do up-regulation. Thus, dn-regulation offers are not the
matter of importance in this case. In Figure 2.5(b), up and DA coordinates are replaced by each other in order to
show that for the lowest DA offer 0.02, the surplus of G6 is the lowest while the social surplus is the highest, which
shows the negative correlation between its surplus and social surplus irrespective of up- and dn-regulation offers.
1n  
 DA Up Dn 
1G  7143 1006 0 
2G  1428 201 0 
3G  1190 168 0 
1D  9761 44.7 0 






  DA Up Dn 
4G  4701 0 3069 
5G  4701 0 3069 
2D  2304 0 170 
3n  
 DA Up Dn 
6G 1679 2218 0 
7G 1175 776 0 
8G 1567 1034 0 
3D 11520 862 0 
1210RTf 
1000RTf 
Figure 2.4. DA and RT quantities when ATC=0
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(a) G6 surplus (b) Social surplus
Figure 2.5. Zonal results with ATC=0
2.3.2.2.2 ATC=10000
Concerning the line capacities, ATC equal to 10000 can be considered as infinite transfer capacity between two
zones in DA. Therefore, DA market is equivalent to the uniform pricing model and equal prices of the two zones
confirm this assumption (Table 2.2). Thus, in DA market all generators located in n1 and n2 sell as much as they
can to D3.
But in RT, they have to come up against physical network constraints. Hence, all of them have to dn-regulate
in favor of generators in n3. By playing strategically, G6’s best offer is (DA,up,dn)=(0.17,0.17,whatever). Identical
to ATC=0 and Figure 2.5, for the lowest DA offer equals to 0.02, G6’s surplus is at minimum level while social
surplus is maximum.









123.4 123.4 40.4 38.3 648.5
2.3.2.3 Strategic bidding of G6 in the zonal-FBMC model
2.3.2.3.1 Flow-based market coupling with weighted-GSK
Based on the definition of weighted-GSK in Section 2.2.5, GSK is calculated based on the weight of the net injec-
tion of each node over sum of the net injections of all nodes in the corresponding zone. These net injections are based
on nodal results. Nodal and zonal PTDFs corresponding to the optimal offer (DA,up,dn)=(0.15,0.15,whatever) are
demonstrated in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
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Table 2.3. Nodal PTDF
Line n1 n2 n3
1 2 0.33 -0.33 0
1 3 0.66 0.33 0
2 3 0.33 0.66 0





Similar to the zonal-ATC model, when redispatch was solved by nodal PTDFs, which shows the real network
constraints, by up-regulating until 2385, G6 can maximize its profit. Therefore, DA as well as up-regulation offers
are important for it.
Different zonal PTDF calculation approaches mentioned here can result in very unexpected prices and quanti-
ties.
2.3.2.4 Discussion on market power potential of G6
The maximum attainable surplus and social surplus from all investigated models in this paper when G6 plays
strategically is shown in Figure 2.6.
Based on the participants behavior analyzed in Sections 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.3, by increasing ATC from
0 to 10000, G6’s surplus has a great increase from 1,402,703 to 1,851,429 (almost 25%). The main reason is that
G1 which is the cheapest generator is located in Z1. Moreover, D3, the most expensive demand is located in the
same node as G6 is located. Therefore, increased ATC lets G1 to produce as much as it can in day-ahead market as
well as generators in n2 (G4 and G5) to produce without considering physical network constraints. Hence, all these
conditions let the second cheapest strategic player G6, to profitably utilize the non-feasibility of flows resulted from
day-ahead market by playing with its day-ahead and real-time offers. Thus, the best offering strategy for G6 when
ATC is rising, is to shift some part of its production from day-ahead to real-time. Even though, by increasing ATC,
the G6’s surplus will rise up to 25%, the maximum variation of social surplus is just 0.8% which is not considerable.
By comparing G6’s surplus of nodal versus zonal-ATC model, the highest surplus it can get from nodal model is
14.42  105 while by increasing ATC, its surplus can reach to 18.5  105, which shows the sensitivity of the market
power to ATC quantities. However, for very low ATCs, its market power is lower than nodal model.
Alike to the zonal-ATC model, FBMC with weighted GSK has the more potential of market power but not as
high as zonal-ATC.
Figure 2.6 illustrates a huge difference between nodal social surplus versus the other ones. It seems that FBMC
with weighted GSK leads to a more efficient market design in comparison to the other zonal models. However, if a
correct ATC quantity has been chosen by TSOs, Then zonal-ATC can be as efficient as FBMC with weighted GSK.
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Even though the FBMC with flat-partitioning GSK leads to the least surplus for G6, but still the social surplus
is also the lowest in comparison to the other methods, which can be justified as an inefficient market design.
(a) Maximum attainable surplus for G6 (b) Maximum attainable Social surplus
Figure 2.6. Maximum surplus from all models
2.3.3 Strategic bidding of G6 when plays strategically just in day-ahead market
The order of the maximum attainable surplus for G6 from all models when it just plays strategically in DA
market is as follows: Nodal¡FBMC-flat¡FBMC-weighted¡Zonal-ATC. It is obvious that since in the nodal model
it considers all network constraints at the time of decision making and plays strategically with full knowledge about
it, G6 can earn the highest surplus.
In general, the more network information is considered at the time of strategic decision making (which is
DA market in this case), the more potential exists for strategic player to exercise market power (Figure 2.7(a)).
Therefore, nodal model leads to the lowest social surplus. In zonal-ATC model, no matter what ATC is, since it
does not reflect real network constraints in DA stage, it does not result in huge profit for G6. Finally, since in
FBMC models, they are in between of nodal and zonal-ATC with respect to considering network constraints, they
are placing in the middle of ranking.
(a) Maximum attainable surplus for G6 (b) Maximum attainable Social surplus
Figure 2.7. Maximum surplus from all models when G6 plays strategically just in DA market
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(a) Maximum attainable surplus for G6 (b) Maximum attainable Social surplus
Figure 2.8. Maximum surplus from all models when G6 plays strategically just in RT market
2.3.4 Strategic bidding of G6 when plays strategically just in real-time market
The figures and numbers show that having possibility to just exercise market power in real-time leads to much
lower profits for G6 in comparison to the cases where it plays strategically just in day-ahead or both markets. In
contrast, social surplus is the highest, especially with nodal model. In zonal-ATC model, choosing very high ATC
culminates in very low social surplus, because it signifies a very different solution of day-ahead than real-time,
therefore G6 finds more opportunity to play with its offers in real-time.
2.4 Conclusion
Several reasons have been mentioned for market power existance such as market structure, market rules,
geographical concentration, congested network and so on Song (2003).
Market structure can be an important cause of exercising market power, for example which pricing machanism
is implied (pay-as-bid or market-clearing-price), how future or forward contracts are designed, demand participation
in market or not, etc.
In this paper we investigated the common objection -usually is mentioned by European politicians- to the nodal
pricing which inherently entails more potential of market power than zonal pricing. But since in zonal pricing, either
with ATC or FBMC, redispatch is necessary to achieve a feasible flow, the market power possibility should be probed
in both markets. Therefore, for zonal market structure, three following cases of gaming are allowed to the strategic
player:
 Strategic behaviour in both day-ahead and redispatch: in this case, strategic player takes an optimal
decision by knowing that market is just running with simplified network or cross-border constraints at day-
ahead stage, then it finds another new opportunity in redispatch market to fix its first stage decision by
new offering based on real-time flexibility cost of redispatch. Therefore, in comparison to one stage gaming
possibility of nodal model, the latter pricing approach surpasses the former one. In general, we can conclude
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that the more network constraints are incorporated in day-ahead market, the less opportunity has the strategic
player to change its decision in redispatch stage. Therefore, The nodal and FBMC are less susceptible to
market power than ATC model. However, in the ATC model, if right ATCs are adopted, it can be as efficient
as FBMC with weighted GSK. Otherwise, particularly for very high ATCs (result in uniform pricing) or very
low ones (result in detached markets), it entails the lowest social surpluses.
 Strategic behavior in day-ahead and non-strategic in redispatch: in this case, if the redispatch
market does not allow the strategic behavior, then the strategic player can play very blindly in day-ahead
when nothing about network is considered and does not have another opportunity to fix the decision taken in
the previous stage. Therefore, by this assumption, both ATC and FBMC outperform nodal model.
 Non-strategic behavior in day-ahead and strategic in redispatch: since in this case strategic behavior
is not allowed in day-ahead stage and redispatch is just based on deviations from day-ahead, strategic player
finds very little space to maneuver. Therefore, this case entails the highest social surpluses in all nodal, ATC
and FBMC models.
Hence, it is important to do extensive investigation about market power mitigation approaches especially in
zonal models which entail two stages of incorporating network. Singh (1999) and Hogan and Newton (2001) discuss
about some mitigating market power approaches which is mostly suitable for one-stage nodal model. Thus, further
market power mitigation studies for zonal models can be a very interesting topic for future research.
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Abstract
The growth in intermittent renewable power in Europe has increased the need to trade closer to real-time. In
recent years, intraday markets have been integrated across Europe, contributing to a more efficient market. On
the other hand, European day-ahead and intraday markets are still based on zonal pricing, where the physical
characteristics of transmission networks are only partly taken into account, and congestion problems may remain
until close to real-time. In this paper, we suggest an intraday market design based on the coordinated multilateral
trade (CMT) approach, using power transfer distribution factors and other network information provided by the
transmission system operators, to generate profitable, but feasible, and possibly multilateral trades based on nodal
bids. Profitable trades can be found by independent brokers or by having the power exchange running frequent
batch auctions at discrete-time intervals. Each trade is accepted by the TSO if no violation occurs in the network,
or is curtailed. If the network flow is feasible at the start of the intraday market, the procedure converges to the
optimal economic dispatch. In any case, this suggestion for intraday trading, taking into account simple information
about network constraints, in a procedure consistent with the functioning of the European intraday market, can
help bridge the gap between the zonal day-ahead markets and the real-time constraints of the power system.




The growth of intermittent generation capacity in today’s electricity markets has increased the importance of
efficient intraday markets, seeing that it becomes more challenging for market participants to be in balance between
the day-ahead and real-time balancing markets. As investigated by many authors, an intraday market, if properly
designed, can be an effective market mechanism not only for facilitating the large-scale integration of wind power
generation but also for increasing wind power generators’ competitiveness (Weber (2010), Mauritzen (2015), and
Jafari et al. (2014)). Hence, there will be an increasing interest in trading in the intraday markets. It is beneficial
both for market participants and for the power system that the network is in balance close to the delivery time, in
order to reduce the need for reserves and associated costs. In this regard, the European Commission established a
target model to integrate all intraday markets based on continuous trading, and XBID (cross-border intraday) was
launched to create a joint integrated intraday cross-zonal market. As stated in XBID documents, the main goals
of integration are to promote effective competition and pricing, to increase liquidity and to enable a more efficient
utilization of generation resources across Europe.
Currently, two different exchange-based forms of intraday markets have been designed in Europe: auction-based
(discrete auctions) and continuous trading intraday markets. In continuous trading, the power exchange provides
a ’limit order book’-based platform wherein market participants can submit bid (for buy) and ask (for sell) orders.
Whenever they find it profitable in a period between intraday market opening until minutes before delivery time,
a trade occurs when the bid price is higher than or equal to the ask price. Hence, each trade has its own specific
price, and this property substantially differentiates continuous trading from discrete auctions (with unique market
clearing prices) (NordPool (2016b)).
The advantages and disadvantages of discrete auction versus continuous trading intraday markets have been
debated in many papers. As continuous trading allows trading 24 hours/7 days a week, market participants may
find an immediate opportunity to trade their imbalances. Thus, as soon as new information is received (either their
own situation, like updated wind power forecasts, or signals from others that can be reflected in a bid-ask spread),
it can be used immediately, and this may be especially attractive for intermittent generators (Henriot (2012b)).
Conversely, Hagemann (2013b) points out that in a discrete auction intraday market, market participants have
to wait until the next auction is cleared, and cannot do immediate self-balancing. Hence, continuous trading is
superior to discrete auctions from an ease of trade point of view.
By simulating the behaviour of a zero-intelligent trader, Weber and Schröder (2011) assess the efficiency of
continuous trading versus discrete auctions. They conclude that since continuous trading adhere to the first-come-
first-serve principle, it entails a lower allocative efficiency, meaning that depending on the order arrivals, some trades
with negative welfare contribution may occur while others with positive welfare contribution may never happen.
This will not be the case for discrete auction markets, where the objective function is to maximize social welfare.
Scharff and Amelin (2016) empirically analysed the trading behaviour on the Elbas intraday market. Their
study shows that factors like high share of wind power in Denmark, restricted available transmission capacity from
Norway to continental Europe for the intraday market, and high balancing prices in Finland result in varying trading
behaviour in different price zones. They also illustrate that half of the Elbas intraday trades are settled 3 hours
before delivery time, most likely by wind power producers with short forecast horizon. Finally, it was concluded
that since most of the intraday trades are motivated by intermittent power producers rather than by conventional
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power plant outages, continuous trading seems to be a more suitable design for European intraday markets.
The question of which intraday market design, continuous trading or discrete auction, is more suitable for
an integrated European intraday market, is further addressed by Neuhoff et al. (2016b). They empirically assess
the effect of an additional intraday auction, introduced by EPEX in December 2014. This uniform price auction
is settled at the beginning of the continuous intraday session at 3 pm, for the next 96 quarters of the following
day. Their observation is that adding an auction to the current continuous market increased liquidity and market
depth, reduced price volatility, and removed the speed race (i.e. the race to be the first to be processed, which is an
important issue in continuous trading). However, too infrequent auctions may lead to postponed adjustments, and
hence, the right frequency of intraday auctions is raised as an important design question. Moreover, they conclude
that with auctions, intraday transmission capacity can be allocated more efficiently, and the value of the scarce
capacity can be signalled, while this is not the case for continuous trading. In the end, to reach all the above
mentioned benefits, they suggest to substitute continuous trading for frequent batch auctions.
The frequent batch auction idea and its advantages over the continuous limit order book in financial exchanges,
was first discussed by Budish et al. (2014) and later extended by Budish et al. (2015). Based on their definition,
frequent batch auctions are identical to the continuous limit order book with two exceptions: 1. time is considered
as discrete, not continuous, and 2. instead of serial processing of orders, based on their time-price priority, orders
are processed in batch form using a uniform-price auction. By modifying the market in this way, the speed race is
eliminated, and instead of competing on speed, price is rivaled.
In line with Neuhoff et al. (2016b), we argue in this paper that the bilateral trading structure of the continuous
European intraday market does not allow efficient congestion management. Together with the simplified network
models of the day-ahead and intraday markets, this create inefficiencies, which result in higher imbalance costs
compared to the case where all transmission network constraints are considered in one or more markets prior to
real-time. In this paper, we suggest to use the coordinated multilateral trade (CMT) approach, proposed by Wu
and Varaiya (1999), to the current European intraday market in order to fix both the aforementioned sources of
inefficiency. The CMT approach allows multilateral trades (instead of just bilateral trades) which are necessary
to relieve congestion. Moreover, by replacing the information transferred between transmission system operators
(TSOs) and power exchanges from available transmission capacities of cross border interconnectors (which are
imaginary lines between zones) to power transfer distribution factors (ptdfs) of congested lines (which are physical
lines between nodes), the intraday market can reach to the optimal economic dispatch. In this paper, we focus on
congestion issues, and not other sources of imbalances or flexibility costs, so we assume that supply and demand
functions remain fixed throughout the day-ahead and intraday markets, and no uncertainty is modeled.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we review different congestion management
approaches which are equivalent to the optimal economic dispatch and optimal nodal pricing model. This literature
review is needed to understand the relationship between the current European design, the CMT approach, and
optimal economic dispatch. Section 3.3 gives a detailed explanation of the XBID components and describes the
research question and the relevant assumptions. Section 3.4 reviews the CMT approach and shows its relation to
the day-ahead and intraday market by mathematical formulations. Section 3.5 illustrates the CMT approach in
a 6-node example. Several cases are discussed, where the capacities allocated in the day-ahead market vary, and
where intraday trading starts from a feasible or infeasible day-ahead solution. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the
paper and future research is discussed.
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3.2 Literature review
In the nodal pricing approach introduced by Schweppe et al. (1988), the nodal prices are the shadow prices of
the power balance equations of the optimal economic power flow problem. The successful implementation of nodal
pricing in North America, Australia and New Zealand has proven the efficiency of this powerful transmission pricing
tool, without encountering significant technical problems. It has also been considered by the European Commission
as one of the plausible approaches for integrating European electricity markets (Brunekreeft et al. (2005)).
In the 1990’s however, there was a great debate about the efficiency of the nodal pricing approach. One of the
most important objections, raised by Wu and Varaiya (1999), was the intervention of transmission system operators
(TSOs) on economic or market decisions. In order to achieve a solution to the optimal economic dispatch problem,
which on the one hand guarantees the security and reliability of the power system, and on the other hand promotes
economic efficiency, strategic information about cost and demand functions (private information) of generators and
consumers must be revealed to the TSO, who should just be responsible of technical support of the power system.
Hence, the information structure and decision making authority are both centralized in the nodal pricing model.
Therefore, many attempts have been made to decouple these two distinct dimensions of the power system, by
delegating economic efficiency responsibilities to power exchanges and technical support of the power system to the
TSO. Nevertheless, they can never converge to a system optimal solution if a proper coordination is not established
between them. Accordingly, the coordination models can be interpreted as various decomposition procedures for
the optimal economic dispatch problem, wherein the dispatchers solve different subproblems, and subject to the
subproblem structure, different information is exchanged back and forth with the TSO. Overall, these decomposition
models can be classified into two groups:
1. Price-directed
2. Resource-directed
The method suggested by Chao and Peck (1996) is a price-directed scheme for explicit congestion pricing. In
this method, scarce transmission resources are explicitly priced, and prices are communicated together with power
transfer distribution factors (ptdfs), such that traders can acquire the necessary transmission capacity rights in
order to do a transaction. In optimum, Chao-Peck prices are equivalent to optimal nodal prices.
Like the Chao-Peck price-directed method, the capacity charge approach suggested by Bjørndal et al. (2010)
can be categorized as a price-driven decomposition of the optimal economic dispatch problem. By relaxing the
line capacity constraints through Lagrangian relaxation, the constraints are implicitly managed by means of nodal
capacity charges, which result in shifts in the nodal supply and demand curves. In other words, the social optimum
solution is achieved by an iterative process between the TSO, who is announcing nodal capacity charges, and the
power exchange, who is solving an unconstrained optimal dispatch problem by clearing the market with respect to
the shifted supply and demand curves.
In the coordinated multilateral trade model presented by Wu and Varaiya (1999), only technical information
related to the congested lines, signalling scarce resource availability (resource in this case means capacity of trans-
mission lines) is announced by the TSO. Hence, the decision making authority related to economic and technical
issues of the power system is broken up. Moreover, in the CMT model power exchanges can also be replaced by
more decentralized entities, called brokers. After receiving supply and demand bids from interested generators
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and consumers, along with relevant signals from the TSO, the broker can find profitable multilateral trades, that
move towards a feasible direction with respect to the announced technical limits. Thus, coordination is established
through an iterative process, where power transfer distribution factors (ptdfs) of congested lines resulting from the
last trades are announced by the TSO, and by utilizing the new information, brokers find new profitable trades.
This process lasts until no further profitable trades can be found. Wu and Varaiya (1999) proved that the proposed
CMT model will achieve the same economic efficiency and the same level of reliability as the nodal pricing model,
meaning that social welfare is maximized with respect to the network constraints, provided that generators maxi-
mize profit and consumers maximize utility. Furthermore, instead of a broker, groups of generators and consumers
with private terms and conditions of trade (without revealing their cost and benefit functions) can suggest balanced
trades to the TSO. Consequently, in general no price can be extracted in the CMT model and it is not necessary
that trades happen at the same time.
The CMT idea introduced in the 1990’s, has been studied by Qin et al. (2017) for designing an innovative flexible
market for smart grids. It is stated that the great flexibility of the CMT model, along with low communication
and control burdens on the TSO, makes it an attractive approach for coordinating procedures in the distribution
system. Moreover, by generalizing the CMT model from a deterministic settlement market setting (day-ahead)
into a stochastic two-settlement market (day-ahead and real-time), they confirm that it is possible to achieve
the same solution (maximizing expected social welfare) as a stochastic optimal dispatch model. Additionally, the
dispatch and prices extracted from their model support competitive equilibrium under uncertainty (i.e. constitute
an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium).
Since we suggest to utilize the CMT approach for a more efficient way of managing congestion in the intraday
market, further details, related terminology and relevant mathematical models of the CMT model will be given in
Section 3.4.4.
3.3 Problem description and assumptions
The sequence of day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets are cleared for each delivery hour of day d. In the
European market design, the first two markets are cleared by power exchanges, only partly addressing the physical
transmission network, while the last is typically organized by the TSOs, settling energy imbalances, while respecting
day-ahead and intraday schedules, and considering the full transmission network. Therefore, the decoupling of the
optimal economic dispatch problem by delegating the market efficiency responsibility to the power exchanges and
security/reliability to the TSOs has been done before. Hence, the main idea of the CMT approach, which is the
decoupling of decision making authorities, is already a reality in the European electricity market, but the information
shared is different from the CMT model, although it is connected to transfer capacities. In the following, we will
look more closely on the detailed design of the European intraday market.
In the XBID project, all orders of each power exchange will be shared in a shared order book (SOB) module,
such that all market participants of other power exchanges located in other bidding zones can see them, provided
that enough cross-border capacity, called Available Transfer Capacity (ATC), is available. The ATCs are provided
by the relevant TSOs in the capacity management module (CMM). CMM provides two ATCs for each cross-border
line, one for each direction. Orders submitted to different bidding zones can be matched provided there is enough
capacity available. If two orders are matched, the SOB and CMM will be updated immediately. Trades are based
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on the first-come first-served principle, such that the highest bid price and the lowest ask price get served first.
Whenever a matching happens, the SOB calculates the required quantity to be transferred between the source and
destination zone. Then the CMM is responsible to find a routing plan which results in capacity allocations and
thus updated ATCs.
The routing model applies a minimum cost flow model to select routes, i.e. routes with minimum cost that
satisfy the flow constraints over cross-border lines. These cross-border lines, however, are edges of a graph which do
not reflect accurately the physical transmission network. For instance, the model does not consider the externalities
created by loop flows, which is a main characteristic of electricity networks. Consequently, like in the day-ahead
market, it is very likely that the trades occurring in the intraday market lead to infeasible flows over physical
transmission lines. Even if the flow-based market coupling model was used in the intraday market, it does not
take into account the full nodal description of supply and demand, and will not achieve the same solution as the
benchmark case of optimal nodal prices.
With the decision of the European Commission to integrate intraday markets with continuous trading, and
with capacity and routing information provided by the TSOs, we consider the XBID market as an interesting
opportunity for the CMT approach. The iterative nature of the CMT approach fits well with the intraday market,
whether it is organized by continuous trading or by batch auctions. Moreover, the information needed from the
TSOs in the CMT model is similar to the information already provided to the intraday market, although more
details about the location of bids and ptdfs for detailed grid models are needed. With the CMT model applied to
the intraday market, the responsibilities of power exchanges and TSOs are not mixed up, and by using ptdfs of
detailed physical transmission lines in a market cleared prior to the balancing market, rather than the simplified
network model of the day-ahead market, we should be able to reduce the costs of congestion management in the
real-time balancing market.
In the following we develop the model, focusing on congestion management, and thus we apply some simplifying
assumptions:
 In the day-ahead market, the power exchanges have access to zonal level information, which means that they
know supply and demand functions for each zone, as well as aggregate transfer capacities (ATCs) between
zones.
 In the suggested CMT intraday market, power exchanges receive supply and demand bids on nodal level,
as well as technical (ptdf) information related to individual congested lines (this is contrary to the current
intraday market design, where information is on zonal level).
 A single TSO (or a unit of cooperating TSOs) announces the ptdfs of congested lines in the whole region of
governance, checks the feasibility of trades, and solves the curtailment problem.
3.4 Mathematical models
3.4.1 Notation
We adopt the same mathematical formulation as Bjorndal et al. (2016), where I denotes the set of market
participants, either generators or consumers. For each i P I, the quantity xi will be either production (if xi ¡ 0)
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or consumption (if xi   0). For the multistage trading process in Section 3.4.4, we will add the superscript k to
denote the current stage, where k  0 denotes the day-ahead market and k ¥ 1 denotes some stage of the intraday
market, and xki is the production or consumption quantity corresponding to market participant i in stage k.
The cost function of generator i, where xi ¡ 0, can be of any type (quadratic, step-wise or piece-wise linear)
and is denoted cipxiq. For consumers, where xi   0, the benefit function is denoted cipxiq. Thus, cipxiq can be
interpreted as a cost function for all market participants. With multistage trading processes, as in Section 3.4.4,
the cost or benefit functions could depend on the current stage k, but we will not consider such cases in this paper,
since our focus is on congestion management only.
The production/consumption plans of the market participants are restricted by individual capacity constraints
as well as by previous decisions. For the day-ahead market stage, the capacity constraints are represented as
x0i P C
0
i i P I, (3.1)
where C0i is the feasible set for market participant i in stage 0. In the intraday market, i.e., where k ¥ 1, the
feasible set Cki will also depend on previous decisions taken by participant i, i.e., the sequence x
0
i , ..., x
k1
i from







i , ..., x
k1
i q i P I. (3.2)
For the benchmark case in Section 3.4.2, where the market is cleared in a single stage, we will omit the superscripts
and just write Ci.
Each market participant i is located in a specific node n P N , i.e., i P In. Nodes of the network are connected
by a set of physical transmission lines L. For each line l P L, the flow is denoted fl, and the corresponding thermal
limit is denoted fmaxl . We will denote the starting and ending node of line l as ν0plq P N and ν1plq P N , respectively.
I.e., fl ¡ 0 indicates a power flow from ν0plq to ν1plq, while fl   0 indicates flow in the opposite direction. Under a
linear DC approximation (Schweppe et al. (1988)), flows can be related to nodal injections/withdrawals by constant
power transfer distribution factors, where the factor ptdfl,n represents the flow over line l P L if 1 MW of power is
injected at node n P N and withdrawn at the reference node.
Each market participant i is located in a pre-determined zone z P Z, i.e., i P Iz. For every pair of connected
zones there is an interconnector e P E and a flow fe. Similar to the notation for lines, we let ω0peq P Z and ω1peq P Z
be the starting and ending zones of interconnector e, respectively. Hence, fe ¡ 0 means that the commercial flow
goes from ω0peq to ω1peq, whereas fe   0 means that the flow goes in the opposite direction. We will assume that
the zonal day-ahead market is cleared with lower (ATCmine ) and upper (ATC
max
e ) bounds on the commercial flow
over interconnection e P E.1
3.4.2 Nodal benchmark model
Model (3.3) describes a day-ahead market with nodal pricing. The objective (3.3a) minimizes total net cost,
which is equivalent to maximizing total welfare. For each market participant i P I, (3.3b) represents the respective
1Unlike transmission line constraints, where the thermal capacity limit fmaxl determines both the upper and lower bound for fl, we
do not necessarily have ATCmine  ATC
max
e , since system operators, when setting the ATCs, will try to ensure feasibility for the
entire system.
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production/consumption constraints. For every node n P N we define τn as injection from the node to the grid,
and (3.3c) links net injection to the sum of production and consumption in the node. The flow over each line l P L














ptdfl,n  τn l P L (3.3d)
 fmaxl ¤ fl ¤ f
max
l l P L (3.3e)
Since we do not consider uncertainty in this paper, and since (3.3) includes a complete description of the network
constraints, as given by the linear DC approximation, it will give us the first-best solution, i.e., a natural benchmark
for our analyses, including optimal nodal prices, λn.
3.4.3 Zonal day-ahead market
The current European electricity market setup is a sequential system consisting of the day-ahead, intraday, and
balancing markets. The markets are cleared with deterministic models, meaning that uncertainty about intraday
and real-time events are not taken into consideration in the day-ahead stage, at least not explicitly. The equations








subject to x0i P C
0











fe, z P Z (3.4d)
ATCmine ¤ fe ¤ ATC
max
e e P E (3.4e)
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, x0i is the vector of production/consumption at the day-ahead market. The
objective (3.4a) is the same as in the nodal benchmark model (3.3). The constraint (3.4b) reflects any kind of
constraints that market participant i is confronted with at the day-ahead market. The constraint (3.4c) defines
the net injection τz from zone z to the grid, and the shadow price, λz, represents the day-ahead clearing price
of the zone. Constraint (3.4d) links the zonal net injection to the flow over the relevant interconnectors. Finally,
constraint (3.4e) enforces the inter-zonal trading capacities.
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3.4.4 Coordinated multilateral trading concepts
The novel idea introduced by Wu and Varaiya (1999) and then developed by Qin et al. (2017), is that a free-
market style of meet-and-trade, instead of a centralized infrastructure with high level of coordination, is able to
provide an opportunity for all generators and consumers to seek profit on their own, implying that they can conduct
the economic function themselves, deciding about price, trading terms and conditions, as well as trading quantity.
Hence, the direct effect of this mechanism is that price information is private.
However, the idea of meet-and-trade without any coordination with the TSO could result in flows that violate
the transmission capacity constraints. Consequently, Wu and Varaiya suggested an idea where the TSO and free
traders coordinate with as little information sharing as possible, such that a feasible solution is attained at every
stage. Therefore, they even neglected the power exchange role and just let market participants coordinate with the
TSO, either directly or with the help of a broker. Hence, trades between two or more market players is the main
element of such a market design.
Even if the definition of multilateral, feasible, feasible direction and profitable trades, as well as other related
terminology, have been fully explained in Wu and Varaiya (1999) and expanded to models with uncertainty by Qin
et al. (2017), we will give a short review, customized to our purposes. The building blocks of continuous trading,
as in current intraday markets, are bilateral trades. However, as Wu and Varaiya (1999) proved, it is not possible
to relieve congestion in a network by bilateral trades only. Hence, multilateral trades may be necessary to ensure
convergence to the optimal nodal solution.
Definition 1. Multilateral trade. A trade involving more than one party, such that, in a lossless system,
the sum of the traded quantities is equal to zero. Mathematically, a multilateral trade involving the participants
I 1  I, is a vector ∆x  p∆xiq, where ∆xi is the traded quantity for participant i P I, such that
°
iPI1 ∆xi  0 and
for i R I 1, ∆xi  0.







xi l P L, (3.5)
and the flow will be feasible if
 fmaxl ¤ fl ¤ f
max
l l P L. (3.6)
Given that x is the current plan, and that it is feasible, i.e., satisfies (3.5) and (3.6), a new trade ∆x may cause one
or more of the inequalities in (3.6) to be violated. If that is the case, then the TSO might have to curtail the trade.
Definition 2. Uniform curtailment. In order to make sure that the new plan is feasible, the TSO will only
accept a portion γ P r0, 1s of the trade ∆x, such that x  γ∆x is feasible. γ  1 means that the whole trade ∆x is
accepted without curtailment.
A feasible direction trade is a trade that does not increase the net power flow over lines that are already
congested.
Definition 3. Feasible direction trade. Let Lc denote the set of congested lines. If x is feasible, and if the
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resulting flow f satisfies
fl  f
max
l l P Lc, (3.7)
fl   f
max
l l R Lc, (3.8)






∆xi ¤ 0 l P Lc. (3.9)
Definition 4. Profitable multilateral trade. Assume that x is feasible. A trade ∆x is profitable at x if it
reduces the total cost (increases social welfare).
Definition 5. Broker. The third party entity that arranges the trades.
As we mentioned before, after curtailing the infeasible flows resulting from the broker’s solution, the TSO
announces the congested lines (lines at maximum flow) and their related ptdfs. Hence, the broker receives new
signals for going in the right direction. The broker’s decision making problem is very similar to the economic dispatch
model. However, instead of modeling the full transmission network, a broker tries to move toward feasibility with
regards to the signals obtained from the TSO. In general, a broker can modify the previously allocated schedules
by finding profitable deviations from the current schedule. These deviations could be positive or negative. Positive
deviations, i.e. ∆x ¡ 0, may be due to:
 Increase in power production from flexible generators, meaning that the generators want to sell an extra
amount of energy in the current stage of the intraday market.
 Decrease in power consumption from flexible loads, i.e. consumers resell power that is bought previously.
 Extra production from intermittent renewable power generators, for instance because updated forecasts show
an increase in available power, which can be sold in the current stage of the intraday market.
Likewise, negative deviations, i.e. ∆x   0, can be due to:
 Decrease in power production from flexible generators, meaning that the generators will buy back power.
 Increase in power consumption.
 Production reductions from intermittent renewable generators, for instance because of new forecasts showing
less availability of power.
Considering the broker problem, it is obvious that if more parties are involved, the higher the chance is to
find a more profitable solution. In this respect, the best case is if all generators and consumers are involved in the
broker’s problem, which then will be identical to a fully coordinated auction operated by the power exchange. The
meet-and-trade approach suggested by Wu and Varaiya (1999) and Qin et al. (2017) demonstrates the possibility
of reaching an efficient market outcome in a decentralized setting, under strong assumptions of zero search cost and
perfect information. They don’t imply that a decentralized market is superior to a centralized in practice, as there
may be significant search costs for finding the right trading partners, unless there is some information platform
that collects participants’ cost/benefit information and shares it with suitable parties. A good market structure
could be some middle ground between a fully centralized market and a fully decentralized one, as centralization
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requires significant communication cost while decentralization leads to higher search cost. Another benefit of the
decentralized approach is that the centralized solution can be contested.
3.4.5 Intraday market with coordinated multilateral trading
The intraday market serves several purposes, as reviewed by Rahimi et al. (2018). One purpose is to handle
unexpected events, like unplanned power plant outages, forecast errors from intermittent renewable energy sources,
load forecast errors, etc. Also, as mentioned in Section 3.4.3, since the day-ahead market (3.4) is modeled as a
partly network-constrained auction, most probably the day-ahead solution does not satisfy the physical network
constraints (3.5) and (3.6), and the intraday market may help relieving the remaining congestion. In this paper, our
focus is on congestion management, and we will not consider deviations due to uncertainty or changes in forecasts
in the illustrations that follow.
With additional detailed locational information about bid and ask offers, as well as the technical information
about ptdfs of congested lines provided to the power exchanges, the limit order book of the European power
exchanges may work exactly as a facilitating information platform for traders. Market participants can find trading
partners to a feasible direction trade without paying the high search costs of the meet-and-trade approach, and
without necessarily having to reveal private information such as cost functions to the power exchange. Thus, the
limit order book may function as an infrastructure for allowing continuous decentralized multilateral trades by
brokers. It may however also serve as an infrastructure for running batch auctions, such that for every batch
auction, a subset of participants take part and are cleared. The clearing result can be interpreted as a multilateral
trade among this subset of participants. As an extreme, the power exchange itself can take on the role as broker.
If we were to model decentralized trades or batch auctions, we would have to model some kind of random
arrival of buyers and sellers. If we were to model forecasting errors of renewable generators, or how information
is revealed over time, this would be a natural approach. Since we want to focus on the congestion management
aspects, and assume that supply and demand functions are fixed as in day-ahead, we simplify the exposition and
assume that the exchange takes on the broker role, running auctions with all participants involved. Thus, the power
exchange and TSO problems are attained by decomposing the optimal economic dispatch problem such that the
power exchange problem is considered to be the master problem, while the TSO problem is the subproblem, and
the feasible direction trade constraints are linking cuts.
In the following, we will use the CMT concepts, introduced in the previous section, to construct two alternative
intraday market procedures, as shown in Figure 3.1. Both procedures start from the day-ahead solution, which may
be infeasible. The main difference between procedures A and B is how they treat the initial day-ahead solution:
A. In this approach we follow exactly the same procedure as the CMT approach, but we curtail the day-ahead
solution to get an initial feasible trade before starting the intraday market. The advantage of this approach
is that we will reach the optimal nodal solution at the end of the intraday market iterations, as proved by
Wu and Varaiya (1999). It is however, an open question whether and how the day-ahead market participants,
that are affected by the curtailment, should be compensated.
B. Start the intraday market with a day-ahead solution that may be infeasible. The difference with respect to
procedure A is, as we will show in Section 3.5, that we do not necessarily reach the optimal nodal solution,
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Figure 3.1. CMT process description under alternative A (left) and B (right).
We will refer to the plan in iteration k as xk, where k  0 represents the day-ahead solution. The initial
curtailment in Procedure A is done by the TSO, who will solve (3.10) in order to maximize the curtailment factor
γ, i.e., accept as much as possible of the initial solution x0, such that the curtailed solution γx0 satisfies the network
constraints (3.10b)-(3.10d).
Maximizeγ,f,τ γ (3.10a)
subject to: τn 
¸
iPn




ptdfl,n  τn l P L (3.10c)
 fmaxl ¤ fl ¤ f
max
l l P L (3.10d)
0 ¤ γ ¤ 1 (3.10e)
After the initial curtailment in Procedure A, we make the assignment x1 Ð γx0. For Procedure B, where no
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initial curtailment is done, we assign x1 Ð x0.
In every iteration k, the TSO will announce the ptdfs of the congested lines, i.e., the lines belonging to the set
Lkc  tl P L : |fl|  fmaxl u. (3.11)
Based on the definition from Wu and Varaiya (1999), a broker can facilitate the trades between generators and
consumers by finding profitable trades in the feasible direction via the optimization problem (3.12), where Ik  I
































i P I (3.12d)
The objective (3.12a) of the broker problem is to find ∆xk such that the cost reduction by moving from xk to
xk  ∆xk is maximized, subject to the power balance constraint (3.12b) and the feasible direction trade constraint
(3.12c) for congested lines. A profitable trade, according to Definition 1, is an optimal solution where the value of
(3.12a) is positive.
Profitable trades found by the broker may lead to infeasible flows, so the TSO may need to curtail them by
solving (3.13), similar to the initial curtailment problem (3.10) in Procedure A.
Maximizeγ,f,τ γ (3.13a)









ptdfl,n  τn l P L (3.13c)
 fmaxl ¤ fl ¤ f
max
l l P L (3.13d)
0 ¤ γ ¤ 1 (3.13e)
After curtailment, we initialize the next iteration with xk 1 Ð xk   γ∆xk, and repeat the process.
3.5 Numerical example and results
In this section, a small deterministic 6-bus system is used to clarify how our suggested CMT-based intraday
market can be implemented. With a deterministic example, it is easier to explore how the trading process is managed
by the CMT model. The 6-bus example is depicted in Figure 3.2. The system consists of 2 zones z P tZ1, Z2u
(which can be interpreted as 2 countries), 6 nodes n P tn1, ..., n6u, 3 conventional generators g P tG1, G2, G3u placed
at nodes 1, 2 and 5, respectively. Moreover, there are 3 elastic loads, d P tD1, D2, D3u, located at nodes 3, 4, and
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6, and finally 8 lines l P tL1, ..., L8u. The capacity of the lines is also shown in Figure 3.2. The susceptance of all





















Figure 3.2. 6-bus example
Table 3.1. Line parameters.
PTDF
Lines Susceptance n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6
1-2 1 0.088 -0.530 -0.105 0.030 -0.020 0
1-3 1.5 0.279 -0.011 -0.332 0.094 -0.064 0
1-4 1.6 0.634 0.540 0.437 -0.124 0.084 0
2-3 0.9 0.088 0.470 -0.105 0.030 -0.020 0
3-5 1.1 0.366 0.460 0.563 0.124 -0.084 0
4-5 1.3 0.160 0.095 0.023 0.329 -0.223 0
4-6 0.95 0.474 0.446 0.414 0.547 0.307 0
5-6 1.4 0.526 0.554 0.586 0.453 0.693 0
The related market participants’ data is as follows:
 G1 is a nuclear power plant with capacity of 450 MW, and a constant marginal cost of 12 e/MWh.
 G2 is a gas power plant with 350 MW capacity and a constant marginal cost of 20 e/MWh.
 G3 is a coal power plant with hard coal fuel, the capacity of this plant is 400 MW and its marginal cost of
production equals 17 e/MWh.
 D1 is a load with medium willingness to pay of 23 e/MWh and maximum consumption of 450 MW.
 D2 is a load with low willingness to pay of 21 e/MWh and consumption capacity of 400 MW.
 D3 is a load with high willingness to pay of 30 e/MWh and maximum consumption of 350 MW.
There is one interconnector e between zones z1 and z2. Based on the ATC of this interconnector and the
different approaches mentioned in Section 3.4.5, several cases will be discussed in the subsequent sections.
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3.5.1 Benchmark: Optimal nodal solution
In Figure 3.3 we display the optimal economic dispatch, with optimal generation, consumption, line flows, and
nodal prices. This constitutes the benchmark solution. Line capacities are given by numbers in black, while the
resulting line flows are given by numbers in red. We have marked line flows that are at (and later also above) their











































Figure 3.3. Optimal nodal solution with social surplus = 8666.5.
3.5.2 Starting point: Day-ahead solutions
We will test Methods A and B with two different starting points, depending on how the ATC capacities are
set by the TSO.
If the TSO sets ATC  8 we get the solution shown in Figure 3.4. The physical flows resulting from the



















































































Figure 3.4. Day-ahead clearing result with ATC  8. Social surplus = 10050.
On the other hand, if the TSO sets ATC  0 we get the solution shown in Figure 3.5. Again, the solution is








































Figure 3.5. Day-ahead clearing result with ATC  0. Social surplus = 9700.
3.5.3 Method A: Curtail day-ahead before intraday starts
3.5.3.1 ATC  8
According to Method A, the DA schedule shown in Figure 3.4 is curtailed, based on (3.10), resulting in the



















































































Figure 3.6. Curtailed starting solution (γ  0.54).












































Figure 3.7. Iteration 1 - profitable trade. Social surplus = 4380.
63






























































































Figure 3.8. Iteration 1 - TSO curtailment (γ  0.106).
This process continues until, after 4 iterations, no further profitable trades can be found, and we end up with













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.14. Iteration 4 - TSO curtailment not necessary (γ  1).
3.5.3.2 ATC  0
We apply (3.10) to the day-ahead solution shown in Figure 3.5, resulting in the curtailed starting point in
Figure 3.15. Figures 3.16-3.21 show the results of 3 iterations, after which no more profitable trades can be found.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.21. Iteration 3 - TSO curtailment not necessary (γ  1).
3.5.4 Method B: Start intraday from (possibly infeasible) day-ahead solution
3.5.4.1 ATC  8
We start Method B from the day-ahead solution shown in Figure 3.4. When we apply (3.12) to this solution,
we cannot find any profitable trades. Hence, for this example, Method B is not able to detect any trades that can
relieve the congestion.
3.5.4.2 ATC  0
Starting with the uncurtailed day-ahead solution shown in Figure 3.5, we apply (3.12), resulting in the solution







































































































































Figure 3.23. Iteration 1 - TSO curtailment (γ  0.31).
In this case, no further profitable trades can be found, so the procedure stops after just one iteration. We
notice that the final solution is not feasible, since the capacity of line 1-3 is still violated. However, it is closer to
being feasible than it was in the day-ahead solution, since the flow over line 1-3 has been reduced, and no other
constraints are violated. Interestingly, it turns out that the final solution in Figure 3.23 is identical to the optimal
economic dispatch that we obtain if we relax the capacity constraint of the violated line 1-3, and set it equal to the























































































Figure 3.24. Optimal economic dispatch with relaxed capacity constraint on line 1-3.
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3.5.5 Summary of example
If the day-ahead solution can be curtailed, as with Method A, we can reach the optimal nodal solution. It
does not matter which ATC capacity the day-ahead solution is based on, except that the convergence time will be
affected. In the example, we have used the uniform curtailment method of the CMT approach. However, in practice,
other methods to obtain a feasible starting solution before the intraday market opens could also be applied, such
as redispatch or counter trading.
If the day-ahead solution cannot be curtailed, as with Method B, the CMT-based intraday market will not
worsen any physically overloaded links, as long as the load factors/ptdfs of these constraints are communicated to
the market place. On the contrary, The CMT approach can help to get closer to a feasible solution, if profitable
trades can be found in a feasible direction. The final solution will depend on the ATC capacities used in the
day-ahead market, and we can have cases where no profitable trades can be found. The final solution will in
general not be equal to the optimal nodal solution, but corresponds to the optimal solution of a relaxed optimal
economic dispatch problem, where the capacity of links that are violated in the day-ahead solution is set equal to
the day-ahead flows.
3.6 Conclusions
Electricity markets across the world differ substantially when it comes to dealing with transmission constraints
and the complexities created by the loop flow characteristics of electricity. This is reflected in the nodal/zonal
debate, where for instance the North American and European power markets have chosen different solutions. The
coordinated multilateral trade (CMT) model is equivalent to the nodal pricing model when it comes to efficiency,
but differs when it comes to the coordination mechanism (technical information about power transfer distribution
factors of congested lines) and information needs and responsibilities for market operators and market participants.
With the present developments in the European intraday markets, with a joint limit order book, and information
about transfer capacities provided by the TSOs, we argue that the CMT model could be used in the European
intraday market, in order to incorporate more detailed information about location of bids and their influence on
congested lines in the system. The benefit would be that intraday trades could improve, and at least not worsen,
capacity constraints in the physical electricity networks. The CMT model can be used in a decentralized setting,
with brokers organizing trades continuously, but it can also be used if frequent batch auctions were to be introduced
in the market.
In this paper, we have outlined the CMT model in the setting of the European intraday market, and we
have discussed the information needs if the CMT model is to be an efficient procedure for managing transmission
constraints in the integrated European intraday markets. The European power exchanges run the day-ahead markets
based on the Euphemia algorithm, which needs zonal level data, while the requirements of the CMT approach is
access to nodal level data. This means that if the power exchanges have access to nodal level supply and demand
functions for the intraday market, then the coordination between power exchanges and TSOs can be done just by
transferring technical information. We have illustrated the iterative CMT procedure on a small 6-node example,
illustrating that the number of iterations and the final result depends on the capacities given to the day-ahead
market (assuming the ATC model) and whether the starting point of the intraday market is the solution to the
day-ahead market or a curtailed (and therefore feasible) solution. Even if we start the intraday market from an
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infeasible day-ahead solution, the intraday trading can improve the constraints by finding profitable trades that
don’t aggravate overloads.
Since we have focused on the congestion management aspects, we have assumed that supply and demand
functions are the same in day-ahead as in the different intraday market stages. Implicitly this means that the only
purpose of the intraday market is to reduce imbalance costs due to the network simplifications in the day-ahead
market. Even in this simplified setting, further research is required to understand whether the number of iterations
in the CMT based intraday market is tractable for realistic networks, and how it depends on settings in the day-
ahead market. Another avenue for further research is to assess the CMT model in relation to other important
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Abstract
With the Europe 2020 strategy, that targeted 20% of gross final energy consumption from renewable sources by 2020,
the security of power systems has been confronted with new challenges due to the stochastic nature of renewable
generation. Consequently, the EU Commission has set the electricity market design reforms high on the agenda.
Because of this, it has been decided to complement the already established power markets with pan-European
intraday auctions. On the one hand, these auctions allow to price cross-zonal capacity, and on the other hand,
by providing new trading opportunities closer to the delivery hour, the risk for the intermittent generators to be
imbalanced in the real-time diminishes. The optimal timing of these auctions is affected by two contradictory
factors; by getting closer to the delivery hour there will be lower uncertainty due to the more accurate forecasts,
and higher flexibility costs of the system due to the activation of more expensive flexibility providers. In this
paper, standard deviation (STD) is used as a measure of uncertainty. By experimenting with several scenario trees
where the standard deviation (STD) is declining from day-ahead to real-time, we find that in a sequential market
setting, STD reduction itself is not enough to say that the latest intraday option is the best (by fixing the other
variables). STD is mainly reflected in re-adjustment quantities and therefore, the multiplicative effect of flexibility
cost and re-adjustment quantities determine the optimal intraday place not the trade-off between flexibility cost
and STD reduction. Furthermore, an optimal intraday auction placement vigorously depends on the technological
combination in the considered market. For instance, in hydro-dominated systems adding an intraday auction does
not have any salient effect while in systems with large share of thermal plants with high flexibility costs, adding an
intraday auction could be hugely cost-effective.
Keywords: Renewable integration, Sequential markets, Intraday auctions, Multi-stage scenario tree generation,
Conditional expectations, clustering (bucketing) approach
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4.1 Introduction
The decision of the European Commission to integrate European intraday markets by a common continuous
trading approach, has unveiled new challenges regarding the pricing of cross-zonal capacity. The guideline on
capacity allocation and congestion management (CACM) requires methods for pricing the capacity that market
participants can use on cross-border lines (Commission Regulation (EU), (2015)), while continuous trading is not
in line with this guideline (NVE THEMA Consulting Group (2019)). In continuous trading, available capacity
is allocated based on a first-come-first-serve principle, and if only parts of the cross-border capacity is assigned
to the first cleared trade, the capacity is not scarce. If, after subsequent trades, the capacity becomes scarce, it
is not possible for capacity owners to place a value on this scarcity, because it has already been assigned at no
cost. Hence, allocating capacity to the continuous trading intraday market may not only result in revenue loss for
capacity owners, but may also provide insufficient signals and incentives for efficient assignment and development
of cross-zonal capacity. Therefore, in spite of the fact that CACM requires pricing of cross-zonal capacity to be
part of the market design, thus far the continuous intraday market does not include this feature.
Consequently, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) has decided to complement the
already established continuous trading intraday market with three pan-European implicit auctions to price cross-
zonal capacity (ACER, (2019)). The main reason for this decision is that with auctions, all offers and bids are
gathered and cleared simultaneously. If capacity constraints are represented in the market clearing, cross-zonal
capacity scarcity (if there is one) is reflected in the values of the cleared trades. The payment to the capacity owner
is the difference between consumers’ and generators’ payments, and this payment may create a financial incentive for
capacity owners to either release capacity for intraday trade or to invest in actions that enhance intraday cross-zonal
capacity.
Given that there will be intraday auctions, the following important questions arise:
 How many intraday auctions should there be per day? Should there be a small number of large auctions, or
very fast and frequent auctions? Generally speaking, maximum efficiency is attainable in large auctions, where
many bids and offers are optimized simultaneously. Hence, we can argue in favor of having a few sequential
and large intraday auctions. In contrast to continuous trading, however, this design would postpone some of
the potential trades until the next auction, and this deferral might either deprive the less flexible providers
from participating in the intraday market at their latest possible time, or prevent intermittent generators from
immediate self-balancing, when updated information is available (Henriot (2012a) and Hagemann (2013a)).
Even though fast and frequent auctions may allow instant response to new information, they may uninten-
tionally clear sub-optimal trades, because a better trade could have been cleared later, if we had waited for
more bids and offers. However, if uncleared submitted bids and offers can be transferred to the next auction,
such that potentially valuable trades are not wasted, the efficiency of this design may improve.
 What is the optimal timing of the added auctions? Should they run before, after, in parallel, or even without
a continuous trading intraday market? Two important factors play a role in deciding about the timing of an
auction, i.e. the share of uncertain production and the flexibility of the system to respond to this uncertainty.
Henceforth, in the following we focus on the timing of an intraday auction and the two essential factors that
affect this decision.
With more intermittent generators being integrated into the power system, accurate forecasting systems become
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increasingly valuable, since large forecasting errors can lead to major economic inefficiencies due to non-optimal
schedules. NREL (2012) analyzes the wind forecast error distributions in several electrical systems, at two different
time scales, i.e. day-ahead and hour-ahead, which are both important when planning unit commitment and dispatch.
It is shown that shorter term forecasts, that are utilized in intraday markets, have smaller forecasting errors than
day-ahead forecasts, and therefore by introducing intraday markets, only the smaller short term forecast errors
must be balanced by flexibility providers in real time. Fabbri et al. (2005), Graeber et al. (2010) and Monteiro
et al. (2009) also show that when getting closer to the delivery time, the wind power forecast errors, and therefore
uncertainty, is declining.
Contrary to the reduced uncertainty, when approaching the delivery time, the flexibility of the power system
decreases, and therefore the costs of adjusting plans increase. Figure 4.1 compares the operating cost and operational
flexibility for different power plant technologies (adapted from Kleit et al. (2006)). As the figure shows, on the one
side, hydroelectric generators can ramp up/down in only a few minutes, and with very low cost, while on the other
side, nuclear power plants are not able to change their schedules for many days. NETL (2012) also shows how
short-term deviations from initial plans can enforce extra cost on conventional power plants. Hentschel et al. (2016)
develop a flexibility evaluation tool for conventional power plants, which translates a change in technical parameters
to an economic effect and revenue. By having access to such tools, generators, as well as flexible consumers, are
able to show their flexibility capability in various markets, by means of different cost and benefit functions. All the
mentioned references emphasize that the further we move away from the day-ahead market, towards the delivery
time, the higher costs are required for altering our initial position. However, this cost function is not increasing
continuously. Over some periods, waiting may have little or even no impact on flexibility costs, while over other
periods, many sources of flexibility may become unavailable.
Hence, the decline in uncertainty and incline in flexibility cost over time demonstrate a trade-off between
postponing dispatch until the uncertainty from generation of stochastic producers is reduced, and hastening dispatch
to avoid rising flexibility costs associated with changes in production and consumption on short notice. This trade-
off, which is displayed in Figure 4.2, demonstrates that early market clearing results in scheduling of cheap base
load power plants under high uncertainty, while later market clearing has little uncertainty but higher generation
costs.
In this paper, we address the question of when, during the time between a day-ahead and a real-time market, it
is best to add an intraday auction, given the trade-off between uncertainty and flexibility cost. Hence, we consider
a sequential three-settlement electricity market, composed of a day-ahead, an intraday, and a real-time market.
Three potential points in time (i.e. hours) are investigated for the intraday market. For the sake of simplicity, the
following assumptions have been made:
 It is assumed that the day-ahead market is cleared at time 24:00 of day d  1 for delivery hour 24:00 of day
d, i.e. we consider load and generation volumes for a single hour 24 hours ahead. Then deviations from the
day-ahead production and consumption schedules are cleared at one of the potential hours for the intraday
market, i.e. hours 6:00, 12:00 or 18:00 of day d, taking into account the information available at the time
of the intraday market. Finally, the energy imbalances are settled by a real-time market for delivery time
24:00, some minutes before hour 24:00, when all uncertainty regarding generation from stochastic sources is
resolved.
 Our model is similar to the conventional dispatch model in Morales et al. (2014) and the myopic model in
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Figure 4.1. Comparison of operating cost and operational flexibility for different power plant technologies (most
renewables are excluded since their operational flexibility is partly dependent on prevailing weather conditions such
as irradiance and wind speed/direction)
Figure 4.2. Trade-off between uncertainty and flexibility cost
and real-time), we analyze the conventional three-stage model, when production is uncertain and flexibility
is costly. In conventional dispatch models the uncertainty is captured by a deterministic approach, where
the day-ahead and intraday schedules of stochastic producers are constrained to their expected generation.
In contrast to the stochastic dispatch models, where the effect of decisions in later markets can be reflected
on the former markets by recourse, in conventional models the day-ahead decision is independent of intraday
and real-time decisions, and similarly, intraday decisions are made irrespective of real-time decisions. Hence,
conventional models are usually computationally tractable at the cost of suboptimal solutions.
 Even though pricing of cross-zonal capacity is an important reason for adding intraday auctions, network
constraints are neglected in this paper. Our main aim here is to analyze the impact of adding an extra
auction on the total cost of the system, and network constraints could easily be incorporated.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews the literature about intraday auctions
and timing issues in the power market. In Section 4.3, the mathematical models of sequential markets are described,
and these models will be tested on a numerical example explained in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, two approaches for
scenario generation are explained. Section 4.6 presents the results for the numerical example on different scenario
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trees, and finally, conclusions are given in Section 4.7.
4.2 Literature review
Neuhoff et al. (2016a) point to the advantages of adding multiple intraday auctions to the existing markets,
considering eight criteria such as improving market liquidity, facilitating contracting for flexibility, allowing effective
participation of players of all scales and technologies, ensuring technical feasibility, compatibility with current
continuous trading, ensuring consistency between intraday and balancing, allowing for pricing and efficient usage
of cross-zonal capacities, and finally, reducing unannounced loop flows. Due to the mentioned benefits, intraday
auctions make up an important step to enhance efficiency and to reduce the operational cost of the European power
system. In parallel, they empirically assess how adding auctions to the continuous intraday trading can improve
the performance of the market. In Neuhoff et al. (2016c) the effect of adding the 3 pm local auction (for quarters
in Germany in December 2014 at the European Power Exchange (EPEX SPOT)) to the current continuous trading
is investigated. They find that the additional auction enhances liquidity, gives rise to a higher market depth and
to reduced price volatility.
Similar to Neuhoff et al. (2016a), NVE THEMA Consulting Group (2019) analyzes how the various intraday
market designs, including one or more auctions alongside or instead of continuous intraday trading, affect market
efficiency by investigating eight mechanisms such as simultaneous clearing of multiple bids, revenues for cross-zonal
capacity, providing focal points for trade, pay-as-clear pricing, timing of trade, bid structures, transaction and
staffing costs and hedging quality. With respect to all these characteristics, they conclude that the introduction of
intraday auctions entails the potential to support efficiency. They are, however, more vague about the number of
auctions and the way they are organized alongside continuous trading.
In addition to the papers that emphasize the role of intraday auctions, other papers focus on the timing
of power markets, considering the large scale integration of renewables. For instance, Borggrefe and Neuhoff
(2011) state that in spite of the substantial improvement in wind forecasting methods, the day-ahead forecast is
still not able to capture the increasing uncertainty due to the surging intermittent generation in the European
power system. Therefore, by reducing the lead-time for wind forecasts through introducing intraday markets, it is
possible to improve wind forecasts within the hours between the day-ahead and real-time. However, the new design
(including intraday) has to satisfy six criteria, such as facilitating system-wide intraday adjustments, allowing co-
optimization of energy and reserve services, allowing inter-temporal optimization of energy and reserve, benefiting
from international integration of power systems, integrating demand side into intraday and real-time, and lastly,
effective monitoring of market power.
Schroder and Weber (2011) is the only reference we have found that focuses mainly on the optimal power
market timing for wind energy with respect to the trade-off between wind uncertainty and flexibility cost. The
three different timing options -changing the gate closure horizon, changing the trading period length, and shifting
the trading period- are conceptually analyzed for the day-ahead market. In their model, at first the hourly forecast
error that needs to be corrected is quantified, then they are multiplied by flexibility costs of the 5 different scenarios
(on flexibility costs) and finally the savings for wind power generation are calculated with respect to the three
timing options. To the best of our knowledge, no previous paper has quantitatively and analytically examined the
optimal timing of an intraday auction in the presence of wind uncertainty and flexibility costs. For a specific delivery
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hour, the day-ahead economic dispatch problem with expected wind power at delivery hour is optimized. Then
for an intraday auction at three places optimal re-adjustments are done to correct expected wind deviations from
day-ahead market. Likewise, the final optimal reschedule is done in real-time to cope with the real wind deviations
from intraday. Consistent to this structure, several 5-stage scenario trees on expected (at day-ahead and intraday
stage) and real (at real-time stage) wind power are tested to find the optimal intraday timing. Our scenario tree
generation approach is specifically practical for sequential markets that are clearing with the expected wind power,
not the wind power itself. Hence, this is also another contribution of this paper.
4.3 Mathematical model
4.3.1 Notation
The model has a set I of participants, either generators or consumers. For each i P I, the variables xDAi , x
ID
i,ωID
and xRTi,ωRT represent generation or consumption quantities for the day-ahead, intraday, and real-time markets,
respectively. Positive values represent generation, while negative values represent consumption.
FS1i represents the set of feasible solutions corresponding to participant i for the day-ahead market. For the
intraday market, the feasible set FS2i pω
ID, xDAi q depends on the intraday scenario ω
ID P ΩID as well as decision xDAi
from the day-ahead market. Finally, for the real-time market, the feasible set FS3i pω
RT , xDAi , x
ID
i,ωID q depends on
the realized scenario ωRT P ΩRT and decisions xDAi and x
ID
i from the day-ahead and intraday markets, respectively.




i ) for all three stages must satisfy the following constraints:
xDAi P FS
1




ID, xDAi q i P I, ω




RT , xDAi , x
ID
i q i P I, ω
RT P ΩRT (4.3)
Each market participant i is located in a specific node n P N , and we let In denote the set of generators /
consumers located in node n. Nodes of the network are connected by a set of physical transmission lines. Since
in this paper we are focusing on the impact of having three sequential markets, the congestion management issues
will be neglected.
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4.3.2 Day-ahead market (first stage)
The day-ahead market clearing model identifies the optimal schedule xDAi that minimizes day-ahead generation







subject to: τn  
¸
iPIn
xDAi  0 n P N (4.4b)¸
nPN
τn  0 (4.4c)
xDAi P FS
1
i i P I (4.4d)
For each market participant i, there is a linear day-ahead marginal cost or benefit function ai   bix
DA
i with
non-negative parameters ai and bi. For a consumer, as mentioned in Section 4.3.1, we have x
DA
i   0, and the
corresponding curve ai   bixi will therefore have a downward slope. The total day-ahead cost/benefit curve, which













The number τn is the net inflow of power in node n from the network. Therefore, constraints (4.4b) enforce
the day-ahead balancing conditions at each node, stating that the power generation plus the net power flow equals
the demand at each node. The equality (4.4c) states that the total generation must be equal to the total demand
in the whole network, i.e. we consider a lossless system. Constraints (4.4d) represents feasibility constraints for
generators and consumers, e.g., capacity limits, non-negativity constraints on generation and negativity constraints
on consumption variables. In particular, we assume that the day-ahead quantity for the stochastic generators GST
is constrained by
0 ¤ xDAi ¤ pxDAi i P GST , (4.5)
e.g., it must be a non-negative quantity less than or equal to the forecasted (expected) generation pxDAi . Since the
marginal cost of a stochastic generator i P GST is usually lower than for the conventional generators, and given
that there are not any other binding constraints, the stochastic generator will often be dispatched at its forecasted
capacity, i.e., xDAi  pxDAi .
4.3.3 Intraday market (second stage)
Once the day-ahead schedule xDAi has been obtained from (4.4), an intraday auction allows market participants
to adjust their physical positions closer to the real-time with respect to their updated forecast at intraday time. All
intraday parameters and decision variables are augmented with the scenario subscript ωID. For generator i P GST ,
let pxIDi,ωID denote the forecasted generation at delivery time, as seen at intraday time in scenario ωID. Over- or
underestimation at former stage(s) (day-ahead market) may result in different actions at intraday:
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 Overestimation (pxDAi ¡ pxIDi,ωID ): The stochastic generator may have to buy back power that it has sold in the
day-ahead market, i.e., xDAi  x
ID
i,ωID ¡ 0.
 Underestimation (pxDAi   pxIDi,ωID ): The stochastic generator may be able to sell extra power in the intraday
market, i.e., xDAi  x
ID
i,ωID   0.





i q ¡ 0, then this
may be compensated by other agents in the following ways:
 The power produced by flexible generators can be reduced. In market terms, this means that the generators
that are flexible in the intraday market, i P GIDflex, buy back a certain amount x
IDbuy
i,ωID of energy in the intraday
market.
 The power consumed by consumers that are elastic in the intraday market, i P DIDelastic, can be increased. In
other words, elastic demands can buy a certain amount xID
buy
i,ωID of energy in the intraday market.





i q   0, then
this may be compensated by other agents in the following ways:
 Increase the power production of flexible generators, i P GIDflex, this implies that flexible generators sell an
additional amount xID
sell
i,ωID of energy in the intraday market.
 Reduce the power consumed by elastic demands, i P DIDelastic , which is equivalent to say that flexible demands
can sell a certain amount xID
sell
i,ωID of energy in the intraday market.
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iPIn
xIDi,ωID  0 n P N (4.6b)¸
nPN
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Similar to the day-ahead market clearing model in (4.4), the constraints (4.6b) and (4.6c) enforce the intra-
day balancing conditions at each node and the energy balance for the entire network, respectively. Constraint
(4.6d), similar to (4.4d), represents feasibility constraints for generators and consumers, e.g., non-negativity (for
xIDi,ωID , i P G
ID
flex) / negativity constraints (for x
ID
i,ωID , i P D
ID
elastic) and capacity constraints. Note that the feasible
set FS2i pω
ID, xDAi q depends on the current intraday scenario ω
ID as well as the day-head schedule xDAi . In partic-
ular, as in (4.5), we assume that the revised schedule after the intraday market is constrained by a capacity equal
to the forecasted (expected) generation:
0 ¤ xIDi,ωID ¤ pxIDi,ωID i P GST (4.7)
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Constraints (4.6e)-(4.6f) defines the buy and sell quantities in the intraday market, i.e., the changes relative to
the day-ahead schedule.
The objective function (4.6a) represents the total cost of dispatching participants in both day-ahead and
intraday markets, provided that the intraday schedule initiated from the day-ahead schedule. The first term
CDAi px
ID
i,ωID q is the total cost (sum of both markets) for generator/consumer i evaluated at the day-ahead cost
































































































(d) Buy in intraday market for consumer i
Figure 1. Supply and demand curves in intraday market
1
Figure 4.3. Supply and demand curves in intraday market
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The extra flexibility costs are reflected by cost and benefit function parameters that differ from those in the day-









i for the intraday buy curve, where a
IDbuy
i ¤ ai ¤ a
IDsell





The objective function (4.6a) is illustrated by the grey and green areas in Figure 4.3. Areas with vertical grey lines
represent the value of CDAi px
ID
i,ωID q, while the parallelograms and triangles with diagonal green lines represent the





4.3.4 Real-time market (the third stage)
The production and consumption quantities scheduled in markets prior to the balancing market can substan-
tially deviate from the actual production and consumption at the real time. This is specifically evident in markets
with a high share of stochastic production. Thus, the real-time market closes the balance gap between the other
prior markets and real-time energy delivery. Therefore, this is the last market opportunity to balance production
and consumption.
Let the optimal day-ahead schedule xDAi and optimal intraday adjustment x
ID





) be obtained from optimization problems (4.4) and (4.6). Hence, decisions at this stage depend on the
potential stochastic production pxRTi,ωRT as well as the first stage decision xDAi and the second stage decision xIDi,ωID .
Therefore, the potential energy imbalance for a stochastic generator i is given by pxRTi,ωRT  xIDi,ωID , and the total
imbalance in the system equals
°
iPGST
ppxRTi,ωRT xIDi,ωID q. Like in the intraday market, this imbalance could be positive,
which illustrates surplus of generation, or negative, implying a shortage of generation. A generation surplus can be
handled by:
 Reducing the power generated by flexible generators i P GRTflex by down-regulation or buying back a certain
amount xdni,ωRT energy in the balancing market.
 Increasing the power consumption of elastic demands i P DRTelastic by down-regulation or buying a certain
amount xdni,ωRT of energy in the balancing market.
 Spilling a part xspill
i,ωRT
, i P GST of the stochastic production (However, stochastic generation is usually spilled
due to network congestion but since in this paper network constraints have not been considered, we do not
model spillage as well).
Similarly, a shortage of power can be handled by:
 Increasing the power generated by flexible generators i P GRTflex by up-regulation or selling a certain amount
xup
i,ωRT
of energy in the balancing market.
 Decreasing the power consumption of elastic demands i P DRTelastic by up-regulation or selling a certain amount
xup
i,ωRT
of energy in the balancing market.
 Shed a part xshedi,ωRT , i P D
RT
inelastic of the inelastic demand with a very high value of lost load (VOLL).
As indicated previously in Section 4.3.3, all real-time decision variables xupi , x
dn
i (i P G
RT
flex or i P D
RT
elastic)
and xshedi (i P D
RT
inelastic) must be subscripted by ω
RT to indicate the realization pxRTi,ωRT of stochastic production.
Consequently, in the real-time market, for every scenario ωRT P ΩRT , the following optimization problem is solved
to minimize the cost of correcting energy imbalances, provided that the real-time decision initiated from the optimal
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V OLLi  x
shed
i,ωRT (4.9a)
subject to: τn  
¸
iPn
xRTi,ωRT  0 n P N (4.9b)¸
nPN
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Similar to the day-ahead and intraday market clearing model in (4.4) and (4.6), the constraints (4.9b) and (4.9c)
enforce the intraday balancing conditions at each node and the energy balance for the entire network, respectively.
Constraint (4.9d), similar to (4.4d) and (4.6d), represents feasibility constraints for generators and consumers, e.g.,
non-negativity (for xRTi,ωRT , i P G
RT
flex) / negativity constraints (for x
RT
i,ωRT , i P D
RT
elastic) and capacity constraints.
Note that the feasible set FS3i pω
RT , xDAi , x
ID
i q depends on the current real-time scenario ω
RT as well as the day-head
and intraday schedules xDAi and x
ID
i .
Constraints (4.9e)-(4.9f) define the up and down regulation quantities in the real-time market, i.e., the changes




i . Constraints (4.9g) show that the final
schedule of stochastic generator i at the end of the real-time market cannot be more than its real generation.
For those consumers that are inelastic in both day-ahead and intraday markets, in case that day-ahead allocated
demand cannot be satisfied, part of the load can be shed by constraints (4.9h)-(4.9i) but with very high value of
lost load cost, VOLL (the reason xshedi,ωRT is added to x
DA
i , instead of being subtracted, is that x
DA
i is assumed to
be negative for consumers).
Flexible generators and elastic demands are assumed to be less available and more costly in the real-time market
than in the day-ahead and intraday markets. For any market participant i which is flexible in real-time (i P GRTflex



































The objective (4.9a) of the real-time market clearing is to minimize the cost of correcting imbalances with
respect to the previous markets dispatches. We can explain the objective function as the sum of three terms,
given by (4.10), (4.11), and (4.12). The first term CDAi px
RT
i,ωRT q is the total cost of generation and consumption
for the final dispatch xRTi,ωRT evaluated at the day-ahead cost parameters. The extra flexibility cost from intraday












, xdni,ωRT q is the additional cost of real-time redispatch evaluated at the real-time cost parameters.
As previously mentioned, in this paper which is in line with the current European sequential market design,
when we are at the intraday and real-time stages, we know the value of xDAi . Hence, in all equations (4.6)-(4.13),





are known values at the real-time
stage equations (4.9)-(4.13). Therefore, in order to formulate (4.11) and (4.12), instead of using binary variables,
we are able to use the indicator function γpq for xselli,ωID and x
buy
i,ωID







































































































































































































Figure 1. Sell in intraday and up-regulate in real-time
1





















Figure 1. Buy back in intraday and dn-regulation in real-time
1
(b) Buy in intraday an down-regu e in al-time.
Figure 4.4. Two simple cases for the cost function (4.9a).
In order to explain the functions (4.10), (4.11), and (4.12), for the case of a flexible generator, we use the
diagrams in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Figure 4.4a illustrates the case where the generator sells additional power in
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. The cost of this volume evaluated at day-ahead parameter values is represented by the





 0. The extra flexibility cost of intraday and real-time redispatch is given by the dotted green area,

























the pink horizontally hatched area represents the extra cost of real-time redispatch at real-time cost parameters,





















both (4.12b) and (4.12d) evaluate to zero.
Figure 4.4b illustrates the case where a generator buys back power in the intraday market and down-regulates









 0. The cost of the real-time volume evaluated at day-ahead parameter values is represented by the grey
vertically hatched area, which again consists of the area of a rectangle (4.10a) plus the area of a triangle (4.10b).
The extra flexibility cost of intraday and real-time redispatch is given by the dotted green area, i.e., the sum of the
area of the parallelogram (4.11a) plus the area of a triangle (4.11b). Finally, the pink horizontally hatched area
represents the extra cost of real-time redispatch at real-time cost parameters, and is again given by the sum of





(4.12a) and (4.12c) have values equal to zero.
The more complex cases, where the changes made in the intraday market and the real-time market go in













, and Figure 4.5a
illustrates the cost adjustments that results from the intraday and real-time generation quantity adjustments. The
gray vertically-hatched area is the cost of the intraday schedule evaluated at day-ahead cost parameters, and the
green dotted area is the extra flexibility cost that results from the intraday adjustment and the assumption that not
all day-ahead costs are reversible. Then, the generation quantity is upregulated in the real-time market, and this
adjustment results in an extra cost given by the horizontally-hatched pink area. The final cost for this case can also
be shown as in Figure 4.5b, which is directly related to (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12). The gray vertically hatched area
is the cost of the final schedule, evaluated at day-ahead cost parameters, and given by the area of a parallellogram
(4.10a) and a triangle (4.10b). The green dotted area, with a value equal to the sum of (4.11a) and (4.11b),
represents the value of the net adjustment made intraday and real-time, evaluated at intraday cost parameters.

















i,ωRT . Hence, since (4.11b) is non-negative, the total value of (4.11) is positive. Finally, the pink
horizontally-hatched area shows the extra flexibility cost resulting from the real-time up-regulation, and given by
the sum of (4.12a) and (4.12c). Since xRT
dn
 0, the remaining two terms in (4.12) will evaluate to zero.








is illustrated in Figures 4.5c and 4.5d. Again, the




, and Figure 4.5c illustrates the cost adjustments that results
from the intraday and real-time generation quantity adjustments. As in the previous case, the figure shows the cost
of the intraday schedule evaluated at day-ahead cost parameters (vertically-hatched gray area), the extra flexibility
cost that results from the intraday adjustment (green dotted area), and the extra cost resulting from the real-time
up-regulation (horizontally-hatched pink area). Figure 4.5d illustrates how the total cost for this case is related to
(4.10), (4.11) and (4.12). Again, the gray vertically hatched area is the cost of the final schedule, evaluated at day-
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ahead cost parameters, and given by (4.10), and the pink horizontally-hatched area represents the extra flexibility
cost resulting from the real-time up-regulation, given by the sum of (4.12a) and (4.12c). The green checkered area
represents the value of the net adjustment resulting from the intraday and real-time market clearing, evaluated at

















i,ωRT . The total value of (4.11) may be positive or negative, depending on
the relative magnitudes of the negative term (4.11a) and the non-negative term (4.11b). In the example shown in
Figure 4.5d, the net value, as indicated by the green checkered area, is negative. Note that the green checkered
area is included both in (4.10) and (4.12), so the negative adjustment given by (4.11) avoids double-counting.









Again, the vertically-hatched areas represent the value of (4.10), i.e., the cost of the real-time dispatch at day-
ahead cost parameters. The green dotted area in Figure 4.5e and the green checkered area in Figure 4.5f represent
the value of (4.11), i.e., the cost adjustment due to the net generation quantity adjustments in the intraday and













i . This value is positive in Figure 4.5e and negative in Figure 4.5f. The deduction in the latter
case serves to avoid double-counting of the green checkered area. Finally, the horizontally-hatched areas in both
figures represent the extra flexibility cost caused by the down-regulation in the real-time market.
By summing (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12) and doing some simplifications, the general formula for (4.9a) can be
written as (4.13) below. We prove the equality given by (4.13) in Appendix A.
CDAi px
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Figure 1. Case 3 and it’s decomposition
1






























































Figure 1. Case 3 and it’s decomposition
1










































































































































































Figure 1. Case 6: Sell in intraday and dn-regulate in real-time
1





Figure 4.5. Complex cases for the cost function (4.9a).
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4.4 Numerical example
In order to illustrate how we can analyze the optimal timing of an intraday auction, we use a simple example
with an uncongested network, with two nodes and a single line, as illustrated in Figure 4.6. This small system
consists of two loads, d1 and d2, one wind power plant, WP , and two conventional generators, g1 and g2. Loads
are assumed to be inelastic and equal to 5000 and 7000 MW , respectively, however it is possible to shed load at
a cost of 1000 ${MWh. We assume that the marginal cost of wind power is zero and that the capacity is 5700
MW . Since conventional generators are assumed to have positive marginal cost, the wind power generator will
always be dispatched up to the quantity that is bid into a market. Wind generation at node 1 is the only source of
uncertainty, and we assume that this uncertainty can be characterized by a finite set of scenarios. These scenarios
then represent all possible wind power realizations. Scenario generation approaches are described in more detail in
Section 4.3. Since the actual wind power availability in real time is uncertain when the day-ahead and intraday
market offers are submitted, we need an assumption about how the wind power generator bids into these markets.
In our analyses we assume that the wind power generator bids to adjust its production plan to the expected wind
power available in real time at all market stages. Moreover, we assume that the wind power generator can adjust
its production without any extra cost, thus it may sell/buy in intraday and up/down regulate in real time at zero
cost, but it must respect the expected power constraints at the time of the intraday auction, and the realized power
constraints given by the scenarios in real time. Hence, the wind generator is partly flexible.
The conventional generator, g1, is relatively cheap, but is inflexible, and will therefore just participate in the
day-ahead market and not in the intraday and real-time markets. On the other hand, generator g2 is flexible to
participate in all these markets but is more expensive and mostly used for flexibility purposes. The day-ahead,






Figure 4.6. Two-bus power system
Table 4.1. Conventional power plant data
node xmax CDA CID1 CID2 CID3 CRT
g1 1 5000 10 - - - -























CDA is the offer price for energy sales in the day-ahead market. In the example, we assume that g1 and g2
submit their constant marginal costs to the day-ahead market. Moreover, g2 is the only flexible source that can
be rescheduled to balance uncertain wind production, and this flexibility imposes additional costs compared to
being dispatched in the day-ahead market. In order to simplify, we assume constant increments/decrements in the
marginal cost over time for g2, reflecting flexibility costs. Thus, the slopes of the respective cost curves are all set
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g2  0, k  1, 2, 3, where the index k represents intraday auctions
at three different points in time. Thus, flexibility costs in intraday and real time are incorporated by increasing or





















































































The increasing/decreasing trend in ∆a is reflecting the increasing flexibility costs when getting closer to delivery
time. In Section 4.6, we experiment with different flexibility costs, i.e. values for ∆a, to see how it affects the best
timing of an intraday auction.
4.5 Representing uncertainty and information in scenario trees
Uncertainty in wind power generation is best characterized by continuous stochastic variables, however, in
order to keep the problem tractable, we represent this uncertainty, as well as how information is revealed over
time, by using scenario trees. The scenarios, given by the information along the paths of the scenario trees, are
subsequently used together with the market clearing models in Section 4.3, to assess the effect on social welfare by
placing an intraday auction at different points in time. Uncertainty in wind power generation is often quantified
by a probability distribution for wind power resources or for forecast errors. We may, however, also consider a
conditional probability distribution for wind power generation at a given future point in time, given the information
up until the present point in time. This may be especially fruitful in the context of this paper, since we are
studying a sequential market, where new information about the wind power generation at a specific future delivery
time becomes available as we move closer to real time. This means that we may first condition the probability
distribution on the information available at the time of the day-ahead auction, and then, as the information is
updated over time, so is the conditional probability distribution. In real time, wind resources are given, and there
is no uncertainty left.
In the following, we examine two ways to generate scenario trees. First, we construct some simple illustrative
scenario trees, with characteristics mimicking those of the conditional probability distributions obtained by Pritchard
(2011), who is using quantile-type models to construct short term probabilistic forecasts, the simplest models having
present power as the only input. Secondly, we use data from the Nordic power market to find scenarios of short-term
wind power production, based on the method described in Pinson et al. (2009). The simulated data is transformed
to a scenario tree.
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4.5.1 Scenarios inspired by Pritchard (2011)
Pritchard (2011) studies the conditional distribution of wind power available at a specific time in the future,
given information available at the present. In the simplest model, termed a ”probabilistic-persistence” quantile
forecast, the only information used as input to the model is the present wind power. Analyzing data from New
Zealand wind farms in this setting, Pritchard (2011) finds that the shapes of the conditional distributions of future
available power depends on whether the present wind is high or low. If, for instance, present power is low (high),
then the probability distribution is skewed towards positive (negative) changes in available power, while if the
present power is at a medium level, the probability distribution is more bell shaped, i.e. the probability of having
positive and negative changes of the same magnitudes are about the same, and the probability of a small or zero
change is highest, i.e persistence.
Pritchard (2011) estimates quantiles of the conditional distributions by means of quantile regression. An
interesting observation is that there is considerably less variation in half-hour forecasts compared to 2-hour forecasts,
and this is illustrated by the quantiles being closer together in the half-hour forecasts than in the 2-hour forecasts.
This is exactly the basis for the trade-off that we are interested in in this paper, namely that when placing an intraday
auction between day-ahead and real time, we must make a trade-off between reducing the effects of uncertainty
by running the auction close to real time, and reducing flexibility costs by running the auction close to day-ahead,
when quantity adjustments are cheaper and/or more generators and loads can contribute.
For the numerical examples in Section 4.6, we use two stylized scenario trees, depicted in Figures 4.7 and 4.8,
that exhibit some of the characteristics of the conditional probability distributions estimated by Pritchard (2011).
The starting node of the scenario tree shows the actual wind power available at the day-ahead stage (i.e. time
0:00). We assume that it is about half the capacity of the wind power generator in our numerical example, i.e. 2900
MW. From this point, we assume two possible (and equally probable) changes in available power for hour 6:00.
For simplicity, we assume all changes to be +/- 500 MW throughout the tree. Thus, the conditional probability
distribution of changes in power, 18 hours ahead in time, is assumed to be uniform, with only two possible outcomes,
+/- 500 MW. The available power in hour 6:00 is shown in stage 2 in the tree in Figure 4.7a. These values can
be interpreted as the actual power in hour 6:00 when we move forward along the paths in the tree from the nodes
in stage 2. Again, we assume that power will increase or decrease by 500 MW until hour 12:00, hence 4 scenarios
are generated for stage 3, two from each starting node at stage 2. By repeating this procedure for every 6 hour, 16
wind scenarios will be generated for the delivery hour at 24:00. Each scenario, corresponding to a path in the tree,
shows the power available for delivery in hour 24:00, but also how the available power develops over time, at each
6-hour stage.
By moving forward in the tree, and getting closer to the delivery time, more information is revealed about
which scenario is going to be realized. For instance, at the time of clearing the day-ahead market, we do not have
any information about which of the 16 scenarios will be more likely at hour 24:00. However, if an intraday market
is cleared after 6 hours, the power information at hour 6:00 determines whether the upper or the lower scenario
has been realized. If the upper scenario is realized at hour 6:00, at hour 24:00 only the eight upper leaf nodes
can be realized, thus the eight lower leaf nodes can be excluded from investigation. At each node in the tree we
calculate the standard deviation of the available power at each leaf node that is connected to the node in question.

















































































































DA ID1 ID2 ID3 RT
1
(b) Expected tree for (a)
Figure 4.7. Symmetric scenario tree with corresponding conditional expectations
The procedure for generating the scenarios in Figure 4.7 is based on an assumption that we have accessible
conditional probability distributions for available wind power 6 hours ahead, given the actual power now. In general,
available wind power at a future point in time depends on other factors as well, including meteorological variables
such as wind speed, wind direction, air pressure, seasonal and diurnal indicators etc. (Pritchard (2011)). In a more
realistic setting, these factors could be considered when generating scenarios. Since we are only considering adding
one intraday auction, another way to generate scenario trees would be to combine 24-hour, 18-hour, 12-hour and
6-hour horizon forecast data, depending on where the intraday auction is placed (i.e. ID1, ID2, or ID3). In a
more realistic setting, we should add an additional stage in the beginning of the scenario tree, in order to consider
different wind power possibilities at the day-ahead stage, however, for simplicity we consider only one day-ahead
alternative.
Since we have assumed that the wind power producer bids the expected power at the delivery time, conditional
on the most updated information, to each sequential market, it is useful to note the expected available wind power
in real time at each node in the scenario tree. While the tree on the left hand side in Figure 4.7 is generated to
produce leaf nodes that reflect possible wind power realizations in real time, the tree on the right hand side shows
conditional expectations of available wind power in real time, i.e. the number in each node, at each stage, shows
the expected power in the leaf nodes that are connected to this node.
As mentioned previously, we have used equal increments and decrements of 500 MW at all stages in the tree
in Figure 4.7. One drawback of this is that we have several nodes with the same power quantity at each stage in
the tree. For instance, 4 out of the 16 scenarios have 1900 MW wind power in real time. In order to avoid this
















































































































DA ID1 ID2 ID3 RT
1
(b) Expected tree for (a)
Figure 4.8. Asymmetric scenario tree with corresponding conditional expectations
4.5.2 Scenarios based on the method by Pinson et al. (2009)
4.5.2.1 Data
We assume that the wind power capacity of the numerical example equals to the cumulative wind capacity
of Denmark at the end of 2018, 5700 MW (WindEurope (2019)). Since no public data for different wind power
forecast horizons is available (it means that for each delivery hour, we just have access to the 24-hour ahead forecast
not anything in between), 24 hour-ahead forecast data from Nord pool is utilized. This data set is composed of the
hourly real and forecast of the wind power production at Denmark for year 2018. Forecast is a D  T  365  24
matrix called F  rfdts, means that for every hour t of each day d of year 2018, a 24-hour ahead forecast fdt is
available. Since real wind power production for all hours of 2018 is also available, error matrix E36524  redts is
extractable. The hourly forecast for the next 24 hours announces at hour 00:00 which coincides with the time of our
day-ahead market. The average hourly production in areas DK1 and DK2 in 2018 was 1571 MWh, with almost
3.2 times higher peak production, 5051 MWh.
Nord pool does not provide any other forecast horizons or update of the forecast between the day-ahead and
delivery time. Indeed, by having access to the more frequent forecast horizons, more accurate scenario trees can be
generated; in our case 24, 18, 12 and 6 hour horizons are required.
Figure 4.9 shows that the forecast error does not follow the normal distribution, especially the tails. However,
as will be explained in Section 4.5.2.2, it can be transformed to a normally distributed stochastic process.
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(a) Forecast error histogram versus fitted normal distribution (b) Normal probability plot for forecast error
Figure 4.9. Forecast error distribution analysis
4.5.2.2 Statistical scenarios of wind power production
Most of the current wind power forecast methods provide end-users with point forecasts which is a single
summary statistics for random variable xi,t k, i P GST , which shows the potential wind power production at time
t   k, where k is the forecast horizon. Even though these forecasts are sometimes enough for decision makers,
they do not say anything about the uncertainty of the underlying stochastic process. In order to do that, interval
forecasts or, even better, density forecasts can be used. Recently, a great effort has been made to develop such
forecasts, called probabilistic forecasts. Since such forecasts are generated on a per horizon basis, they disregard
the interdependence structure of forecast errors among different forecast horizons. This interdependence structure
is particularly important for time-dependent and multi-stage decision making problems, such as the multi-market
problem we are considering in this paper. Hence, to generate scenarios of wind power production that shows the
development of wind power over all hours of look-ahead time, we have used the method devised by Pinson et al.
(2009). In the following, we explain how we have implemented this method to simulate the power forecast scenarios
given the forecast matrix F . Power forecast scenarios are generated by the following steps:
1. For each hour t  1, ..., 24 (each column of F ), estimate the cumulative distribution function (CDF) by the
empirical distribution function




Ut  {CDF tpfdtq, t  1, ..., 24 (4.15)
Since CDFtpfdtq is uniformly distributed, Up0, 1q, we get an approximate Up0, 1q-variable by Ut.
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3. Next, compute a standard normal distribution variable Zt, Np0, 1q, by
Zt  Φ
1pUtq, t  1, ..., 24 (4.16)
where Φ is the CDF for the standard normal distribution.
4. The dependence structure between the forecasts of different hours collected in the vector Z  rZts is captured
in the constant 24  24 variance-covariance matrix V pZq  Σ . The diagonal elements of Σ are all equal to
one and consequently, the off-diagonal elements are correlations.
5. Now, a multivariate normal vector, Ẑ  rẐts, t  1, ..., 24, with mean vector 024 and variance-covariance
matrix Σ2424 is generated. Through the next steps, by a reverse procedure we have passed so far, s forecast
scenario paths will be generated.
6. We simulate Ẑ  rẐts, t  1, ..., 24 from the 24-dimensional normal distribution.
7. Ẑt are transformed back to a Up0, 1q-variable by
Ût  ΦpẐtq, t  1, ..., 24 (4.17)
8. A scenario path for the power forecast, drawn from the estimated distribution, with the interdependence
between hours accounted for, is obtained by
f̂t  {CDF1t pÛtq, t  1, ..., 24 (4.18)
It should be noted that CDF is a step function and its inverse is not unique. However, we have many data
points so using, e.g., the r’th smallest value as an approximation for {CDF1t p1{rq, does not differ much from
using the, say, pr   1q’th.
9. Finally, s scenario paths for the power forecast are generated by iterating steps 6,7 and 8.
Figure 4.10 is an example of wind power point forecast (from Nord pool data and shows the wind power forecast
for 365th day of year 2018) and 30 relevant scenario paths generated from the method mentioned in Pinson et al.
(2009). These scenarios reflect the forecast uncertainty as well as the interdependence structure of forecast errors
and describe how much wind production will be at each hour of the next 24 hours.
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Figure 4.10. Wind power scenarios associated with point forecasts
As can be seen in Figure 4.10, scenarios follow the same trend as point forecasts. However, by moving away from
hour 0:00, when the point forecasts were published for the next 24 hours, uncertainty of prediction increases. By
simulating 1000 scenarios, the correlation between hours 1:00 to 23:00 with hour 24:00 (delivery hour) is measured.
As Figure 4.11 demonstrates, the forecast for hours 1:00 to 13:00 have very low correlation with hour 24:00. Hence,
the wind production at these hours does not contain valuable information about production at delivery hour. In
other words, placing an intraday auction at these hours will not solve the problem with a high level of uncertainty
even though the flexibility costs are lower.
The potential places for an intraday market must reflect different uncertainty levels. For example, hours 3:00,
5:00, 7:00 and 9:00 do not differ from an uncertainty perspective. Hence, there is no worth in comparing these
alternatives. Therefore, 3 potential places 3:00, 18:00 and 21:00 are chosen based on their high, medium and low
level of uncertainty, respectively with correlation coefficients 0.22, 0.42 and 0.58.
Figure 4.11. Correlation between hours 1 to 23 with hour 24
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4.5.2.3 Building scenario tree by a clustering (bucketing) approach
In Section 4.5.2.2 several scenario paths were obtained by sampling from a continuous probability distribution
but still additional steps are required to build a scenario tree with desirable characteristics. One of the appropriate
approaches is cluster (bucket) analysis mentioned in Birge and Mulvey (1996), Canestrelli and Giove (1999) and
Dupačová et al. (2000).
The 1000 scenario paths extracted from the previous section - represents that there are 1000 wind power
possibilities for each hour 1:00 to 24:00- are collected in a matrix M100024. However, we shall only consider the
possible hours for the intraday market at hours 3:00, 18:00 and 21:00 and the delivery hour 24:00 (the hour that
day-ahead, intraday and real-time are optimized for). Hence, columns 3, 18, 21 and 24 of matrix M are saved in
matrix M 110004  rMp3q,Mp18q,Mp21q,Mp24qs
The outcome of this clustering approach is a 5-stage scenario tree which resembles scenario trees in Figures
4.7b and 4.8b. Each bucket is equivalent to a node in the mentioned trees. Algorithm.1 explains the bucketing
approach in details.
µ of each bucket is the expected wind power (pxDAi or pxIDi ) which is directly utilized in the day-ahead or intraday
market models. σ of the bucket is the standard deviation that shows the amount of uncertainty. These sigma’s
are mostly decreasing from the parent to child buckets but not necessarily for all. The std of the day-ahead bucket
equals to 339 and the std of the ID1 buckets are equal to 325, 317, 343, 335, and 331. For ID3 stage, the minimum
and maximum stds are respectively 82 and 390 which means that at least there is one bucket which has a std higher
than day-ahead bucket. To sum up, with the available data set, we ended up with a scenario tree with decreasing
stds for most buckets but compared to trees in Figures 4.7b and 4.8b which show a huge std reduction, the stds in
this tree display a smaller reduction. However, the other important point that should be noticed here is that the
24-hour ahead forecast data is much more accurate than the other trees, because the std of the day-ahead node in
data-driven tree is 339 which is much smaller than the std of the equivalent node in other trees (796, 1000 and 831,
respectively for Pritchard’s, asymmetric and symmetric trees).
4.6 Numerical results
In this section some computational results are presented. Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 present the results and
analyses related to the asymmetric and symmetric scenario trees shown in Figure 4.8b and Figure 4.7b, respectively,
while the results for the data driven scenario tree, generated in Section 4.5.2, are given in Section 4.6.3.
As indicated in Table 4.1, g2 is the only flexible generator in the system that can participate in several markets
with potentially different cost parameters. In order to analyse how various cost parameters in different sequential
markets impact the best intraday market placement, nine cost parameter settings for g2 are depicted in Figure 4.12.
Figure 4.12a shows that in case 1 participation in the day-ahead market costs 40 ${MWh for g2, and there is

















 0, k  1, 2, 3. These cost
parameters may reflect a hydropower plant, with an opportunity cost of water, i.e. water value, equal to 40
${MWh used for the the short-term generation planning, and where deviations from the schedules, even on very
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Algorithm 1: Bucketing algorithm
Input : M 110004sb : number of buckets
bstg : number of buckets at stage stg
s : number of scenario paths
sstg : number of scenarios in each bucket of stage stg
Cstg,j : j
th bucket in stage stg, j  1, ..., bstg
Bstg,ch,p : ch
th child bucket of parent bucket p in stage stg, ch  1, ...,sb
Initial : s  1000sb  5
for stg  1 to 4 do















Function BuildBucketpCstg1,pq: /* Generate sb child buckets for parent bucket p */
Sort Cstg1,p based on column stg  1
l=1
for ch  1 to sb do
Cstg,ch Ð Cstg1,prl : l   sstg  1, 1 : 4s
lÐ l   sstg
µpCstg,chq  EXP pCstg,chr:, 4sq /* EXP():Average of scenarios in the bucket */





short notice, are almost costless. In case 2, which is shown in Figure 4.12b, it is assumed that a change in g2 is
costly on very short notice, i.e. just before delivery time, but not costly in the intraday markets. Hence, the relevant

















 0, k  1, 2, 3.
Similar interpretations can be made for the other cases. Thus, the cases differ with respect to how the generation
cost develops over time, from the day-ahead market until real-time. In order to focus on the effect of cost changes
and their timing, the five first cases have cost either equal to the day-ahead cost or 5 ${MWh higher/lower. In case
6, we consider linearly increasing/decreasing flexibility cost, while cases 7 and 8, respectively, model convex and
concave cost functions for sell and up-regulation and concave and convex cost functions for buy and down-regulation.
In contrast to all cases 1 to 8, where cost functions are symmetric, in case 9, g2 will buy back or down-regulate with
the same cost as in the day-ahead market, while it will sell or up-regulate with a linearly increasing cost function.
So, in case 9 the flexibility costs are asymmetric.
4.6.1 Numerical results for the asymmetric scenario tree in Figure 4.8
The detailed results for the asymmetric scenario tree in Figure 4.8, and with cost parameters equal to case 5,
is presented in Table B1 in the Appendix B. For each scenario, the following quantities are displayed for intraday
placements ID1, ID2, ID3, as well as No ID: sell/buy quantities (positive values for sell and negative values for
buy) and relevant cost (negative numbers are income) in intraday, up/down regulation quantities and associated
cost/income in real-time, the net change in cost due to intraday and real-time, and the total cost of generation and
re-adjustments in all markets, i.e. day-ahead, intraday and real-time. The last column displays the sum of absolute
values of quantity adjustments in intraday and real-time markets.
From Table B1 in Appendix B, we highlight the following observations:
1. From the quantity rows we notice that for all scenarios the total adjustment in intraday and real-time quantities
(when there is an intraday market) is equal to the adjustment in real-time quantity when 1No ID1 is considered.
For instance, in scenario 2 the total quantity adjustment in both intraday and real-time (ID1 RT  550 550,
ID2  RT  1000  100, ID3  RT  1350 250) is equal to 1100 (RT  No ID  1100). The reason is that
demand is inelastic and there is no need for load-shedding in this case.
2. Even if the total quantity adjustments are the same within each scenario, the adjustments in each sequential
step vary a lot, depending on where the intraday market is placed. This can be seen from the last column
in Table B1, showing the sum of absolute values of quantity adjustments for each scenario and each intraday
market placement. Since we assume that the wind power generator bids according to expected wind power at
delivery time in each market, and this conditional expectation changes through the scenario tree, there may
be both positive and negative sequential adjustments in a given scenario (see for instance scenario 4). In case
5, both are costly.
3. If the intraday and real-time quantities adjust in the same direction (i.e. sell in ID and up-regulate in RT
or buy in ID and down-regulate in RT) then the ’net change in cost’ and ’final cost’ are equivalent to the
corresponding costs for RT  No ID. However, if adjustments are in opposite directions (i.e. buy in ID and
up-regulate in RT or sell in ID and down-regulate in RT) then the ’net change in cost’ and ’final cost’ are
higher than the corresponding RT  No ID cost. For instance, in scenario 2:
























































































































































































Figure 4.12. Assumptions on flexibility cost of g2
99
ID2 : 1000  45  100  45  49500
ID3 : 1350  45  p250q  35  52000
No ID : 1100  45  49500
The first point is valid for all considered cost parameter cases. The consequences of the second and third points
are contingent on the flexibility cost parameters, and may result in different final cost rankings of possible intraday
placements for the cases considered.
We rank the best intraday placements based on expected total cost of generation. The expected total cost
of generation for all 16 scenarios for all cost parameter cases 1 to 9 are summarized in Table 4.2. There is one
row for each intraday market placement, as well as not having an intraday market at all. The last row shows the
Expected Value with Perfect Information (EVPI), i.e. each scenario cleared in an optimal dispatch with day-ahead
cost parameters.
Table 4.2. Expected total cost for different cost parameters and intraday placements for the asymmetric scenario
tree
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 Case 9
ID1 222000 224625 224625 224625 227375 225313 224900 226550 248500
ID2 222000 223750 223750 226500 226500 225125 224300 225950 247000
ID3 222000 223250 226625 226625 226625 225781 224263 226288 252250
No ID 222000 225375 225375 225375 225375 225375 225375 225375 249000
EVPI 222000 222000 222000 222000 222000 222000 222000 222000 222000
Case 1
In case 1, deviating from the day-ahead plan does not cost anything, and even though uncertainty is decreasing
from day-ahead to real-time (and therefore from ID1 to ID3), it doesn’t matter if or where the intraday market is
added, the cost are the same no matter, and equal to the EVPI. This case can illustrate a power system with fully
flexible resources, for instance one dominated by hydropower with large reservoirs. Hence, with costless flexibility,
adding intraday auctions does not have any impact on the final total cost of the system, and real-time markets
would be sufficient to obtain efficiency in generation.
Case 2, 3 and 4
In case 2, there is a sharp increase in cost when g2 quantities are adjusted in real time rather than intraday. In
cases 3 and 4, the cost increase occurs earlier. In these cases, we can clearly see the trade-off, where the uncertainty
factor tends to favour a later timing of the auction, while increasing flexibility cost favours an early one. In case
2, participation in any of the intraday markets does not incur extra cost, hence g2 waits until more information is
available and until the cost increase becomes too large, ID3 being the best placement with lowest expected total
cost. In cases 3 and 4, the best intraday timings are ID2 and ID1, respectively.
Case 5
In case 5, quantity adjustments are equally costly (compared to the day-ahead cost parameters) in all possible
intraday markets, as well as the real-time market. Thus, it is not surprising that we prefer to wait as long as possible
until all uncertainty is resolved, and the best decision is to have no intraday market and resolve necessary quantity
adjustments in the real-time market. In this respect, this case is similar to case 1, showing that if intraday flexibility
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costs are equal either to day-ahead or real-time costs, then it leads us to the ”no intraday market” decision.
Considering only the potential intraday market placements, since adjustment costs are constant, and since
uncertainty (measured by standard deviation) is reduced over time in the scenario tree, we would expect ID3 to
be the better choice for an intraday auction, if we were to have one. This is however, and somewhat surprisingly,
not the case. Part of the reason for this follows from our assumption that in each market stage, the wind power
producer adjusts its position to the updated conditional expected wind power available in real-time. To understand
why, we consider more carefully the expected total cost, which in our numerical example, with inelastic demand

























Since g2 is the only flexible resource in the system, that can participate in intraday and real-time markets, the
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Table 4.3. Expected adjustment quantities in intraday and real time for the asymmetric scenario tree
Epxsellq Epxbuyq Epxupq Epxdnq
ID1 275 275 262.5 262.5
ID2 275 275 175 175
ID3 337.5 337.5 125 125
No ID   337.5 337.5
By neglecting the first term, which is connected to the day-ahead market and is common for all intraday
placements, and just evaluating the expected cost of adjustments in 4.20, using the adjustment values from Table
4.3, the following values are obtained:
ID1 : 45  275  35  275  45  262.5  35  262.5  2750  2625  5375
ID2 : 45  275  35  275  45  175  35  175  2750  1750  4500
ID3 : 45  337.5 35  337.5  45  125 35  125  3375  1250  4625
No ID : 45  337.5 35  337.5  3375
The values shown in Table 4.2 for case 5 are the sums of the numbers calculated above and the day-ahead cost,
which is equal to 222000. Thus, we can see that the ranking of the intraday placements is the same as the ranking
of adjustment cost, from the lowest to the highest, i.e. No ID   ID2   ID3   ID1. This means that even if the
standard deviation is reduced from ID2 to ID3, when generation positions are consistently adjusted in the markets
to updated information about conditional expectations of wind availability, then the up- and down-adjustments
are larger and therefore more costly in ID3 than in ID2. This shows that the trade-off between uncertainty and
flexibility cost can be more complicated than expected, and moreover, depends on which strategy we assume for
how market agents trade in the intraday markets.
Case 6
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In this case there is a gradual (linear) increase in the flexibility costs, from day-ahead, through the different ID
placements, and until real time. The trade-off between uncertainty and flexibility cost shows that ID2 is the best
intraday timing in this case. As Table 4.3 illustrates, because energy balance is enforced in every market clearing,
expected sell and buy quantities are equal, and the same goes for expected up- and down-regulations. Hence, the
















ID1 : 2.5  275  10  262.5  2750  2625  3312.5
ID2 : 5  275  10  175  3125
ID3 : 7.5  337.5  10  125  3781.25
No ID : 10  337.5  3375
Hence, the ranking of intraday placements from low to high cost, is as follows: ID2   ID1   No ID   ID3.
Case 7 and 8
In cases 7 and 8, the increases in flexibility cost vary over time, in the sense that in case 7, there is a large
cost increase late (”convex cost”), while in case 8, a jump in the flexibility cost comes early (”concave cost”). The
result is that the best timing of an intraday auction is early (ID2) in case 7 and late (i.e. No ID) in case 8.
Case 9
This case has asymmetric sell/buy and up/down flexibility costs. More specifically, there is no flexibility cost
for reducing net injections. In this case, the trade-off places the intraday market in 2, i.e. ID2.
4.6.2 Numerical results for the symmetric scenario tree in Figure 4.7
Table 4.4. Expected adjustment quantities in intraday and real time for the symmetric scenario tree
Epxsellq Epxbuyq Epxupq Epxdnq
ID1 250 250 375 375
ID2 250 250 250 250
ID3 375 375 250 250
No ID   375 375
Table 4.5. Expected total cost for different cases in the symmetric scenario tree
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 Case 9
ID1 214000 217750 217750 217750 220250 218375 218000 219500 249000
ID2 214000 216500 216500 219000 219000 217750 217000 218500 244000
ID3 214000 216500 220250 220250 220250 219312 217625 219875 256500
No ID 214000 217750 217750 217750 217750 217750 217750 217750 244000
EVPI 214000 214000 214000 214000 214000 214000 214000 214000 214000
Case 2
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In this case all intraday placements have the same flexibility costs, while adjustments in real time are consid-
erably more costly. Again we would expect ID3 to be the better placement of an intraday auction, however ID2
also shows the same expected adjustment cost. This can be explained by using Equation 4.21 together with the
adjustment quantities in Table 4.4 to obtain expected adjustment costs as follows:
ID1 : 0  250   10  375  3750
ID2 : 0  250   10  250  2500
ID3 : 0  375  10  250  2500
No ID : 10  375  3750
Since intraday sell and buy flexibility costs are equal, their difference is zero. Hence, intraday adjustment costs
do not matter, and only real time adjustments are important in this case. Since real time adjustments are equal
for ID2 and ID3, as well as for ID1 and No ID, ID2 and ID3 are equally good placements, and the same goes for
ID1 and No ID.
Other cases
As can be seen from Table 4.5, different cost parameters result in different best placements for an intraday
auction, and the same kind of reasoning as in Section 4.6.1 can be utilized here.
4.6.3 Numerical results for the data-driven scenario tree described in Section 4.5.2
Table 4.6. Expected adjustment quantities in intraday and real time for the data-driven scenario tree
Epxsellq Epxbuyq Epxupq Epxdnq
ID1 34 34 124 124
ID2 61 61 115 115
ID3 87 87 97 97
No ID   126 126
Table 4.7. Expected total cost for different cases in the data-driven scenario tree
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 Case 9
ID1 161494 162732 162732 162732 163072 162817 162766 162970 172080
ID2 161494 162645 162645 163258 163258 162952 162768 163135 173154
ID3 161494 162465 163336 163336 163336 163118 162726 163249 174486
No ID 161494 162758 162758 162758 162758 162758 162758 162758 171606
EVPI 161494 161494 161494 161494 161494 161494 161494 161494 161494
For this scenario tree the most interesting cases are 2, 5 and 6, and these cases will be described further in the
following. Cases 7, 8 and 9 are comparable to cases 2, 5 and 6, respectively.
Case 2
Even if the order of best intraday placements follow the pattern of reduced uncertainty, the following calculations
can help to explain the decreasing expected total cost from ID1 to ID3:
ID1 : 0  34  10  124  1240
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ID2 : 0  61  10  115  1150
ID3 : 0  87  10  97  970
No ID : 10  126  1260
Since the sell and buy costs are equal for all intraday placements, the intraday quantities do not play any role
in deciding the best intraday placement. Only the decreasing trend of expected adjustment quantities in real time
matters, and ID3 is best.
Case 5
As for case 2, the uncertainty is reduced from ID1 to ID3, and flexibility costs are equal across all intraday
placements. However, in contrast to case 2, in this case, the expected total cost increases from ID1 to ID3, and
this can be explained by the following calculations:
ID1 : 10  34  10  124  1580
ID2 : 10  61  10  115  1760
ID3 : 10  87  10  97  1840
No ID : 10  126  1260
I.e. the best intraday placement is reversed compared to case 5, due to the cost difference between intraday
buy and sell, and No ID is the best option.
Case 6
In this case, flexibility costs increase linearly over time, while uncertainty is reduced. One could expect that
this would favour the intermediate placement of an intraday market, i.e. ID2, however, this is not the case:
ID1 : 2.5  34  10  124  1325
ID2 : 5  61  10  115  1455
ID3 : 7.5  87  10  97  1623
No ID : 10  126  1260
If an intraday market is to be added, ID1 is the least cost option.
4.7 Conclusion
The increasing share of uncertain generation mostly coming from wind and solar makes European commission
regulators to revise electricity market design and particularly pay more attention to intraday market. Regarding to
the challenges that continuous trading intraday market faces with respect to the congestion management, adding
one or more intraday auctions is on the agenda to facilitate trading in the short-term and create better transparency
by delivering one price (instead of many prices in continuous trading) and provide a quicker and easier way to submit
orders. If the decision is to add one auction between day-ahead and real-time when would be the best time to do
that?
In this paper, we demonstrate that timing of intraday auction is affected by two opposing factors: uncertainty
and flexibility cost. The earlier auctions confronted with the higher uncertainty but lower flexibility costs, while
the later ones tackle with higher flexibility costs but lower uncertainty. By testing several scenario trees with
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uncertainty reduction characteristic from day-ahead to real-time, a tight trade-off between these two factors has
been observed. Our findings reveal that even though standard deviation reduction is an important measure for
uncertainty its reduction is not enough to say that always the latest intraday is the best by assuming the other
variables as fixed. Therefore, the std reduction is mainly reflected in re-adjustment quantities, this means that the
more std is reducing from day-ahead to real-time, the more re-adjustments are required. This is the reason that in
some cases especially case 2 and 5, instead of observing ID3 as the lowest expected total cost, the other intraday
placements look less costly. Hence, it can be concluded that in the sequential market setting that expected wind
power is utilized for clearing stochastic generators, the multiplicative effect of flexibility cost and re-adjustment
quantities determine the best intraday place not just the trade off between flexibility cost and std reduction.
Experiments on diverse flexibility costs disclose very interesting results. For instance, in hydro-dominated
systems where flexibility cost is very low, adding an intraday auction cannot be cost-effective while intraday auction
can have a huge cost reduction for systems with very high flexibility costs, then the trade-off between uncertainty
and flexibility is more evident.
In the simulated symmetric and asymmetric scenario trees, std is high at the begining (compared to data-driven
scenario tree), illustrates an inaccurate 24-hour ahead forecast, while in the shorter-term forecasts 18, 12 and 6
hour ahead stds show a huge decrease, meaning that by getting closer to the delivery time, the forecasts getting
much more accurate. Results show that in scenario trees with huge changes of std from day-ahead to real-time,
which can be connected to the accuracy of forecasts, adding an intraday auction helps to relieve the total cost of the
system, while in trees with not so conspicuous reduction in std, like data-driven scenario tree, our findings report
that adding an intraday auction cannot relieve costs of the system.
However, in the future research the last finding require to be tested with more shorter-term forecasts. Because
just having access to 24-hour ahead data leads us to not have intraday auction for most flexibility cost cases.
Hence, having access to 24, 18, 12 and 6 hour ahead forecast data can reveal more trade-off between uncertainty
and flexibility cost. We have also neglected congestion management in this paper. Therefore, the next natural step
in future research is to see how the intraday placement will be affected by modeling congestion. Finally, it would be
more interesting to model hybrid intraday market, a combination of continuous trading and an auction to see how
the behavior of market participants will change and whether the main aim of auction, which is helping continuous
trading in managing congestion, is achieved or not.
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Appendix A. Proof of (4.13)
In order to prove the equality given by (4.13), four different combinations of intraday and real-time dispatch
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Similar cases can be defined for flexible consumers, but since the analysis is similar to the one presented for

















































































































which is equal to (4.13) for this case.


































































































































































































































































































































































































which equals (4.13) for this case.
Appendix B
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Table B1. Detailed results for the asymmetric scenario tree with cost parameters of case 5
Scenario Description ID1 ID2 ID3 RT Net Cost Change Final Cost Absolute Quantity
1
ID1 quantity 550 1050 1600
ID1 cost 24750 47250 72000 294000
ID2 quantity 1000 600 1600
ID2 cost 45000 27000 72000 294000
ID3 quantity 1350 250 1600
ID3 cost 60750 11250 72000 294000
No ID quantity 1600
No ID cost 72000 72000 294000
2
ID1 quantity 550 550 1100
ID1 cost 24750 24750 49500 271500
ID2 quantity 1000 100 1100
ID2 cost 45000 4500 49500 271500
ID3 quantity 1350 -250 1600
ID3 cost 60750 -8750 52000 274000
No ID quantity 1100
No ID cost 49500 49500 271500
3
ID1 quantity 550 350 900
ID1 cost 24750 15750 40500 262500
ID2 quantity 1000 -100 1100
ID2 cost 45000 -3500 41500 263500
ID3 quantity 650 250 900
ID3 cost 29250 11250 40500 262500
No ID quantity 900
No ID cost 40500 40500 262500
4
ID1 quantity 550 -150 700
ID1 cost 24750 -5250 19500 241500
ID2 quantity 1000 -600 1600
ID2 cost 45000 -21000 24000 246000
ID3 quantity 650 -250 900
ID3 cost 29250 -8750 20500 242500
No ID quantity 400
No ID cost 18000 18000 240000
5
ID1 quantity 550 150 700
ID1 cost 24750 6750 31500 253500
ID2 quantity 100 600 700
ID2 cost 4500 27000 31500 253500
ID3 quantity 450 250 700
ID3 cost 20250 11250 31500 253500
No ID quantity 700
No ID cost 31500 31500 253500
6
ID1 quantity 550 -350 900
ID1 cost 24750 -12250 12500 234500
ID2 quantity 100 100 200
ID2 cost 4500 4500 9000 231000
ID3 quantity 450 -250 700
ID3 cost 20250 -8750 11500 233500
No ID quantity 200
No ID cost 9000 9000 231000
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Scenario Description ID1 ID2 ID3 RT Net Cost Change Final Cost Absolute Quantity
7
ID1 quantity 550 -550 1100
ID1 cost 24750 -19250 5500 227500
ID2 quantity 100 -100 200
ID2 cost 4500 -3500 1000 223000
ID3 quantity -250 250 500
ID3 cost -8750 11250 2500 224500
No ID quantity
No ID cost 222000
8
ID1 quantity 550 -1050 1600
ID1 cost 24750 -36750 -12000 210000
ID2 quantity 100 -600 700
ID2 cost 4500 -21000 -16500 205500
ID3 quantity -250 -250 500
ID3 cost -8750 -8750 -17500 204500
No ID quantity -500
No ID cost -17500 -17500 204500
9
ID1 quantity -550 1050 1600
ID1 cost -19250 47250 28000 250000
ID2 quantity -100 600 700
ID2 cost -3500 27000 23500 245500
ID3 quantity 250 250 500
ID3 cost 11250 11250 22500 244500
No ID quantity 500
No ID cost 22500 22500 244500
10
ID1 quantity -550 550 1100
ID1 cost -19250 24750 5500 227500
ID2 quantity -100 100 200
ID2 cost -3500 4500 1000 223000
ID3 quantity 250 -250 500
ID3 cost 11250 -8750 2500 224500
No ID quantity
No ID cost 222000
11
ID1 quantity -550 350 900
ID1 cost -19250 15750 -3500 218500
ID2 quantity -100 -100 200
ID2 cost -3500 -3500 -7000 215000
ID3 quantity -450 250 700
ID3 cost -15750 11250 -4500 217500
No ID quantity -200
No ID cost -7000 -7000 215000
12
ID1 quantity -550 -150 700
ID1 cost -19250 -5250 -24500 197500
ID2 quantity -100 -600 700
ID2 cost -3500 -21000 -24500 197500
ID3 quantity -450 -250 700
ID3 cost -15750 -8750 -24500 197500
No ID quantity -700
No ID cost -24500 -24500 197500
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Scenario Description ID1 ID2 ID3 RT Net Cost Change Final Cost Absolute Quantity
13
ID1 quantity -550 150 700
ID1 cost -19250 6750 -12500 209500
ID2 quantity -1000 600 1600
ID2 cost -35000 27000 -8000 214000
ID3 quantity -650 250 900
ID3 cost -22750 11250 -11500 210500
No ID quantity -400
No ID cost -14000 -14000 208000
14
ID1 quantity -550 -350 900
ID1 cost -19250 -12250 -31500 190500
ID2 quantity -1000 100 1100
ID2 cost -35000 4500 -30500 191500
ID3 quantity -650 -250 900
ID3 cost -22750 -8750 -31500 190500
No ID quantity -900
No ID cost -31500 -31500 190500
15
ID1 quantity -550 -550 1100
ID1 cost -19250 -19250 -38500 183500
ID2 quantity -1000 -100 1100
ID2 cost -35000 -3500 -38500 183500
ID3 quantity -1350 250 1600
ID3 cost -47250 11250 -36000 186000
No ID quantity -1100
No ID cost -38500 -38500 183500
16
ID1 quantity -550 -1050 1600
ID1 cost -19250 -36750 -56000 166000
ID2 quantity -1000 -600 1600
ID2 cost -35000 -21000 -56000 166000
ID3 quantity -1350 -250 1600
ID3 cost -47250 -8750 -56000 166000
No ID quantity -1600
No ID cost -56000 -56000 166000
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Abstract
The growing penetration of intermittent renewable energy sources has increased the importance of efficient intraday
electricity markets, seeing that they provide an environment where market participants could correct their day-
ahead decisions due to imbalances caused by intermittency or any other reasons. For more efficient utilization
of generation resources across the whole continent, the European commission has established a target model to
integrate all intraday markets based on continuous double auctions or limit order book. A fundamental model for
a limit order book simulation is represented in this paper. Very simplifying assumptions are made on price and
quantity decisions. Instead, more focus is on the limit order book modeling in which market participants (they can
be any type of intermittent and conventional generators, elastic consumers and even financial traders) randomly
(based on uniform distribution) submit market or limit orders with random quantities chosen from their residual
capacity or cleared capacity (depending on ask or bid order submission) and their day-ahead marginal cost as
the submitted price. The model is able to manage the order arrivals, their addition to the list (as limit order)
or matching them with the best available opposite order (market order), store the matched trades, update the
quantities of matched orders and finally accept part (or whole) of matched orders to maintain the feasibility of the
transmission network with respect to the nodal constraints of the network.
Keywords: Market Microstructure, Continuous trading by limit order book, Simulation, Renewable integration
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5.1 Introduction
Electricity markets are designed as double auctions wherein sellers and buyers are able to submit their offers.
Double auctions are classified into two types, i.e. auction and continuous clearing. For example, all European
day-ahead and some intraday markets are based on auction clearing in which trade determination and price setting
rely on power exchanges. Hence, the power exchange determines which offers are successful and finds the clearing
price of transactions. While in continuous double auctions (CDAs), trade determination and price setting is not
generally built upon an institution, meaning that market participants themselves decide which quantities are traded
at which price and the clearing process is delegated to market participants. Therefore, by providing an appropriate
tool, a power exchange can give information to market participants and allow them to engage in transactions with
each other. A limit order book can be such a tool. In a limit order book, market participants can submit a bid
(request to buy) or ask (request to sell) to the orderbook by specifying a quantity and a price.
Market participants basically can submit two types of orders:
 Limit order : reflects the maximum willingness to pay (bid) or the minimum willingness to accept (ask) for
each unit (megawatt hour) of the specified quantity. As Table 5.1 shows, bids and asks are sorted respectively
in descending and ascending orders. These sortings place the current ”best offers” at the top of the order
book. The highest bid price in Table 5.1 is less than the lowest ask price, which implies that the buyer’s
willingness to pay is not high enough for the seller to trade. The magnitude of the difference between the
prices at the top of the order book is called the bid-ask spread. A limit order can be matched either partly
or entirely. If the limit order is not fully matched, it will remain active in the market until it is matched or
cancelled. Some execution constraints on limit orders have been defined for continuous intraday electricity
markets, for instance Fill or Kill (FOK) and Immediate or Cancel (IOC). With an FOK constraint, the entire
volume of the order will either be matched immediately after submission or cancelled right away. With an IOC
constraint, as much as possible of the order will be matched immediately after submission and the remaining
quantity will be cancelled instantly.
 Market order : participants submit a market order when they buy or sell a certain quantity at the best
available sell or buy price. Once a market order has arrived, it is matched instantly with the best available
price in the order book and trade occurs.
Table 5.1. Limit order book example
Bid Ask
time price quantity time price quantity
10:18 50 15 10:10 52 20
10:22 47 25 10:29 54 15
10:07 46 20 10:05 55 25
10:16 43 25 10:13 58 22
Limit orders remain in the order book until they are matched with a market order or cancelled.
As mentioned before, only a few European intraday markets such as the Iberaian (Spain and Portugal) and the
Italian markets are discrete auctions. The Iberian market is divided into 7 auctions with different gate-closure and
trading hours coverage. Pricing is based on the marginal pricing rule (Chaves-Ávila and Fernandes (2015)). Except
for these two mentioned markets, almost all other European intraday markets are continuous double auctions.
Elbas which is run by Nordpool spot AS is a good example of this type, and covers the Nordic and Baltic countries,
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Germany and the UK. Although Elbas covers many countries, the trading volume is relatively low. For instance,
only 8.3 Twh was traded on Elbas in 2018, which was just 0.02% of the total volume traded in the Nordpool
day-ahead market (Elspot). One possible reason for this low volume is that the installed capacity of intermittent
renewables is not very high in the countries covered by Elbas. In 2017, the combined capacity of wind turbines and
photovoltaic installations in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania amounted to 17.2
GW. For comparison, the capacity in Germany was nearly 97.4 GW (WindEurope (2017)).
The growth of the intermittent generation capacity has increased the importance of efficient intraday markets,
seeing that it becomes more challenging for market participants to be in balance after the closing of the day-ahead
market. Hence, there will be an increasing interest in trading in the intraday markets. It is a potential benefit for
both market participants and power systems that the network is in balance closer to the delivery time, in order
to reduce the need for reserves and associated costs. The European commission has established a target model to
integrate all intraday markets based on continuous trading. Therefore, the XBID project (cross-border intraday) was
launched to create a joint integrated intraday cross-zonal market. As mentioned in the XBID documents (NordPool
(2016a)) the main aims of integration are to promote effective competition and pricing, increase liquidity and enable
a more efficient utilization of generation resources across Europe.
This measure illustrates the importance of intraday markets in integrating renewables and therefore more in-
depth studies are required to analyze the best market design - auction, continuous or hybrid - and finds suitable
congestion management technique for the intraday market. Simulation is one of the key tools to imitate the
operation of continuous trading intraday market. Since none of the former electricity markets has been designed as
a continuous trading market, this topic is new for many power market experts. Even though the experiences gained
from the stock market, which uses the limit order book tool, can open new doors to electricity market experts, the
specific characteristics of power markets, like physical transmission network constraints, power plant and consumer
restrictions, etc. may limit the value of these experiences and call for specific adjustments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A comprehensive intraday electricity market literature review
is given in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3 the main reasons for participating in intraday markets will be discussed.
The research assumptions, the mathematical formulation and simulation of limit orders, market orders, matching
of orders, updating quantities for matched agents, etc., are represented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 introduces an
illustrative example and the results of the computational study. Corresponding insights and suggestions for future
research are explained in section 5.6. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the paper.
5.2 literature Review
The literature about intraday markets can be categorized into three main groups:
 Intraday prices
 Trading strategy of different types of market participants in the intraday market
 Modeling of intraday markets
Empirical or analytical analysis of intraday prices has evolved very rapidly over recent years. While Soysal
et al. (2017), Sekamane (2018), Panagiotelis and Smith (2008), Gürtler and Paulsen (2018), Hagemann (2013b),
Ziel (2017) and Karanfil and Li (2015) suggest time-series regression-based methods and Monteiro et al. (2016)
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and Kolberg and Waage (2018) utilize several kind of neural networks and deep learning techniques for forecasting
intraday prices, some other papers like Pape et al. (2016) and Kiesel and Paraschiv (2017) utilize the econometric
approaches to extract the relation between day-ahead, intraday and sometimes balancing market prices.
In some other studies various optimization approaches have been utilized by different types of market partic-
ipants so as to find their optimal bidding and trading strategies to operate in sequential markets. Löhndorf et al.
(2013), Braun (2016), Braun and Hoffmann (2016), Engmark et al. (2018), Engmark et al. (2017) develop bidding
strategies for hydropower or pumped storage technologies to optimize their dispatch in two-stage day-ahead and
intraday markets, while Vardanyan and Hesamzadeh (2017) suggest optimal coordinated bidding of a risk-averse
profit-maximizing hydropower producer in three-settlement day-ahead, intraday, and real-time markets. To the
best of our knowledge, Boukas et al. (2018) is the only paper that utilizes markov decision processes and deep
learning to find the optimal bidding strategy of a storage operator in a continuous trading intraday market. Since
one of the main reasons of designing a continuous trading intraday market is to facilitate trades for wind and solar
producers, many interesting studies have been done to suggest the optimal trading strategies for these intermittent
technologies. While Du et al. (2018) and Usaola and Moreno (2009) focus on the co-optimization of a wind pro-
ducer’s trading strategies in both day-ahead and intraday markets, Skajaa et al. (2015) and Garnier and Madlener
(2015) propose an efficient trading strategy to balance the forecast errors of wind producers in a continuous trading
intraday market.
In most papers on electricity intraday market design, the continuous double auction structure of this market
has not been paid much attention, and until recently, mathematical co-optimization of auction-based day-ahead
and intraday markets (and sometimes balancing market) were the predominant approach. For example, Abrell and
Kunz (2015) develop a rolling planning procedure in a stochastic electricity market setting to analyze the impact of
both uncertain wind generation as well as network constraints on the results of sequential markets. By modeling the
German power system, they illustrate how intermittent wind generation affects the flexibility providers’ dispatch
in an auction-based intraday market. More recents papers like Neuhoff et al. (2016a) and Neuhoff et al. (2016c)
empirically assess the hybrid intraday market design, which is based on the simultaneous operation of continuous
trading and several discrete auctions. In Neuhoff et al. (2016c) the effect of adding the 3 pm local auction (for
quarters in Germany in December 2014 at the European Power Exchange (EPEX SPOT)) to the current continuous
trading is investigated. They find that the additional auction enhances liquidity, and gives rise to higher market
depth and reduced price volatility. Neuhoff et al. (2016a) analyze how the various intraday market designs - one
or more auctions alongside or instead of continuous intraday trading - affect market efficiency. They conclude that
the introduction of intraday auctions entails the potential to support efficiency.
As mentioned before in Section 5.1, the limit order book is the tool for continuous trading intraday market
operations. The literature on limit order book modeling and trading strategies in stock market continuous double
auctions is more abundant than continuous intraday markets for electricity. Von Selasinsky (2016) reviewed the
related literature very comprehensively. Based on his classification, limit order books can be modeled either by
equilibrium or by stochastic models. The former approach is used to illustrate how the interaction of market agents
forms the prices, however the main disadvantage of this approach is that due to the anonymity of the agents, their
characteristics are not known. Hence, the parameters of such models are unobservable and this gives incomplete
intuition about the statistical properties of limit order books (Luckock et al., 2003). Stochastic modeling of order
book dynamics, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that the evolution of the order book is driven by
the collective behavior of all market participants not the individual ones. Therefore, most of the models in this
category (in stock market studies) are based on queueing techniques. Queueing behavior plays an important role in
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short-term market dynamics. Kiesel and Luckner (2018) is the only reference in the electricity continuous trading
intraday market subject that models market order arrivals by a stochastic process called Hawkes process. In markets
with a limit order book structure, the timing of order arrivals play a key role because these market orders are the
ones that may change the mid price and bid-ask spread. By empirical analysis, Kiesel and Luckner (2018) illustrate
that a Hawkes process with exponential baseline intensity and exponential excitement function is able to capture
the dynamics of market order arrivals very well.
Thus far, Von Selasinsky (2016) is the only and the most comprehensive reference in simulating continuous
trading intraday electricity markets. Since this reference is inspirational to many ideas mentioned in this paper, its
approach will be brifely summerized here. To find the initial point for the intraday market, the first step is to clear
the day-ahead market. The day-ahead result determines the dispatched and non-dispatched generators as well as
satisfied and unsatisfied consumers. The continuous structure of the intraday market is modeled by discrete time
steps; meaning that for a given hour in the future ten pre-defined time steps and thus ten possibilities to balance
forecast errors are considered. In other words, Von Selasinsky (2016) assumes that for each day-ahead clearing of a
future trading hour, the wind forecast can be updated ten times. At the first time step, market participants decide
to offer buy or sell order based on the results of the day-ahead market. Then, by a very innovative procedure, an
intraday offer pair (quantity,price) is calculated for each market participant. The resulting offers are utilized to
generate an order book for the first time step by sorting bids in descending and asks in ascending order with respect
to their price. Von Selasinsky (2016) also assumes that a central renewables manager (CRM) tries to balance the
cumulative forecast errors from all renewable producers. Therefore, when the limit order book is created, with
respect to the direction and the magnitude of the forecast error, the CRM decides to either sell or buy a quantity
and hence start to be matched with the highest priority orders from the limit order book. Next, the matched orders
will be stored and the position (quantities) of cleared market participants will be updated to be used for the next
time steps. A similar simulation procedure is repeated for nine more time steps when forecast errors are updated.
Even though Von Selasinsky (2016) made outstanding contributions to continuous trading simulation, especially
in calculating optimal price and quantity of orders submitted to the intraday market by different types of market
participants (generators and consumers), his model is still not able to capture the dynamic structure of entering
the orders, adding them to the list, matching, and many other characteristics of the limit order book. Moreover,
the forecast errors of all intermittent producers are balanced by a central manager and this authority, irrespective
of the submitted order prices, just try to trade the imbalance quantity after each updated forecast. Hence, firstly
each intermittent generator cannot decide for its own imbalances and secondly by this approach the CRM has to
balance forecast errors whenever it receives the updated information. So, no trade-off between risk and profit of
intermittent producers is allowed in this decision making process.
In this paper, in contrast to the very advanced price and quantity setting model devised by Von Selasinsky
(2016), very simplified assumptions are made on price and quantity decisions. Instead, I focus on the limit order
book modeling wherein market participants (they can be any type of intermittent and conventional generators,
elastic consumers and even financial traders) randomly (based on a uniform distribution) submit market or limit
orders with random quantities chosen from their residual capacity or cleared capacity (depending on ask or bid order
submission) and with their day-ahead marginal cost as the submitted price. The model is able to manage the order
arrivals, their addition to the list (as limit order) or matching them with the best available opposite order (market
order), store the matched trades, update the quantities of matched orders and lastly to accept part (or whole)
of matched orders to maintain the feasibility of the transmission network with respect to the nodal constraints
of the network. Hence, the procedure allows for taking into account congestion management by checking trades
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against available remaining capacity, and curtailing trades when the capacity is not sufficient. By this approach,
the stochastic process of order arrivals is still very simplified and independent of the current state of the limit order
book but it provides a solid fundamental model for the limit order book. Then the other characteristics of the limit
order book like dependence of order arrivals to the state of the limit order book, modeling intermittent entrance
by the time of receiving updated forecasts and advanced trading startegies of non-intermittent market participants
- like their decision to trade or not, submit ask or bid orders, and (quantity,price) pair decisions - can be attached
to the fundamental basis provided in this paper.
5.3 The reasons for participating in the intraday market and price
impacts
As I explained before, the intraday market lets market participants correct their day-ahead decision and adjust
their quantity and price appertaining to either their own deviations or new information extracted from the market.
In this section, several motivations for intraday market involvement will be discussed. Hagemann (2013b) studied
empirically the effect of diverse factors over intraday market prices which are reflecting the market participants
willingness to involve in this market. His hypothetical price determinants are:
1. Unplanned power plant outages
2. Forecast errors from intermittent renewable energy sources
3. Load forecast error
4. Cross-border trading
The empirical analysis on German data confirms that forecast errors from intermittent renewables, especially
wind, have the highest impact on the average price.
Neuhoff et al. (2016c) mention that in the case of power plant outages, which need large adjustments, market
participants are more willing to negotiate bilaterally. In this fashion, a buyer is allowed to identify its needs for
consecutive hours and the seller of (this large flexibility) is allowed to do more comprehensive adjustments of its
operational schedules, e.g. the start-up of new units. Therefore, in this paper we exclude the possibility of flexibility
trading owing to outages.
In the following subsections, it will be illustrated how prices and/or quantities submitted to the limit order
book are influenced by these elements.
5.3.1 Price setting decisions in the intraday market due to the intermittent genera-
tors’ forecast error
For better analyzing the intraday market, the day-ahead market results can be utilized. Figure 5.1 illustrates
conventional supply and demand curves for a given hour in the day-ahead auction. Since in the supply curve
the generators’ offers are ranked according to increasing prices, this curve is referred to as the merit order curve.
Renewables have a very low marginal cost. Hence, they are found at the bottom of the curve. Then respectively,







Figure 5.1. Day-ahead auction for a given hour (Von Selasinsky (2016))
The bids received from consumers are sorted descendingly (with respect to price). In uniform price markets, the
intersection of the supply and demand curves determines the clearing price. It is generally assumed that under full
competition, all market participants offer their true valuation which is the marginal cost of production for generators
and the willingness to pay for consumers. As can be seen from Figure 5.1, dispatched generators and satisfied
consumers are those accepted to produce and consume at the day-ahead clearing price. Generators/consumers
with offer prices above/below the clearing price are called non-dispatched generators/unsatisfied consumers. It is
assumed that all accepted and non-accepted day-ahead participants can take part in the intraday market. After
revealing the day-ahead market results, we can divide the market participants into two groups: Buyers (submit bid)
and sellers (submit ask) in the intraday market.
Dispatched generators sold in the day-ahead market, hence they are able to buy back quantities in the intraday
market by submitting a bid. Similarly, since unsatisfied consumers were not able to buy in the day-ahead market,
they can buy their required quantities in the intraday market by submitting a bid. Satisfied consumers bought in
the day-ahead market, thus they can sell the quantities they bought before by submitting an ask in the intraday
market. Finally, non-dispatched generators did not succeed in selling in the day-ahead market, therefore, the
intraday market provides a new opportunity to sell (ask).
Figure 5.2 demonstrates that by vertical rotation of the demand function around the day-ahead equilibrium,
dispatched generators and unsatisfied consumers can be grouped as bidders, while non-dispatched generators and
satisfied consumers are able to submit ask.
Now the question is how do market participants set the prices in a continuous intraday market? By submitting
the true valuation of the electricity bought or sold, which is called the indifference price, market participants would
not make a profit from the transaction, meaning that they are indifferent between staying in the current position
or changing this position. Nevertheless, the incentive to participate in the intraday market is to earn more profits
not just to be indifferent. Therefore, in a competitive continuous intraday market a profit-making strategy for
generators and consumers is to bid below their true valuation for quantities they buy and to ask above their true
valuation for quantities that they sell. It should be noted that the profit-making strategy should not be confused















Figure 5.2. Framework for analysing the intraday market (Von Selasinsky (2016))
errors from intermittent renewables is one of the main stimulating factors for other generators and consumers to
trade in the intraday market with the aim of profit increment.
If the output from renewables is underestimated, they are eager to sell electricity, and the market participants
on the left side of Q can submit bids to buy their quantities in the intraday market. In order to have a profitable
trade, the bidders have to bid below their day-ahead offer price (bid arrows in Figure 5.2). In this fashion, if the
bidder is a generator, it is able to get the quantities cheaper from the intraday market than from its self-production.
Similarly, for a consumer it is profitable to buy electricity when prices are below its willingness to pay.
Conversely, an overestimation of renewable outputs means that they have to buy the difference in the intraday
or balancing market. Thus, if the agents on the right side of Q ask above the price of their unsuccessful day-ahead
offer, not only their marginal cost is covered but also some profit is attainable. Satisfied consumers will only sell
the quantities they acquired in the day-ahead market if at least their true valuation is paid.
Thus far, we have mentioned that in the first order placements in the intraday market the buyers bid below
and the sellers ask above their marginal costs and willingness to pay. But the main feature of continuous trading is
to let market participants trade electricity for a given hour in the future multiple times. For instance, intermittent
renewables like wind generators may decide to react to updated forecasts whenever they get a new one. Then they
try to buy (in the case of overestimation) or sell (in the case of underestimation) electricity for a given hour in the
future. Hence, they provide this opportunity for other generators and consumers to modify their intraday decisions
in order to make more profit. Even though the possibility of trade among all market participants could exist,
the probability of this occuring is not very high. As an illustration, since a non-dispatched generator has higher
marginal cost than a dispatched one, its ask price is probably higher than the willingness to pay of a dispatched
generator.
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5.3.2 Intraday market trading for relieving congestion
Different congestion management approaches in day-ahead and balancing markets in European power markets
create inefficiencies within and between countries as follows:
 Within countries: As the network is simplified in the day-ahead market, the value of generation at differ-
ent locations is not recognized thoroughly by this market, resulting in gaming opportunities and inefficient
dispatch.
 Between countries: capacity allocation of transmission across zones is treated differently from intra-zonal
dispatch, which gives incomplete information on the state of the transmission network and usually ending up
with underutilization of the network.
Hence, if the EU commission, electricity regulatory forum or any other related political economics institutions
still put their foot down to operate simplified networks in the day-ahead market, there is still the possibility to
relieve congestion resulting from day-ahead schedules in the intraday market. In this paper, we suggest a congestion




In a limit order market, transaction prices are determined by the interaction of incoming orders with the current
state of the order book. So, in order to have a proper model of the price formation and stochastic properties of
prices, we need to have a better perception of this interaction.
Owing to the inherent complexity of limit order markets, developing a tractable model may be hindered by
many simplifying assumptions:
1. The arrival of orders of any type (bid, ask, limit order, market order) as well as the type of entrant agent
(generator or consumer) is based on simple uniform distribution in (0,1). If we want to see the relation between
incoming orders with the current state of the limit order book then we have to work on this assumption.
2. Market participants submit their (price,quantity) pair without using information about the current state of
the limit order book. This situation usually happens in very active markets in which the order book changes
before a reaction of an agent can be transmitted (which is not the case at least in current intraday markets).
Hence, by this assumption the expected order arrival rates will be independent of the order book state. In
the more advanced case, we need a self-exciting process to show that the market participants’ decisions are
not independent of the state of the limit order book, because they watch the current prices in the list, the
spread or average price, then decide to enter or wait and choose the (price,quantity) pair. It seems that a
Hawkes process is very suitable to model the self-exciting behavior of the limit order book. In this paper, the
dependence of order arrivals on the current state of the limit order book is relaxed and will be investigated
in future research.
3. The independence assumption let us assume that agents just submit their marginal cost (MC) or willingness
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to pay (MB) as the price, and quantities are determined randomly based on the agents’ available or cleared
capacity in previous trades. Hence, in this paper, I avoid to focus on the profit making strategies of agents
by finding optimal price and quantity values.
In general, these assumptions can be interpreted as a market with zero information flow.
5.4.2 Mathematical model
When a market participant submits an order, three important factors price, quantity and time must be
considered. Hence, an ordered triple x  ppx, qx, txq represents that an agent has submitted an order x with price
px, quantity qx at time tx to trade up to qx units at a price not lower than px to sell or not higher than px to buy.
The third assumption in Section 5.4.1 mentions that limit order prices are placed from a price set P 
tMCg1 ,MCg2 , ...,MCgG ,MBd1 ,MBd2 , ...,MBdDu. G and D are respectively the total number of generators and
consumers.
At time zero, the limit order book is empty. At time t, the state of the order book is kept track of with a
continuous time process Xptq  pXMCg1 ptq, ..., XMCgG ptq, XMBd1 ptq, ..., XMBdD ptqq, t ¥ 0, where | Xpptq | is the
number of limit orders at price p P P .
If Xpptq   0, then there are Xpptq bid orders at price p;
If Xpptq ¡ 0, then there are Xpptq ask orders at price p.
In the limit order markets, we are interested in the best bid and best ask prices stored in the order book. Lets
define pAptq as the lowest (i.e. best) ask price at time t:
pAptq Minptp P P | Xpptq ¡ 0u Y tpcapuq
And pBptq as the highest (i.e. best) bid price at time t:
pBptq Maxptp P P | Xpptq   0u Y t0uq
When the ask list in the order book is empty, an ask price of pcap (which is the market cap price) is forced and
when there is no bid order, a bid price of 0 is forced. Without loss of generality, we can assume that at any time t,
the order book consists of a queue of unexecuted sell orders with sorted prices α1ptq, α2ptq, ... and another queue of
unexecuted buy orders with sorted prices β1ptq, β2ptq, ... waiting to be matched with incoming orders. These prices
are actually reindexed such that α1ptq  pAptq and β1ptq  pBptq. Hence, the prices will satisfy the inequalities:
... ¤ β2ptq ¤ β1ptq   α1ptq ¤ α2ptq ¤ ...
Whenever a new order is submitted, the order book will be revised according to the following rules:
1. If the new order is a buy (bid) at the price pb and quantity qb, at time t, then:
 If pb ¥ pApt 1q, the new bid order becomes a market order and is immediately matched with the current
best ask (lowest ask). Then the matched price and quantity are:
pmatched  pApt 1q
qmatched Minpqb, qApt 1qq
Thus, the updated lowest ask price (in the case that the whole order quantity is not matched)
If qmatched  qb, then pAptq  pApt 1q
If qmatched  qApt 1q, then pAptq  the next lowest ask price in the list (α2ptq)
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 If pBpt  1q   pb   pApt  1q, then the new bid order will be a buy limit order which places at the top of
the bid list causing a change in the highest bid price at time t; pBptq  pb, qBptq  qb.
 If pb ¤ pBpt  1q, then the new bid order will be a buy limit order (and will be added to the bid list) but
will not change the highest bid price; pBptq  pBpt 1q
2. If the new order is a sell (ask) at the price pa and quantity qa at time t, then:
 If pa ¤ pBpt 1q, the new ask order becomes a market order and is immediately matched with the current
best bid (highest bid). Then the matched price and quantity are:
pmatched  pBpt 1q
qmatched Minpqa, qBpt 1qq
Hence, the new highest bid price is updated as follows:
If qmatched  qa, then pBptq  pBpt 1q
If qmatched  qBpt 1q, then pBptq  the next highest bid price in the list (β2ptq)
 If pBpt 1q   pa   pApt 1q, then the new ask order will be an ask limit order which places at the top of
the ask list causing a change in the lowest ask price at time t; pAptq  pa, qAptq  qa.
 If pa ¥ pApt 1q, then the new ask order will be an ask limit order (and will be added to the ask list) but
will not change the lowest ask price; pAptq  pApt 1q
In this paper, order arrivals are not only taken from a stochastic process but also the available/already cleared
capacity of market participants from the day-ahead market and previous intraday trades are considered to decide
about bid or ask order submissions. The details of the stochastic process will be explained in the simulation section.
5.4.3 Simulation of the continuous intraday market
Figure 5.3 demonstrates the simulation procedure of the continuous intraday market. The steps are as follows:
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Figure 1. Flowchart for intraday market simulation procedure
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fe z P Z (5.1d)
ATCe ¤ fe ¤ ATCe e P E (5.1e)
The objective function (5.1a) maximizes the social welfare of the power system. Cgpq
DA
g q and Bdpq
DA
d q show
the cost and benefit functions of generators and consumers, respectively. The constraint (5.1b) reflects the
production/consumption capacity constraints of generators and consumers or in general it can show any
constraint on market participants in the feasible region FRDA. NIz declares the net injection (outflow (if
NIz ¡ 0)/ net inflow (if NIz   0)) of power to zone z. The day-ahead power balance constraint at each zone
z P Z is demonstrated by equation (5.1c), meaning that production minus consumption with positive/negative
sign equals to the net outflow/inflow at each zone. Therefore, the shadow price λz of this equation is interpreted
as the day-ahead clearing price of zone z. Unlike nodal day-ahead market, just commercial flows which do
not reflect physical network constraints are modeled in the zonal day-ahead market. For every adjacent zones
which are connected by physical connections l, there exists a cross-border interface e P E which conveys
commercial flows between zones. Corresponding to each interface e, there is a flow pfeqePE . If ω0 and ω1 show
the starting and ending zones of interface e and fe ¡ 0, then it means that commercial flow is flowing from
ω0 to ω1. Constraint (5.5e) shows the cross-border trade capacities (ATC) over the cross-zonal interfaces.
Thus, the day-ahead dispatch model (5.1) can be elucidated as a partly network-constrained auction where
the cheapest generators and the consumers with the highest willingness to pay are cleared. Due to the network
simplification at day-ahead stage, most probably the day-ahead solution is not satisfied by the physical network
constraints and therefore is not a feasible initial trade for intraday market.
2. Day-ahead power flow: in order to have feasible trades in the intraday market, the system operator has to
















PTDFnl NIn l P L (5.2b)
| fl |¤ f
max
l l P L (5.2c)





d . Nodes of the network are connected by a set of physical transmission lines L. Corresponds to
each line l, there is a flow f  pflqlPL. To calculate the physical power flow over each line l, the PTDF-based
formulation (5.2b) can be utilized. PTDFnl is the power transfer distribution factor, which states how much
power flows through line l if 1 MW is injected in node n P N and is taken out in the reference node. By
inequalities (5.2c) flows are forced to be in the capacity limit of the lines. If the day-ahead schedule is not
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satisfying the power flow constraints (5.2c), then the congested lines must be saved and optimal curtailment
is done.
3. Day-ahead curtailment: we need to have a feasible flow before intraday trades occur. Because it is very
probable that a matched trade in the intraday market is totally curtailed due to the infeasibilities caused by
other market participants in the day-ahead stage. Thus, the transmission system operator (TSO) is running
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PTDFnl NIn l P L (5.3d)
| fl |¤ f
max
l l P L (5.3e)
0 ¤ qcurtg ¤ q
DA
g g P G (5.3f)
0 ¤ qcurtd ¤ q
DA
d d P D (5.3g)
The objective (5.3a) minimizes the total curtailment of the day-ahead quantities. It is assumed that all
generators and consumers have equal value of lost of generation and load, hence the weight of qcurtg and q
curt
d
is equal to 1. NIn in equation (5.3b) is the net injection of power into node n when the day-ahead solution is
curtailed. Equation (5.3c) guarantees that the sum of net injections over all nodes in a lossless system must be
equal to zero. Constraints (5.3d) and (5.3e) have the same interpretations as (5.2b) and (5.2c). Finally, (5.3f)
and (5.3g) guarantee that the curtailed quantities do not exceed the original production and consumption



















d  qd d P D (5.4b)
4. Intraday initialization: The updated feasible schedules qg and qd for all g and d are conveyed to the intraday
market. However, at the opening of the intraday market (for a specific delivery hour) the limit order book is
empty. If generators enter the intraday market, then they may submit part of their cleared (and curtailed)
quantity for buy and residual capacity (which equals to qfreeg ) for sell, while consumers may submit a portion
of their residual capacity qfreed for buy and cleared quantity qd for sell. Moreover, since at the beginning, the
limit order book is empty, I initialize the prices such that the ask price is set to the price cap and the bid
price is set to zero.
5. Random entrance: when the intraday market is opening, there could be several reasons (Section 5.3) for the
market participants to enter into the intraday market. This is the part that is difficult to model because we
have to model them based on the limit oreder book state. We have to make a chaos from the day-ahead
market. For example, a consumer may enter first because of a load forecast error, or a wind generator may
enter first because of the updated forecast it gets, but in all these cases it is important to consider what would
be their submitted price and quantity and how prices are evolving based on the latest information which
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is attainable from the limit order book. The orders can either enter at a constant rate (like in the Poisson
process) or be governed by an intensity function. However, in reality it is often known that the arrival of an
event increases the likelihood of observing events in the near future. An earthquake aftershock event is a very
good example for this type of events. It seems that a class of processes in which the arrival rate explicitly
depends on past arrivals is perfectly fitted to the limit order book model and the most well-known self-exciting
process is the Hawkes process. As explained in the second assumption in Section 5.4.1, in this paper it is
assumed that the order arrivals are independent of the state of the limit order book and the order arrival
is modeled by a very simple uniform distribution. A random number, rand ent, is picked up from (0,1). A
number less than 0.5 means that a generator enters while a number greater than 0.5 means that a consumer
enters to the intraday market.
6. Like in stage 5, a generator (rand g) or a consumer (rand d) is sampled uniformly at random, from the integers
1 to G or 1 to D and therefore, by assumption 3, its MC (for generator) or MB (for consumer) will be the
submitted price. Hence, in this paper the price submission is not in accordance with the ideas mentioned in
Section 5.3.1 and the optimal bidding of market participants to the intraday market is neglected.
7. As mentioned before, when an agent decides to submit an order in the intraday market, the pair (price,quantity)
must be submitted. The amount of residual capacity qfreeg (or q
free
d ) is a determining factor when submitting
bid or ask orders, and several cases may happen. For generators, if the residual capacity qfreeg is close to
zero (LB is equal to 5, meaning that all quantities in the limit (0,5) are considered as almost zero) then
g does not have any extra capacity to sell and the only option is to buy. Hence, any random number in
rLBB , UBBs  r5, qgs can be submitted as the bid order quantity. If q
free
g is close to the capacity limit (UB
is equal to qmaxg  5, meaning that all quantities in rq
max
g  5, q
max
g s are considered as quantities close to
capacity), it means that g has not sold anything yet, and if g decides to enter now, then the only option is
to sell. Thus, any random number in rLBA, UBAs  r5, q
max
g s can be submitted as the sell order quantity.
Finally, if the residual capacity qfreeg P p5, q
max
g  5q, then g can randomly decide to submit ask or bid orders.
8. After deciding on bid or ask orders, price and quantity submission, the procedure of matching or adding to
the list is exactly what is explained in Section 5.4.2. If matching occurs, then the opposite best order must be
updated, either deleted from the list or still stay in the list with updated quantity. Then the matched quantity
and their two related locations (nodes) in the network is sent to the TSO. The TSO checks the feasibility of




In this section, a small 6-node system is used to intuitively illuminate the main characteristics of the previously
discussed intraday market model.
Figure 5.4 depicts a 6-node system which consists of 6 nodes n P t1, ..., N  6u, 3 generators g P t1, ..., G  3u
placed respectively at nodes 1,2 and 5, 3 consumers d P t1, ..., D  3u located at nodes 3,4 and 6, and finally 8 lines
l P t1, ..., L  8u. The capacity of the lines is shown in the figure, and the reactance of every line is assumed to be






















Figure 5.4. 6-node network configuration
Data for the generators and consumers is collated in Table 5.2, where qmaxg and q
max
d are the generator g and
consumer d capacities . MCg is the marginal cost of production of generator g and MBd is the marginal benefit of
consumption of consumer d, which is assumed to be their offer price in the day-ahead as well as intraday market.








G1 12 450 D1 23 450
G2 20 350 D2 21 400
G3 17 400 D3 30 350
5.5.2 Day-ahead market results
In the day-ahead market, the zonal configuration with two zones and zero transmission capacity between them
is considered, meaning that ATC  0, which is the worst case with respect to considering the transmission limitation
between zones.
The day-ahead result along with the power flows over the physical lines - which are calculated with respect to
the day-ahead net injections at each node - is illustrated in Figure 5.5. As the result shows, the day-ahead market
culminates in an infeasible network solution due to the violation of lines l13 and l46 capacity constraints. Therefore,
for the purpose of having feasible trades before the intraday market, the day-ahead result has to be curtailed by
curtailment problem (5.3) to reach a feasible solution. The day-ahead curtailed solution is depicted in Figure 5.6.
Hence, thus far a feasible starting point for the intraday market is extracted and the corresponding social surplus
equals to 7713 e.
5.5.3 Continuous intraday trading environment
At the beginning of the intraday market, the limit order book is empty. Assume that after a while, D1 decides
to enter (as mentioned before, the reason for D1’s participation is not paid attention to here, however in a more





















































































Figure 5.6. Day-ahead curtailed result
As Figure 5.6 demonstrates, D1 is assigned to consume 300 MW after the day-ahead curtailment, hence its
available capacity is equal to 150 MW. D1 can submit both ask and bid orders. Without knowing the reason of its
participation, we assume that D1 submits an ask order with price equal to its willingness to pay, which is 23, and
a random quantity from (0,300), because submitting an ask means that D1 wants to decrease its consumption by
selling part of the 300 MW that had been cleared before.
Then as a second entrant, D2 enters by submitting a bid order with price equal to 21 and a random quantity
from (0,350), meaning that it wants to increase its consumption from 50 MW.
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Figure 5.11. Power flows after first matching
129
(it does not have an option to submit an ask, because it sold all its capacity in the day-ahead market, therefore if
it decides to trade, the only possibility is just to submit a bid). Then it submits a bid with price 17 and random
quantity 382 from the interval (0,400). Since its offered price is 17, which is lower than the highest bid price, G3’s
order is placed in the second priority after D2’s order, and still 21 is the highest bid price.
If G2 enters as a fourth entrant by submitting an ask order with price of 20 and a random quantity from
(0,350), since the asked price of the new arrival is lower than the current highest bid (which is 21), then matching
occurs between G2 and D2. The matched price and quantity are respectively 21 and 31. Thus, G2 is removed from
the ask list while D2 can stay in the bid list with a price and quantity pair of (21,174), or it can be cancelled after
matching, in which case the highest bid price goes down from 21 to 17 and the spread increases.
After each matching, the power flows over the physical lines can be calculated and in the case of violation,
a partial or full curtailment of the matched trade can be done by the system operator. The Latest power flows
after adding the new matched trade is shown in Figure 5.11. None of the lines are violated, so no curtailment is
needed, and the updated quantities are qG2  31 and qD2  81. By this trade the social surplus is raised by 31e
(p21 20q  31) and the total reaches 7744e.
Now, the simulation procedure is used to compare the two following cases:
 Lower number of entrances: it is assumed that 200 entrances occur which means that on average an entrance
occurs every 7 minutes. Then, in total, the intraday market trades raise the social surplus by 461e and the
total social surplus of the day-ahead and intraday market reaches 8174e.
 Higher number of entrances: it is assumed that 1000 entrances occur which means that on average an entrance
occurs every 1.5 minutes. Then, in total, the intraday market trades raise the social surplus by 754e and the
total social surplus of the day-ahead and intraday market reaches 8467e.
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If ν0 and ν1 show the starting and ending nodes of line l and fl ¡ 0, then it means that power is flowing from ν0
to ν1. Optimal nodal power flow result is depicted in Figure 5.12. The best possible social surplus can be achieved
by the nodal result which is equal to 8912.5e.
An interpretation of these results demonstrate that if it was an aim to utilize the continuous trading intraday
market to resolve congestion issues, then a very liquid market is needed but still the optimal nodal solution will not


















































































Figure 5.12. Optimal nodal power flow result
5.6 Suggestions for future research
With a fundamental basis for a continuous trading model, there are many possibilities to develop the model
further to analyze specific issues in a continuous trading environment. Some examples are given in the next two
sections.
5.6.1 Model intermittent producers entrance into the intraday market
The reasons for participating in the intraday market is mentioned in Section 5.3 but it has not been explicitly
modeled in this paper. An obvious reason for trading in intraday market is updated forecasts for intermittent
generation sources. Among the few references that suggest optimal trading strategies for wind producers in intraday
markets, Garnier and Madlener (2015)’s method considers the continuous structure of the intraday market in the
best way. They formulate an intraday bidding strategy for wind and solar producers to maximize the value of trade
under price uncertainty and production forecast error. Whenever an intermittent producer receives an updated
forecast for delivery hour t, it can either decide to trade immediately or postpone it to the next trade window
of updated forecasts. Their method combines the trade value concept with an option valuation and dynamic
programming to optimize quantity and timing decisions of an intermittent producer to balance their updated
forecast errors. The main important issue related to the intermittent producers’ participation in the intraday
market is their price submission with respect to the fact that their marginal cost is almost zero. The output of
the Garnier and Madlener (2015) model is also just the ”optimal quantity” and ”trade/or not trade” decision at
the time of receiving an updated forecast. This suggests that intermittent producers can just submit ”market
order” not ”limit order”. In other words, if the result of the Garnier and Madlener (2015) model says that trade
is valuable now, the intermittent producer submits a market order, otherwise no action is taken. As mentioned
before, in market orders an entrant agent’s quantity is just matched with the current best limit orders and no price
is submitted. Thus, the price setting issue for intermittent generators can be solved by this suggestion.
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5.6.2 Model conventional producers’ and consumers’ entrance into the intraday mar-
ket
As mentioned in Section 5.6.1, intermittent producers can just submit market orders. Therefore, before their
first entrance there must be other agents like non-dispatched generators and unsatisfied consumers in the day-ahead
market that are flexible enough to participate in the intraday market with limit orders. The method suggested
by Von Selasinsky (2016) calculates the optimal offer prices based on the trade-off between profit and risk for
conventional power plants, as well as elastic consumers. Even though he did not model the order arrivals by
stochastic processes, for price-setting decisions he utilizes all available information from the open order book to
model the success of trade probability.
5.7 Conclusion
The simulation of the continuous trading intraday market (limit order book) could help to analyze different
characterisitics of this market. For example, it can help market participants to test their trading strategies with
different risk preferences to compare their performance with volume weighted average price and adopt their optimal
level of risk and therefore maximize their expected profit. It also helps market participants, especially the flexible
producers, to test their automated trading strategy softwares and check their arbitrage opportunities that may arise
in the limit order book.
Moreover, it is helpful for market designers and regulators to measure the usefulness of the market with market
depth which is the quantity of electricity that is offered at certain prices at given times. The higher is the market
depth, the more of the available flexibility is directly offered to the market and the more likely it is that renewables
decide to balance their forecast errors in the intraday market. By having access to a market simulator, market
designers can also measure market liquidity which is the volume of transactions in the market. By assuming the
other factors equal, the higher market liquidity increases the possibility of finding a trading partner. It is also
possible to test various congestion management techniques.
The fundamental basis for simulating the limit order book suggested in this paper combined with ideas men-
tioned in Garnier and Madlener (2015) and Von Selasinsky (2016) can lead us towards a full simulation of continuous
trading intraday market in a more realistic context.
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Weber, A. and Schröder, S. (2011). Efficiency of continuous double auctions in the electricity market. In Energy
Market (EEM), 2011 8th International Conference on the European, pages 87–92. IEEE.
Weber, C. (2010). Adequate intraday market design to enable the integration of wind energy into the european
power systems. Energy Policy, 38(7):3155–3163.
WindEurope (2017). Wind in power. http://windeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/files/about-wind/
statistics/WindEurope-Annual-Statistics-2017.pdf. Online; accessed 18.11.2019.
WindEurope (2019). Wind energy in europe in 2018. https://windeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/files/
about-wind/statistics/WindEurope-Annual-Statistics-2018.pdf. (accessed 18.09.2019).
Wu, F. F. and Varaiya, P. (1999). Coordinated multilateral trades for electric power networks: theory and imple-
mentation. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 21(2):75–102.
Ziel, F. (2017). Modeling the impact of wind and solar power forecasting errors on intraday electricity prices. In
2017 14th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM), pages 1–5. IEEE.
139
